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SUMMARY
This thesis examines the construction and articulation of diasporic cultural ident4y among
Turkish male hip-hop youth living in Kreuzberg, Berlin. The research reflects upon the
narratives and life-worlds of two predominantly male youth groups, whose 'habitats of
meaning' are primarily defined by the ethnic enclave in which they are living. The research
strategy mainly involves qualitative research techniques such as 'rapport', 'in-depth
interviews' and 'semi-structured interviews', and attempts to go beyond the dichotomy of
'objectivism' and 'subjectivism' by combining the two in a hybrid form.
The main assumption of this study is that Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youngsters have
recently developed a politics of diaspora to cope with their structural outsiderism in their
country of settlement. The social and cultural space created by Turkish migrants and their
descendants in Kreuzberg, or in what they call 'Little Istanbul', constitutes a diasporic
space which provides the modem diasporic subject with a syotholic bridge between the
diaspora and their homeland. In this diasporic space, they tend to gain an 'imagined sense
of belonging' to their homeland Turkey, which has been 'deferred' as a spiritual, cultural
and political metaphor, on the other hand, conversely they also develop a strong sense of
homing to the 'Turkified' Kreuzberg.
Besides shedding light on the notion of diasporic identity, this study also attempts
to underline two major constituents shaping diasporic cultural identity, namely
globalisation and cultural bricolage. Modern diasporic identity is constructed and
articulated through means of globalisation. The growth of modern communication and
transportation networks such as TV channels, video tapes, newspapers, internet facilities
and charter flights has facilitated and increased the pace of communication between
Germany and Turkey. In consonance with this, the diaspora has infiltrated the homeland,
and the homeland infiltrated the diaspora. Transnational connections with homeland, other
members of diaspora in various geographies, and/or with a world-political force (such as
Islam) break the binary relation of minority conamunities with majority societies as well as
strengthening their claims against an oppressive national hegemony.
Modem means of globalisation have not only brought the homeland closer to the
diaspora, but also erased the distance between the diasporic subject and the external world.
Modern networks of globalisation have provided Berlin-Turkish youth with an opportunity
to incorporate themselves into different global cultural streams such as hip-hop culture. In
the context of Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth, what emerged out of these transnational links
is a syncretic form of minority youth culture, or 'third culture'. This 'third culture' is a
bricolage in which elements from different cultural traditions, sources and social discourses
are continuously intermingled with and juxtaposed to each other.
This work also investigates the transformation of political participation strategies
which Turkish migrants in Berlin have developed since the beginning of the migratory
process in 1961. So far, there have been two principal strategies, namely a migrant strategy
and a minor4y strategy. Both strategies developed along ethnic lines partly due to the
exciusionist incorporation regimes of the Federal Republic of Germany vis-â-vis' migrants.
Yet, recently diasporic consciousness seems to be replacing, or at least, supplementing the
migrant and minority strategies.
The work concludes that the politics of diaspora is grounded on different
antithetical forces such as past/present, here/there, 'tradition'/'translation' and locaVgloba].
In this sense, modern diasporic identity conveys an identity which is not a fixed, essentialist
and authorised totality, but which is always in a constant process of change and
transformation.
x
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GLOSSARY*
Alem: Universe, world; having parties with friends.
Alemci: Someone who has amusing parties with his/her friends.
Alevisin: Anatolian version of Shllsm, but it is a more hybrid form of belief
consisting of many different rituals and religious undertones such as Sufism,
Shamanism, Christianity, Judaism as well as Islam. Turkish Alevis used to be
concentrated in central Anatolia, with important pockets throughout the Aegean
and Mediterranean coastal region and the European part of Turkey. Kurdish
Ale vis were concentrated in the north-western part of the Kurdish settlement zone
between Turkish Kurdistan and the rest of the country. Both Turkish and Kurdish
Ale vis have left their isolated villages for the big cities of Turkey and Europe since
1950s.
Alinanci, Almanyali: German-like; stereotypical definition of German-Turks in
Turkey. The major Turkish stereotypical images of German-Turks are those of
their being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in Germany, losing
their Turkishness, and becoming more and more German.
Arabesk: It is mostly known as a music style which is composed of western and
oriental instruments with an Arabic rhythm. This syncretic form of music has
always borrowed some instruments and beat of the traditional Turkish folk music.
The main characteristic of arabesk music is the fatalism, sadness and pessimism of
the lyrics and rhythm. It also corresponds to a fatalistic and pessimistic life style
which emerge in the urban spaces of Turkey.
* Italic words in the glossary are Turkish.
xu
Auslanderberauftragte: Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs
Auslandergesetz: Foreigners' law in Germany.
Auslanderliteratur: Foreigners' literature in Germany.
Aussiedler: Ethnic Germans who repatriate from Eastern Europe; resettlers.
Baglaina: A musical instrument having a guitar-like body, long, and strings, that
are plucked or strummed with the fingers or a plectrum.
I3erufschule: Vocational schools
Bombing: A hip-hop term which refers to the tagging and/or painting of several
locations in one go.
Duglin: Wedding ceremony
Efes: Popular Turkish bier.
Gastarbeiter: Guest worker.
Gesamtschule: Comprehensive school; grades 5-13.
Grundschule: Primary school; grades 1-6
Gurbet: An Arabic word which derives from garaba, to go away, to depart, to be
absent, to go to a foreign country, to emigrate, to be away from one's homeland,
to live as a foreigner in another country.
Gurbetci: Someone who is in gurbet.
Gymnasium: Academic secondary school; grades 5-13
Hauptschulç: Lower secondary school; grades 5-9 (or 10)
Hemsehri: Fellow villager.
Imbiss: German word for 'döner kebab' kiosk.
Isyan inuzigi: Rebellion music, protest music.
xJn
Kanak Sprak: A creole language spoken and written by the working-class
German-Turkish youth.
Kanak: Turkish vernacular of the German word kanake, which is an offensive
word used by the right wing Germans to identify the Africans.
Lander: The 16 constituent political-administrative units of the Federal Republic
of Germany.
Mithurger: Fellow citizen.
Oberschule: Grammar school; grades 5-13
Raid: Popular Turkish alcoholic beverage, made of grape and aniseed.
Realschule: Intermediate secondary school; grades 5-10
Sila: Home
Sonderschule: A different kind of primary school with specialist classes for
children with 'learning difficulties'; grades 1-9
Sunni: The dominant school in Islam religion.
Tagging: A pseudonym signature usually in one colour marker pen or spray can.
Ubersiedler: East Germans who migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany
during the Cold War.
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INTRODUCTION
Bu dunyada beraberce yasiyoruz
Dogu ye batiyi birlestiriyoruz
Sinirlari asiyoruz
KültUrler kaynasiyor
Birbirini tamarnliyor.
We live together on planet earth,
and if we want to grow in peace
We need to erase our borders,
share our rich cultures.
Yes, connect and blend the West with the East.
Azize-A	 Azize-A1
In her rap song 'Bosporus Bridge', the Berlin-Turkish rapper Azize-A, attempts
to locate the descendants of Turkish migrants in a hybrid space where cultural
borders blend, where the periphery meets the centre, and where the West merges
with the East. She perceives these transparent cultural border crossings as sites of
creative cultural production, not as what Renato Rosaldo (1989: 208) calls
'empty transitional zones'. So far, Turkish immigrants in Germany have been
regarded by most Turkish and German scholars as culturally invisible because they
were no longer what they once were and not yet what they could become. Only
recently some scholars have begun to inquire into the creative character and
potential of newly-emerging syncretic cultures.
We can identify three stages in the studies on Turkish migrants in
Germany. In the early period of migration in the sixties, the syncretic nature of
existing migrant cultures was not of interest to scholars analysing the situation of
Turkish Gastarbeiter (guest worker) in Germany. The studies carried out during
Orientation (1997). Bosporus Bridge. Berlin: GGM Orient Express. The project of
'Orientation' run by the Oriental Express, is a mix of 'oriental hip-hop' and 'arabesk
soul'. It aims to introduce an amalgamation of various musical forms to the Berlin
audience. The translation of this song was made by Meryl Prettyman. The English
translations of all the other Turkish rap songs in the thesis were made by myself.
this period were mainly concerned with economics and statistics, 'culture' and the
dreams of return (cf., interalia, Abadan, 1964; Castles and Kosack, 1973). As
Ayse caglar (1994) has rightfully stated, the reason behind this neglect is twofold.
First, at the beginning of the migration process, Turkish workers were
demographically highly homogenous, consisting of either single males or females,
and were not visible in the public space. Second, workers in this period were
considered temporary, and they themselves regarded their situation as such
(caglar, 1994: 16-17).
The end of recruiting foreign labour to Germany in 1973 and the
beginning of family reunion mark the beginning of the second stage. The number
of studies on Turkish migrants' culture increased with the visibility of Turkish
migrants becoming more evident in the public space after the family reunification.
Faced with the choice of leaving Germany without a possibility of returning, most
migrants decided to stay in Germany for the time being and were joined by their
families. The transformation from being a rotatable workforce to becoming
increasingly settled went hand in hand with the emergence of community
structures (development of ethnic small business, sport clubs, religious
organisations and meeting places) which made Turkish migrants more visible to
the German populations. Furthermore, the rising presence of non-working
dependants, women and children, necessitated the provision of some basic social
services, such as education and housing. Against this background, studies of this
period concentrated on the reorganisation of family, parent-child relationships,
integration, assimilation and acculturation of migrants to German culture (cf.,
interalia, Abadan-Unat, 1985; Nauck, 1988; Kagitçibasi, 1987). The key words in
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these studies were 'cultural conflict', 'culture shock', 'acculturation',
'inbetweenness' and 'identity crisis'.
The third stage -starting in the nineties- is characterised by a wide
diversity of approaches. In this last stage, questions pertaining to the relationship
between structure and agency, and interest in cultural production have come to
the fore. Studies have dealt with such questions concerning citizenship,
discrimination and racism, socio-economic performance and increasingly with the
emergence of diasporic networks as well as cultural production (cf., interalia,
caglar, 1994; Mandel, 1996; Schwartz, 1992; Zaimoglu, 1995).
The following study is critical of conventional approaches that followed a
holistic notion of culture. Rather than reducing Turkish-German youth culture to
the realms of 'ethnic exoticism', this work claims to be evolving around the notion
of cultural syncreticism, or bricolage, which has become the dominant paradigm in
the study of transnational cultures and modern diasporas. The formation and
articulation of the German-Turkish hip-hop youth culture will be investigated
within the concept of cultural bricolage. The main framework of such an
investigation should consist of the question of 'how those youngsters see
themselves': as 'Gastarbeiter' (guest worker), immigrant, 'gurbetci' (in exile),
caught 'betwixt and between', as with no culture to call their own, or as agents
and avant-garde of new cultural forms.
Research Framework and Interest
As I began to search the Turkish diasporic youth in Berlin, my attention often
wandered to some more particular aspects of diasporic youth culture. I became
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fascinated with the hip-hop youth culture, undoubtedly because hip-hop has
represented an adequate model of cultural bricolage and diasporic consciousness.
This thesis focuses on the processes of cultural identity formation among the
Turkish male hip-hop youth living in Kreuzberg, Berlin. The main assumption of
this thesis is that Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth has developed a politics of
diaspora to tackle exclusion and discrimination in their country of settlement. As a
response to those boundaries that have been erected to keep them apart from the
majority German society, these youngsters have created symbolic boundaries
based upon parental, local and global cultures that mark their uniqueness.
Apparently, these symbolic boundaries have been created through diasporic
networks and modern means of communication and transportation.
The politics of diaspora is a product of exclusionist strategies of
'differential incorporation' (Rex, 1994) applied by the Federal Republic of
Germany vis-à-vis migrants. The politics of diaspora, which I shall call in the
following chapters diasporic consciousness, or diasporic identity, is comprised of
both particularist and universalist constituents. The particularist components
consist of an attachment to homeland, religion and ethnicity and provide these
youngsters with a network of solidarity and a sense of confinement. The
universalistic constituents include various aspects of global hip-hop culture such
as rap, graffiti, breakdance and 'cool' style; they equip the youngsters with those
means to symbolically transcend the discipline and power of the nation-state and
to integrate themselves into a global youth culture. In this sense, the notion of
modem diaspora, as I shall suggest in the following chapters, appears to be a
useful concept for the study of contemporary labour migrants and their
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descendants: it embraces and conceptualises two of the main antithetical forces
that characterise modern times, namely localism and globalism.
My main interest lies upon the creation of diasporic cultural identities
amongst the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth in Kreuzberg, Berlin. I am not
concerned with generalised external pronouncements about the 'problems' or
'crises' of Turkish identity, but focus on the form and content of these identities
as they are experienced in everyday life. In doing so, I try to move away from a
predominantly macro-structural approach, in which Turkish youth constitutes a
social category considered only in its relation to institutions.
The research for this work has been carried in a Turkish enclave.
However, it does not claim to shed light on the situation of all youngsters living
in this enclave. In this sense, my work is rather illustrative, not representative.
Various other youth groups such as Islamic youth, middle-class youth and Ale vi
youth will be touched upon in order to gain deeper analytical insights to
understand the distinct situation of Turkish hip-hop youth. Far from constituting a
culture of despair and nihilism, I intend to demonstrate that Turkish hip-hop
youths are concerned with the construction of new cultural alternatives, in which
identity is created and re-created as part of an ongoing and dynamic process. By
focusing on a specific group of Turkish youths, I seek to compose an alternative
picture of Turkish youth, commonly portrayed as destructive Islamic
fundamentalist and problematic (Der Spiegel 1997; Focus 1997; Heitmeyer,
1997).
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Flagging up the notions of cultural bricolage, diasporic consciousness and
globalisation, my research draws from and contributes to the fields of migration
studies, 'race' and ethnic relations and, in particular, the recently emerging studies
on diaspora (cf., interalia, Clifford, Hall, Gilroy, Cohen, Vertovec). The growing
research on transnational migrant communities and their descendants suggests that
the notion of diaspora can be considered an intermediate concept between the
local and the global, thus transcending narrow and limited national perspectives.
The material analysed in this study provides further evidence that the
contemporary notion of diaspora is a beneficial concept in order to study the
formation and articulation of the cultural identity among lransnational
communities.
Much of the current research on the Turkish migrants and their
descendants in Germany has focused on socio-economic issues, emphasising their
labour relations, residential patterns and 'acculturation' difficulties. No research
has yet been undertaken to explore the formation and articulation of both cultural
identity and political participation strategies among German-Turks, based on the
notion of diaspora. One of the central claims here is that working-class Turkish
hip-hop youth culture in Berlin can adequately display how cultural bricolage is
formed by the diasporic youth in coffision, negotiation and dialogue with the
parental, 'host' and global cultures. The idea of cultural bricolage, thus,
contravenes those problematic terms such as 'deculturated', 'inbetween' and
'degenerated', attributed to the German-Turkish youth.
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In addition to being an investigation into how the diasporic
consciousness and cultural bricolage have been constructed and articulated by
Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth, this is also a study about how the Berlin-Turks,
those allegedly least autonomous and influential actors of the German social
system, have over time developed two major strategies for political participation:
a migrant strategy and a minority strategy. These political participation strategies
have been built up by migrants along ethnic lines as a response to the exciusionist
and segregationist regimes of incorporation applied by the Federal Republic of
Germany vis-d-vis migrants. Migrant strategy was formed at the beginning of the
migratory process as a need to cope with the destabiising effects of migration.
Minority strategy, on the other hand, emerged sometime after the family reunion
started and the labour recruitment ceased in 1973. While the former strategy was
based on a non-associational community formation, ethnic enclave, hemsehri
bonding, and a Gastarbeiter ideology (see Chapter 2), the latter was based on the
idea of permanent settlement and the discourses of culture and community.
Shedding light upon these two strategies, my work will also demonstrate how the
modern diaspora discourse appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing,
these ethnic strategies.
Before describing the details of my field research in Berlin, let me briefly
touch upon some of the terms I will be using in the thesis. The terms such as
Turkish hip-hop youth and/or Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth, which I will
interchangeably use throughout the thesis, primarily refer to the working-class
male Turkish diasporic hip-hop youth. Hip-hop in general has its roots in urban
American ghettos and represents a form of youth culture that expresses the anger,
7
visions and experiences of black and/or Latino 'underclass' youngsters. Although
there are some successful female hip-hoppers such as Queen Latifah and Sister
Souljah, hip-hop remains a predominantly male domain. Against this background,
I choose to focus in my research on male, working-class youngsters. During the
course of my research, I did, however, meet and converse with a number of
Turkish women hip-hoppers, who provided a valuable insight into their experience
both as a comparison with, and contrast to, the experience of Turkish men.
Clearly, an analysis of female hip-hoppers is necessary in the future in order to
gain a fuller picture on cultural forms created by diasporic youth.
A separate note is also needed for the contextual use of the term
'German-Turk' in this work. The notion of German-Turk is neither a term used by
the descendants of Turkish migrants to identify themselves, nor is it used in the
political or academic debate in Germany. I use the term German-Turk in the
Anglo-Saxon academic tradition to categorise diasporic youths; the term
attributes a hybrid form of cultural identity to those groups of young people.
There is no doubt that political regimes of incorporation applied to the immigrants
in Germany are very different from those in the United States and England.
Accordingly, unlike Italian-American or Chinese-British, Turks have never been
defined as German-Turks or Turkish-German by the official discourse. They have
rather been considered apart. That is why, practically, it does not seem
appropriate to call the Turkish diasporic communities in Germany 'German-
Turks'. Yet, it is a helpful term for my purposes for two reasons: the term
distances the researcher from essentialising the descendants of the transnational
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migrants as 'Turkish'; furthermore it underlines the transcultural character of
these youths.
The Universe of the Research
The main body of my research took place among three separate youth groups in
Berlin. Two of the groups are located in the Turkish ethnic enclave in Kreuzberg
362 ,
 spending their leisure time in two different youth centres. The first one, which
was the focus of my research, is called Naunyn Ritze Kinder & Jugend
Ki1turzentrum located in Naunynstrasse. The second one is the Chiv Jugend,
Kultur & Kommunikationzentrum located in Reichenbergerstrasse. Both centres
are quite close to each other, so that the youth workers and some of the
youngsters are in contact. Both centres are financed by local organisations and
Kreuzberg municipality.
The third youth group is comprised of a group of youngsters living
mostly outside Kreuzberg and attending gymnasium. These middle-class Turkish
youths were approached in order to build, by way of contrast, a fuller view of the
life worlds of the working-class Turkish hip-hop youngsters, and to indicate the
heterogeneity of the Turkish diasporic communities. Inclusion of the middle-class
Turkish youth will also provide us with a ground where we can more precisely
2 The number 36 refers to one of the pre-reunification postal area codes of the Kreuzberg
district which is densely populated by Turkish migrants. Kreuzberg 36 comprises the
three U-Ba/rn stations Kottbusser Tor, Gärlitzer Bahnhof and Schlesisches Tor.
Kreuzberg 36 can be defined as a Turkish ethnic 'enclave', not a 'ghetto'. Peter Marcuse
(1996) describes enclaves as 'those areas in which immigrants have congregated and
which are seen as having positive value, as opposed to the word "ghetto", which has a
clearly pejorative connotation'. In this sense, enclaves refer to symbolic walls of
protection, cohesion and solidarity for immigrants and ethnic minorities. Kreuzberg as an
ethnic enclave is rather different from the those black and Hispanic ghetto examples in the
United States, where the poor, the unemployed, the excluded and the homeless are most
frequently concentrated.
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differentiate between the strategies of cultural identity formation undertaken by
various Turkish youth groups in the diaspora. In what follows, I shall briefly
describe these groups.
Naunyn Ritze Youth Centre
Naunyn Ritze youth centre is situated in Naunynstrasse a street which is
predominantly inhabited by the Turkish migrants originating from the eastern rural
parts of Turkey (see Chapter 3). The centre is run by the Kreuzberg municipality
and a Kreuzberg neighbourhood organisation, Mixtur 36 e. v. The main activities
in the centre are breakdance, capoeira (Brazilian dance), mountain climbing,
graffiti, painting, photography, body building and taekwondo. The Turkish
youngsters in the centre, who number between forty-five and fifty, are mainly
involved in breakdance, graffiti, painting, body building and taekwondo. Some of
them have won many prizes in Berlin's breakdance and graffiti competitions. The
other activities are dominated mostly by Germans. The centre is open from
Tuesday to Saturday between 15.00 and 22.00 hours. The proportion of girls and
boys coming to the centre is almost equal. There is a café in the centre where the
youngsters usually congregate; in addition, the girls have a separate room for
themselves.
The centre employs approximately ten youth workers, three of whom are
Berlin-Turks. The youth workers have the controlling power over the youngsters.
There is some tension between the German youth workers and the Turkish
youngsters, and the Turkish youth workers, Neco (25), Elf (25) and Ibo (28), try
to absorb this tension since they are more respected by their co-ethnic youngsters.
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Incidentally, the presence of the Turkish female youth worker, Elif, encourages
the Turkish girls to come to the centre and to become involved in the activities.
Naunyn Ritze is the most popular centre for Turkish minority hip-hop
youth. This is the centre where the previously active 36rs and 36 Boys gangsta
groups, and the local rap group Islamic Force, which I shall examine more fully in
Chapter 6, originated. It is also the place where interested parties of the German
media come in order to collect trendy material on Turkish hip-hop youth culture.
There is always American music in the background. It is the head youth worker,
Peter, who decides which music to play, not the youngsters. Yet, the girls and
boys, when they meet up in their private rooms in the centre, prefer listening to
Turkish arabesk, Turkish folk music, Turkish pop music and Islamic Force (see
Chapter 6). Arabesk, hip-hop, Turkish folk music and Turkish pop music are
respectively the most popular types of music amongst the youngsters. The
pessimism of arabesk, the romance of the Turkish pop, and the 'coolness' of rap
match the feelings they have. They call arabesk 'isyan miizigi' (rebeffion music).
Arabesk is a protest style of music in itself, but it has always had a passivist beat
and a pessimist content which leads to what Adorno (1990/1941: 312) called
'rhythmic obedience' (see Chapter 6).
The youngsters in Naunyn Ritze are mainly Ale vis (see Chapter 3) -few
Sunnis-, and their parents migrated mostly from the eastern parts of Turkey. This
group is a relatively homogenous group in terms of ethnicity compared to the
other two youth groups examined in this study.
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Chip Youth Centre
Chip is located in Reichenbergerstrasse, a Street which is situated on the other
side of the Kotbusser Tor U-Bahn station and which is inhabited by mixed ethnic
dwellers such as Turkish, Lebanese, Yugoslavian and German (see Chapter 3). It
is also administered by the municipality. Activities in the centre include music,
graffiti, photography and computing. It is smaller than Naunyn Ritze: there are
only five youth workers, none of whom are Turkish. The research was carried out
with approximately twenty Turkish youngsters. The centre is mostly dominated by
Turkish and Lebanese male youngsters. Turkish girls participate only in the
vocational training activities, and rarely spend their spare time in the centre's café.
In these respects, Chit is quite different from Naunyn Ritze.
It seems that the controlling power resides in the hands of the male
youngsters, especially of the Turks. There is always a tension between the youth
workers and the youngsters; even I, myself, could feel this tension during the
course of my research. Furthermore, the relations between the Turkish and Arabic
youths are problematic and sometimes violent. I have been told by the youngsters
and the youth workers that a Turkish youngster was killed by an Arab in front of
the centre three years ago. Thus the tension between the groups has continued
since. It should be noted that Ch4v is another important centre like Naunyn Ritze:
Chiv has previusly been a meeting place for one of Berlin's gangsta groups -the
Fatbacks, a group that was mostly composed of Turkish and Arab youngsters.
Tension between the Naunyn Ritze boys and Chiv boys still exist, however
sometimes alliances are formed to fight against other Arab or German youngsters.
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The Turkish youngsters coming to the centre are mainly Sunnis. Their
parents originate from various regions in Turkey. It is a more heterogeneous
centre in terms of parental origins. It is the youngsters themselves who decide
which type of music is played in the café. They mostly choose the melancholic ad
pessimistic Turkish arabesk which plays in the background. Wolfgang, a youth
worker, indicated that the youth workers in the centre have been trying to adopt a
democratic understanding in Ch4v. Although they have granted the youngsters the
freedom to choose their type of music, they were not happy with the pessimist and
passivist arabesk music. Two months after my first visit to the centre, the youth
workers had made some rearrangements in the organisation, i.e. they took over
the running of the café from the youngsters, and now they play hip-hop music to
attract also German youngsters to the centre.3
BTBTM Youth group
This is a group of between fifteen and twenty middle class youngsters, living
mostly outside Kreuzberg. They all attend Gymnasium. In addition, they take
some additional courses at the Technische Universität delivered by a Turkish
student organisation called Berlin-Turkish Science and Technology Centre
(B TB TM) . Courses which they are taking include Turkish, Maths, Physics,
Biology and German literature. These youngsters decided to form a group that
Chip was temporarily closed in June 1997 due to some violence among the youths.
Berlin Turk Bum ye Teknoloji Merkezi (BTBTM) was founded in 1977 by a group of
Turkish university students in order to provide technology transfer to Turkey from
Germany. Although it was established in the very beginning as an initiative aiming to
contribute to the technological development of Turkey, it has recently become a social
democratic student initiative dealing with the problems of the second and third generation
Turkish students. It has become more oriented to the Turks living in Berlin rather than to
Turkey. Since 1992 they have conducted a project in Berlin, called 'Project Zweite
Generation' (Second Generation Project). Through this project they aim to assist Turkish
students with their problems whilst studying in the high schools in Berlin.
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meets regularly and gives them the opportunity to exchange ideas about their
problems. Their meetings were organised by a university student, Nurdan, now
the head of BTBTM. Discussion topics include identity, sexism displayed by
Turkish men, youth, racism, xenophobia and nationalism. At the end of these
meetings, which lasted nearly one year, they initiated a Jugendfest (youth festival)
in the Werkstatt der Kulturen located in the district of Neukölln. They presented
their own works to German and Turkish audience (see Chapter 4). I joined their
meetings as an observer and also participated in the festival and their
entertainments.
While I spent time with several political activists in their community
organisations, with a few families in their homes, with many first generation male
migrants in the traditional Turkish cafés, and with many youth workers in the
youth centres, I spent most of my time with youths in the Street, at their other
'hangouts' and in their youth centres. Of these three distinct aforementioned
youth groups, Naunyn Ritze youths became the core of my field research.
Accordingly, in the following section I will narrate the story of my acceptance
into the Naunyn Ritze youth centre.
First Encounter with the Turkish Hzo -Hop Youth
Roaming around Kotbusser Tor during my first trip to Berlin in order to get a
'feel' for Kreuzberg, I found myself in front of an old building constructed with
red-and-yellow bricks. There was a figurative graffiti on the entrance wail with a
message in English, "Long Live to 36rs: TO STAY HERE IS MY RIGHT"
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(Figure 1). The sign on the door read "Kinder, Jugcnd & Kulturzentru,n". Inside,
a dark corridor led into the youth centre.
Figure 1. Graffiti on the entrance wall of the Naunyn Ritze youth centre,
Kreuzberg. "Long live to 36rs: To stay here is my right posse"
It was around 6 pjn., and very cold outside. The stairs led to a café where
there was a makeshift bar along with some tables, chairs, bar-football tables, a
television, a piano in the corner and some pictures on the wall. There were also
some youngsters around. I assumed they were Turkish youngsters. I was greeted
by a young man who asked in Turkish if he could help me. I asked if I could get a
cup of coffee to warm myself up a bit, he gave me the coffee, and we started to
talk. I told him about my research interest, and discovered that he was a youth
worker in the centre. His name was Neco (25). From that moment on I developed
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a very good friendship with Neco, from whom I learned more about Berlin, youth,
graffiti, life and mutual respect. In what follows, I shall cite a brief story of his life
as a representative example of the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth in
Kreuzberg, who have similar contradictions, concerns, dreams and expectations as
Neco.
Neco was born in Kreuzberg, and grew up in Naunyn Ritze, like many
other Turkish-origin youngsters. Today, he is one of the popular figures in the
Berlin hip-hop scene, a painter as well as a graffiti artist who is called 'Neco Da
Vinci' by his friends. He has developed a varied interest in painting since his
childhood, beginning with Superman comics, continuing with Salvador Dali, and
later taking inspiration from the New York graffiti artist Lee. He used to make
figurative graffiti in streets and -on request- in cafés, then he shifted to painting.
In order to get a proper job after completing his studies in pedagogy, and in order
to gain an opportunity to assist Turkish youngsters, he decided to become a youth
worker in the centre. He is now guiding the Turkish youngsters in the centre who
want to learn about graffiti or painting. He explains his artistic evolution in the
following terms:
When I was in the secondary school, I was attracted by a tag5
which I saw almost everywhere. The tag was 'Dragon'. Then, I
found that the marker of the tag was a very good friend of
mine. I liked it and I was fascinated by his popularity all around
Berlin. I started to mark my own tag all around the city. Later
on, everybody began talking about me. I went on and imitated
designs from comics I was reading. I was also imitating the
graffiti masters' works. Lee is one of them. I still don't know
who Lee is, but when I saw his graffiti in the American graffiti
magazines of Subway Art and Spray City, I was fascinated.
5 'ragging refers to drawing personal signs (mostly initials or nick names) with spray-cans
on the walls and/or public properties in the city.
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Afterwards, I have seen some painting works and I liked them
very much. I was too young then, that's why I didn't realise
that those impressive paintings belonged to Salvador DalI. As a
result of all these different inspirations, I got my own style
(Personal interview, 28 January 1996).
At a certain point, Neco saw a film which narrated Michaelangelo's painting of
the Sistine Chapel. Then he decided to reproduce in painting some works from
the Turkish Ottoman period, through which he developed his own style.
Although, in his own words, he grew up with the German Renaissance images of
Jesus Christ and the angels, through the Ottoman models he attempted to express
his 'own' history and culture, which he drew from books, mosques and museum
visits during the summer vacations in Turkey:
I have seen many Italian-Renaissance paintings including the
figures of Jesus Christ and angels. Those people have expressed
their own peculiar culture through these paintings. I cannot
identify with those Christian images. I told myself that I also
have my own culture, we are not coming out of nothing. We
have made the history. That's why I have been recently working
on a series of motifs from the Ottoman Empire period (Personal
Interview, 4 February 1996).
Neco stopped painting when he discovered that painting had not been a legitimate
activity in the Islamic-Ottoman world, and that consequently, all the original
pieces he reproduced had been painted by European artists.6
Recently, Neco has become interested in film making. He does not
consider film-making disobedient to the Islamic way of life as outlined by the
Koran, because it did not exist when the Koran was written. He has produced
some scripts portraying various figures from his multicultural neighbourhood.
6 Orthodox Islam does not permit depiction of figures, but only geometric patterns and
designs.
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When I asked if he had seen the movie La Haine', he replied with a deep sigh:
uThat is the movie I was trying to make. I had already written the script before
this movie was shown." Moreover, he complained about the lack of financial
support for film-making in Kreuzberg:
You need good contacts to make a movie. All I can do for the
time being is to write scripts and to give them to the directors,
but I want to make my own movie. Here, there are some
German directors whom I am collaborating with. They have a
lot of stereotypes about the daily life in Kreuzberg and they are
only fuming what they already have in their minds. For instance,
when the German directors want to make a movie on the
Turkish youngsters, they represent the youngsters' houses and
clothes as their parents' were twenty years ago. They are still
playing with the clichés... Someday I will make my own movie
(Personal Interview, 7 February 1996).
To illustrate the way the Germans' perception of Kreuzberg is different from that
of the Turks, Neco gave an example. He had sat an examination in the Fine Art
School at Humbolt University. During the exam, all the students were asked to
write a film scenario. He wrote about the life of the minority youngsters in
Kreuzberg. His scenario was, in fact, a critical look at violence, Neco said. He did
not pass the exam. When he asked the head of the jury the reason for his failure,
he was told that there was too much blood and violence in his scenario, and that
this image did not match the reality of Berlin:
They do not know anything about how we are living here. They
are tob removed from the reality of Kreuzberg. They think that
every place is similar to their own comfortable milieu. Then, I
found out that I was on the right track, and I understood that
they had almost nothing to give me (Personal interview, 7
February 1996).
La Haine (The Hate, 1994) is a Mathieu Kassovitz film. The film covers twenty-four
crucial hours in the lives of three ethnically diverse young men, representatives of a
generation relegated to the public housing projects on the outskirts of Paris. There is a riot
on the housing estate after a police beating leaves a young Arab nearly dead.
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Neco is still in search of a sponsor for his scripts. He says he has everything but
money to make a good movie. He has a gangsta background which he is proud
of. He reminded me of a sentence by Henry Hill in Martin Scorsese's movie
GoodFellas: "As far back as I can remember I always wanted to be a gangster".8
In the course of time, I also met EEl (25), who is another Turkish youth
worker in the centre, and who facilitated my contacts with the girls. Elif was born
in Berlin, she speaks fluent Turkish, German, English and French Despite
qualifying for the university, she preferred to become a youth worker. Like Neco,
her main target is to help the Turkish youngsters attain their goals. She is one of
the most respected figures in the centre, both among the boys and the girls.
Coming across as a mother figure, he counsels the youngsters and is a role model
for the girls in the centre.
As the field work proceeded I met many youngsters, graffiti artists,
painters, rappers and breakdancers in Kreuzberg, especially in Naunyn Ritze.
Although I did not previously have an elaborate knowledge and particular taste
for hip-hop, I began to appreciate the way the hip-hop youngsters expressed
themselves through the global hip-hop youth culture. In consonance with what I
unexpectedly encountered at the beginning of the research, my preliminary focus
shifted to the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth in particular.
8 GoodFellas is a Martin Scorsese film which is based on a true story. The film with a
cast including Robert de Niro, Ray Liotta, Joe Pesci and Lorraine Brasco follows the life
of Henry Hill who hankers to be special, a standout guy in a field of nobodies. Crook,
cabbie, boxer, comedian, pool- and sax-player, even Christ (Murphy, 1990).
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Developing Rapport with Youngsters
At the very beginning of my research, I was a stranger for the youths, coming
from a place that they did not know. I was obviously a Turkish citizen, but what
kind of Turkish? Was I Kurdish, or Ale vi, or Sunni, or what? They were initially
extremely sceptical about me, as they always are about any stranger. However,
since I had been introduced to them by Neco and Elif, they had a slightly more
positive first impression of me. Beyond their introductions, our rapport depended
on my own ability to communicate with them. Should I act as a researcher asking
many questions, or as a participant observer scrutinising everything, or should I
interact with them as 'myself'? These were the questions with which I struggled in
the beginning. Actually, it seemed extremely difficult, and not at all reasonable, to
decide on which role to choose at the very beginning of the research. I merely
endeavoured to avoid the formalism of research methods.
I was at the centre almost every day, except on holidays. I introduced
myself as a student coming from England and doing research about experiences of
Turkish hip-hop youngsters in Kreuzberg. Their first reaction, or first
confirmation, of what I was doing, was that I had come to the right place to
research such a subject. Naunyn Ritze has hitherto been the most popular place
for German and other international journalists who want to find out about the
daily life of Turkish youngsters and gangsta groups living in Kreuzberg. That is
why I was also treated as a television or newspaper journalist at first sight and
was even asked by the youngsters where my camera or tape-recorder was. Since I
avoided using any mechanical equipment to record, to videotape, or to take
pictures, I convinced them that I was not a journalist. Although they were at first
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slightly disappointed, it did not take long for them to get used to the fact that I
was just a student. They immediately wanted to know what kind of student I was.
Apparently, I did not match the type of student they had in mind -according to
them 'I was a bit old to be a student'.
Repeatedly, they asked me questions about England and the Turkish
youths living there. They wanted me to make a comparison between themselves
and the British-Turkish youths. I let them question me as much as possible in
order to balance our positions. My transnational identity -or, in their perceptions,
cosmopolitan identity- obviously worked in my favour and facilitated a rapport
with them. They found my English connection more interesting to play with than
my Turkish connection. I was Irying, at all times, to avoid being received as
merely an academic researcher. Rather, I was presenting myself as a student doing
a PhD., or doctorate, which they failed to understand clearly. To make it clear for
them, I told them that this research would, at the end, lead to a book about
themselves. It was pleasant for them to imagine their stories printed in a book.
Then, they all agreed to help me.
While I never concealed the fact that I was doing research, these
youngsters did not generally define my identity as merely a researcher. I was seen
as an elder brother (agabey) and a good friend who would understand their
problems and help them obtain their goals. Accordingly, my relationship with the
youngsters developed on a friendly basis. If the researcher makes friends with the
actors of the research and considers them 'interlocutors' rather than 'informants'
and/or 'respondents', and if the actors trust the researcher, they will also be
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honest with him/her (Horowitz, 1983, 1986; Adler et al., 1986; Alasuutari, 1995:
52-56). My personal background is working class and I am of Turkish-Alevi
origin, therefore quite similar to those of the youngsters. Accordingly I was not
relegated to a marginal position in the course of the research. Rather, I was
considered an insider to a certain extent, though they maintained a fragile
distance.
In the course of my field research, I did not need to apply any of the
formalist participatory roles formulated by various schools -for instance, Chicago
school of symbolic interactionism, whereby the researcher attempts to take the
most objective and detached position, or the ethnomethodological way of
subjective interactionism whereby the researcher takes the most radically
subjective and involved position. I tried to refrain from a variety of research
postures which differ in the degree of researcher's involvement. Hence, I tried to
abstain from the use of two polar field research stances: the observer-as-
partic4'ant and the participant-as -observer. Rather, I eventually maintained a
balance between involvement and detachment. I was spending time with the
youngsters, getting to know them informally, but also trying to avoid becoming
personally or emotionally involved with them to retain my objectivity.
Developing close relationships with the youngsters still made me aware
of the severe pitfalls associated with losing detachment and objectivity: 'going
native' (Berg, 1995; Rosaldo 1989: Chp.8; Adler et al., 1986; Hammersley and
Atkinson, 1983). 'Going native' refers to developing an overraport with research
subjects that can harm the data-gathering process. Overraport may also bias the
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researcher's own perspectives, leading him/her to uncritically accept the views of
the members as his/her own (Adler et al., 1986: 364). The rapport I developed
with the youths never involved making repeated overtures of friendliness, artificial
postures to attract the attention of the youngsters, or exploiting the norms of
interpersonal reciprocity to build a research web of friendly relations and key
informants, because role playing and using deceptive strategies in the interest of
sociological inquiry do not constitute a good faith commitment.
Another crucial point to be raised about gaining rapport among the
youngsters is the advantages and disadvantages of being an 'ethnic' researcher. As
an ethnic minority researcher I acquired privileged relations with both Turkish
youngsters and adults. Familiarity with the language and physical space of the
Turkish minority in Berlin provided me with an easy access to the youth groups I
worked with. I had more advantages compared to German researchers because of
the negative perception that the working-class Turkish youths have of the
Germans. The youngsters assumed that I empathised with them -an empathy
which they would not expect from a German researcher. But as well as providing
a crucial advantage in facilitating the process of 'getting in', being an ethnic
researcher brings about some disadvantages. It might accelerate 'going native',
and it might also lead to the sentimentalisation of the research due to the close
effective links established with the people researched. Above all, sometimes the
minorities might expect the ethnic researcher to solve their problems, or at least to
mediate between the governmental authorities and themselves. Having in mind all
these disadvantages of being an ethnic researcher, I tried to abstain from
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developing an overraport and giving an impression which might lead them to think
that I was there to find a solution to their problems.
I had a theoretical and ethical difficulty in treating the youngsters in the
process of social inquiry. Was I going to treat them as 'respondents', 'informants'
or whatever? After spending some time to get into their worlds, I realised that
treating the youngsters as 'respondents' was not relevant and ethical at all because
in their world parents, youth workers and the police asked questions. These were
the social actors who signified power to be obeyed by the youngsters.
Accordingly, I tried to refrain from adopting the power to ask questions as
granted. Above all, the researcher who has the power to ask questions attempts to
place himself/herself on a higher position than that of the people s/he researches.
Such a positioning might lead to the manipulation of the research on the sidewalk
of the researcher. In other words, this notion might invite the risk of praising the
scientific dogmatism or pure sociological investigation.
Unlike 'respondents', the term 'informants' might, at first glance, seem a
more reasonable role to give the youngsters because then they are considered to
narrate their own-life stories to the researcher who supposedly stands on a
neutral, or rather assimilated, positioning. Although this term ethically seems
more accurate, the researcher ceases to exist as a subject. Contrarily, this term
might invite the risk of 'going native' which is contemplated as the end of
scientific knowledge. Thus, I also tried to avoid purely ethnographic approach,
praising the youngsters and their narratives more than necessary. As Rosaldo
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(1989: 180) put it I had to dance "on the edge of a paradox by simultaneously
becoming 'one of the people' and remaining an academic."
Bearing in mind the limitations of these two terms, I prefer to use the
term 'interlocutor' which locates myself and the youngsters as separate subjects
who are free from ideological manipulation of each other, and open to dialogical
interaction. In doing so, I tried to distance myself from pure sociological and
ethnographic puritanism, or from what Rosaldo (1989) calls 'sociological and
ethnographic monumentalism'. Treating the youngsters as 'interlocutors' is also
an attempt to minimise the question of power between the researcher and the
people 'researched'. This term, at the same time, situates the researcher in a
middle position where s/he can utilise both • his/her objective and subjective
dispositions in his/her attempt to capture and explain the full meaning of the social
life of the people 'researched'. Without objectivity, researching particular/local
cultures and identities is out of the question because obj ectivisrn attempts to
prevent the subjective researcher to romanticise his/her subjects. Identically, It is
also accurate to claim that all human knowledge is influenced by the subjective
character of the human beings who collect and interpret it. Therefore, social
analysts should explore their subjects from a number of different positions, rather
than being locked into any particular one.
I spent approximately eight months in Berlin, from January to August
1996. Afterwards, I had two more trips to Berlin for two weeks, one of which
was in December 1996, and the other in June 1997. Besides interacting and
making participant observation, I also carried out semi-structured in-depth
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interviews with ten members of the each youth group, five of whom are girls and
five boys. My intention was to obtain a summary of the experiences utilising some
'key questions' suggested by an examination of the data. However, these
interviews remained semi-structured in that the replies by the youngsters led to
the generation of further questions as I sought explanations and elaboration of the
events. In the course of the research I did not use any tape- or video-recorder to
record the interviews or informal chats I made with the youngsters. Since there
were many journalists visiting these two youth centres, especially Naunyn Ritze,
the youngsters seemed to develop a fixed way of representation of themselves to
the media. Being equipped with no electronic recorder I aimed not to be received
as a journalist by the youths.
The Implications and the Scope of the Study
As pointed out before, my work mainly reflects the stories and narratives of the
two working-class youth groups who took part in the field research in Kotbusser
Tor, Kreuzberg 36. During the course of the study, it has become evident that the
processes of cultural identity formation of these youth groups primarily revolved
around two significant constituents: diasporic cultural consciousness and global
h4-hop youth culture. Accordingly, this work explores these two constituents in
order to map out the landscape of these youths' cultural identity. To do so, these
Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth groups should be situated in a broader social and
cultural framework which highlights their ethnic enclave, their parental culture,
middle-class Turkish youth culture, majority society culture and contemporary
global youth culture.
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Thus, this thesis is built on three principal phases. The first phase portrays
the diasporic urban space created by the Turkish migrants and their descendants in
Kreuzberg. The second phase of this study considers teenagers as they interact
and develop identities in various social settings: in their homes, in the schools, on
the streets, and in Turkey. The third phase of the study examines the process by
which the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth develops a diasporic consciousness in
collision, negotiation and dialogue with the majority society. Hence, the main
theme which these three phases aim to reveal is the cultural bricolage and
diasporic cultural identity constructed and articulated by the Berlin-Turkish hip-
hop youth, drawing upon modern means of globalisation.
The first chapter explicates the debates over the relative importance of
theoretical notions such as culture, youth culture, 'subculture', ethnicity,
globalism and hip-hop in the study of German-Turkish hip-hop youth. In a first
step, two distinct notions of culture namely the holistic notion of culture and the
syncretic notion of culture are put forward. Departing from this differentiation, I
summarise the main trends that characterise studies on German-Turks.
Highlighting the limits of these conventional studies, I base my argument on the
idea of cultural bricolage to which the youngsters are subject. In this chapter,
where I question some theoretical conceptualisations, I also try to develop a
theoretical frame that allows to differentiate the contemporary ethnic minority hip-
hop youth culture from the traditional concept of 'subculture'.
The second chapter explores the migratory process in the Federal
Republic of Germany, which has resulted in the formation of a diasporic
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consciousness by the Turkish labour migrants. Prior to describing the formation of
diasporic consciousness, it discusses ethnic-based strategies of political
participation developed by the Turkish migrants in Germany since the beginning
of the migratory process in 1961. In drawing up the main framework of migrant
strategy and minority strategy, I also outline the migratory process and the
incorporation regimes in the Federal Republic of Germany, leading to the 'ethnic
minorisation' of the labour migrants.
Chapter 3 begins with delineating the importance of Kreuzberg for
migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, and demonstrates how a modern diasporic
space has been created by Turkish migrants and their descendants in Kreuzberg
36. Thus, it portrays the images, symbols, sounds, views and traditions carried by
transnational migrants from their homeland to form a diasporic space which
provides them with a symbolic 'fortress' protecting them against institutional
discrimination, assimilation and racism. Subsequently, the major constituents of
this diasporic space are displayed: the Turkish media and ethnic associations in
Berlin. Finally, this diasporic space and its cultural constituents are evaluated in
the broader setting of multicultural Berlin with reference to the Turkish Ale vi
community. This final section aims to raise the question of ideology of
multiculturalism and its discontents for the Turkish diasporic communities.
Chapter 4 examines the process of 'homing of diaspora' by the working-
class Turkish male youth in Kreuzberg, who experience a socioeconomic and
political marginality. Being subject to structural outsiderism, working-class
Turkish diasporic youth develops a 'demotic' discourse and a language of fatalism
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against exclusion and discrimination. This chapter also delineates the principal
life-worlds of the working-class diasporic Turkish youth: youth centre, street,
school and home. The male peer groups construct their identities in negotiation
between these distinct worlds. To understand the identity formation process of the
working-class Turkish diasporic youth, this chapter also explores a relevant side
of the identity formation process among the middle-class diasporic Turkish youth.
Chapter 5 investigates the major constituents of 'third culture' and/or
cultural syncreticism developed by the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth in
Kreuzberg. Their cultural syncreticism becomes apparent in their leisure culture
which is characterised by both particularistic and universalistic constituents. The
particularist components of their leisure culture are 'ãlem' (meeting with
friends), diigiins (wedding ceremony) and arabesk music, while the universalist
ones are rap, graffiti, dance and 'cool' style. In defining the main framework of
the cultural identity formation process and leisure culture of these hip-hop
youngsters, this chapter underlines the multicultural competence of ethnic
minority youths.
Chapter 6 calls attention to the issues of cultural syncreticism, 'double
diasporic consciousness' and transculturation. It explores the discourses and
social identities of the Berlin-Turkish rappers whom I consider contemporary
minstrels, 'organic intellectuals' and 'storytellers' of their own communities. What
they call 'Oriental' hip-hop provides these youngsters with a ground where they
can express their imaginary nostalgia towards 'home' and 'already discovered
country of the past' as well as to manifest their attachment to the 'undiscovered
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country of the future'. In other words, 'Oriental' hip-hop as an expressive cultural
form represents the symbolic dialogue undertaken by the cliasporic youth between
'past' and 'present', between 'tradition' and 'translation', between 'there' and
'here', and between the local and the global.
Finally, I conclude that a diaspora can be created through cultural
artefacts and a shared imagery that symbolically connect the new country of
settlement to homeland. These symbolic links between the diaspora and homeland
can only be produced through modern means of communication and
transportation. I am aware that in rapidly changing world all generations are
transitional, but I am convinced nonetheless that Turkish hip-hop youngsters in
Berlin have constructed something unique -a 'third culture' which transcends
conventional binarism.
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CHAPTER 1
THE NOTIONS OF CULTURE, YOUTH CULTURE,
ETHNICITY, GLOBALLSATION, AND STUDIES ON
GERMAN-TURKISH YOUTH
As the main theme of this work is to explore the construction and articulation of
the diasporic cultural identity of the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth,
the concepts of culture, minority youth culture, ethnicity, globalisation and
diaspora must also be examined. Accordingly, this chapter aims to redefine the
concept of culture and minority youth culture by departing from the conventional
definition of culture in order to provide a theoretical ground for understanding
diasporic youth culture. Raymond Williams (1983: 90) has defined culture in three
different ways, which are in fact complementary to each other: firstly culture
could be used to refer to 'a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic
development' (anthropological definition); secondly culture might be used to
suggest 'a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, or a group'
(sociological definition); and finally culture could refer to 'the works and practices
of intellectual and especially artistic activity' (humanistic definition). While culture
was previously defined as the received high culture of various literary and
philosophical canons, now it is characterised in a broader sense as any expressive
activity contributing to social learning.
The expansion of the notion of culture affects the way in which popular
culture is now conceptualised as a broad ensemble of everyday discursive
practices that may fall outside the traditional parameters of official high culture.
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Over the past three decades the dominance of high culture over popular culture
has decreased. Popular culture is articulated as a structured terrain of cultural
exchange and negotiation between forces of incorporation and resistance: a
struggle between the attempt to universalise the interests of the dominant against
the resistance of the subordinate (Storey, 1993). The upsurge of popular culture
in alliance with global culture crosscuts with the rapid industrialisation,
urbanisation, domestic/international migration and social mobilisation since the
1960s, when the periphery started to infiltrate the centre. Popular culture has
mainly been formed in urban spaces in which many kinds of cultures and life forms
have to intermingle. It is also evident that much of the impetus behind the
expansion of the notion of culture springs from the sweeping transformations in
information technology after World War Two -a point to which I shall return
shortly.
The study of youth cultures have recently gained a remarkable space
within the field of popular culture. The expansion of the ideology of consumerism,
leisure industry, post-Fordist economic production, the extension of the
adolescence period through raising of the school leaving age, and the globalisation
of Western urban culture turned the concept of youth to be one of the significant
fields of study in social sciences. Topics that receive scholarly attention include
definitions of style, musical tastes, unemployment, delinquency, sexuality,
resistance, difference and ethnicity. Beginning with the Chicago School of
sociology and continuing throughout the 1960s, interest on youth began to
emerge. In the 1970s, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS)
became the site of a great deal of research on youth 'subcultures'. These studies
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examined working-class youth subcultures as social groups through analyses of
class structures (Cohen, 1972; Hall and Jefferson, 1976). While these works were
highly influential in determining how youth were to be conceptualised, it remained
at the level of the examination of facets of youth cultures as expressions of class
conflict or the position of youth in future adult roles. Furthermore, these studies
also helped to reinforce the view of youth as primarily passive.
In this context, particular cultural forms have been produced and
articulated by minority youth, a group that emerged after the settlement of
migrant labour in the 1970s in the continental Europe. 9
 The cultural forms
produced by minority youths provide a number of facilitating conditions for the
creation of new ethnic cultures and identities which celebrate specificity,
difference and distinction (Hannerz, 1989; Appadurai, 1990). More recent studies
on the minority youth cultures involve notions such as globalisation, diaspora,
'youthnicity', multiculturalism, cultural agency, leisure, transnationalism,
transculturation, bricolage, syncreticism, d(fferance, racism, exclusion, hegemony
(cf., interalia, Gilroy, 1993; Keith, 1995; Amit-Talai and WuIff, 1995; Wilpert,
1989; Liebkind, 1989; Pamgren et al., 1992, Alund, 1996; Alund-Schierup, 1991;
Schwartz, 1992; Mandel, 1990; Vertovec, 1996a, 1995). The primary difference
of these works from those of the Chicago School of Sociology and of the CCCS
is that youth are not considered victims of technology and consumerism, or
passive receptors of parental culture, but active agents who are capable of
producing, reproducing and articulating their cultures. Much of my work will
This is a process which was undertaken somewhat earlier in the United Kingdom. For
further information, see Clarke et al. (1975) and Hebdige (1979).
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follow the recent approach to portray the expressive cultures of the Berlin-
Turkish hip-hop youth. Yet, some aspects of the CCCS scholars will necessarily
be taken into consideration in the course of analysis.
Contemporary scholarly works on minority youth cultures also refer to the
notion of modern diaspora in order to describe the complexities of simultaneous
processes of cultural localisation and transculturation by the respective youths.
The diaspora idea invites us to explore expressive minority youth cultures in
relation to their 'roots' and 'routes' without essentialising them (Gilroy, 1987,
1993, 1994, 1995; Clifford, 1992, 1994; Hall, 1994). Diaspora studies, as I will
demonstrate, provide a convenient framework to display cultures of bricolage
which exist in mixing rather than in static ethnic lines. In what follows, I will
elaborate various notions of culture in relation to the literature on Turks in
Germany. Thereafter, the literature of the earlier schools working on youth
cultures will be briefly reviewed. Consequently, I will locate the minority hip-hop
youth culture in the framework of modern diaspora studies.
Notions 0/Culture
There are two principal notions of culture which I will briefly summarise in this
section. The first one is the holistic notion of culture, and the second is the
syncretic notion of culture. The former considers culture a highly integrated and
grasped static 'whole'. This is the dominant paradigm of the classical modernity,
of which territoriality and totality were the main characteristics. The latter notion
is the one which is most obviously affected by increasing interconnectedness in
space. This syncretic notion of culture has been proposed by the contemporary
34
scholars to demonstrate the fact that cultures emerge in mixing beyond the
political and geographical territories.
The term culture came to the fore in Europe during the construction of
cultural nationalist identities. As the main constituent of the age of nationalism
was territoriality, culture was defined as the cumulative of 'shared meanings and
values' which manifested itself in that particular territory throughout history. This
is the holistic notion of culture which has provided the basic for the emergence of
the myth of distinct national cultures. To quote Eric Wolf,
The demonstration that each struggling nation possessed a
distinctive society, animated by its special spirit or culture,
served to legitimate its aspirations to form a separate state of its
own. The notion of separate and integral cultures responded to
this political project. Once we locate the reality of society in
historically changing, imperfectly bounded, multiple and
branching social alignments, however, the concept of a boxed,
unitary and bounded culture must give way to a sense of the
fluidity and permeability of cultural sets. In the rough and
tumble of social interaction, groups are known to exploit the
ambiguities of inherited forms, to impart new evaluations or
valences to them, to borrow forms more expressive of their
interests, or to create wholly new forms in answer to changed
circumstances (1982: 387).
The idea that cultures exist as separate and integral entities clearly
supported the project of defining the 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983) of
nations struggling for independence or dominance. The holistic notion of culture
resembles the usage of the German Romantics, as in 'Volk culture' which
imprisons cultures within distinct social compartments containing separate sets of
'shared meanings and values'. This understanding attributes a time, context,
territoriality, space, unity and memory to culture. According to this approach,
modernity, which appears in the form of electronic communications,
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transportation, deterritorialisation and cultural imperialism, has disrupted the
'unity and authenticity of culture' (Smith, 1990, 1995; Bell, 1978).
The main claim of the holistic approach is that 'shared meanings and
values' are the principal constituents of each distinct culture. The focus on 'shared
meanings and values' may sometimes make culture sound too unitary,
homogeneous, holistic and too cognitive. The disturbance of this unity and holism
is considered to result in crisis, breakdown or degeneration. The themes of
'identity crisis', 'in-betweenness', 'split identities' and 'degeneration' raised by
some scholars in the study of ethnic minorities -a point to which I shall return in
the next chapter- is the product of such an assumption. This assumption claims
that culture emerges in discrete ethnic lines, and holds no place for syncreticism
and bricolage. Syncreticism could merely be considered, in this approach, nothing
but an impurity polluting the 'authentic culture'.
Although some researchers working on Turkish migrants' culture in
Germany note emergent syncreticisms, they dislike these 'cultural impurities', to
use James Clifford's term (1988). The common trend amongst these scholars in
the context of Turkish migrants in Germany is either to label the cultures of
bricolage as 'degenerate' (Abadan-Unat, 1976, 1985; Kagitcibasi, 1987), or to
diagnose the situation as 'fragmented cultural world leading to a crisis of identity'
(Mushaben, 1985). These scholars regard the Turkish migrants as the victims of
transnational capitalist process. This is why those 'victims' have been considered
to be incapable of coping with the new circumstances and obstacles emerging in
the diaspora. This approach negates the subject-centred analysis. Ironically, this
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notion of culture also provides the ground for the formation of multiculturalist
polities. Multiculturalism, as I shall explore in the coming chapters, assumes that
cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes belonging to
ethnic groups.
Most of the studies on Turks and Turkish culture in Germany are based on
a notion which links ethnicity and culture. This approach mainly rests on the
assumption that Turkish migrants carry their own distinct cultural baggage all the
way along from home to the country of settlement. Underestimating the
situational and instrumental nature of ethnicity, these scholars went back to the
place of origin of migrants to find out the main parameters of their social, cultural
and ethnic identifications. These analysts took the 'traditional culture' of Turkey
as their basis to ascertain the migrants' social and cultural identities in their new
countries of settlement. The emphasis is usually placed on the norms, values and
codes that predominate in rural areas of Turkey. Islam, on the other hand, comes
to the fore in these studies as the core of this 'traditional culture'. Moreover, this
group of scholars approach the issue through the lens of an 'identity' framework
in which identity is considered stable, fixed, centred and coherent (Abadan-Unat,
1976, 1985; Kagitcibasi, 1987; Mushaben, 1985).
On the other hand, the syncretic notion of culture claims mixing and
bricolage are the main characteristics of cultures. In this approach, culture does
not develop along ethnically absolute lines but in complex, dynamic patterns of
syncreticism (Gilroy, 1987: 13); and cultural identity is considered a matter of
'becoming' as well as 'being' (Hall, 1989, 1994). It seems more appropriate for
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this perspective to treat migrant cultures as mixing their new set of tools, which
they acquire in the migration experience, with their previous lives and cultural
repertoires. The major challenge to the scholars who are bound to the holistic
notion of culture comes from those who reject the idea of viewing ethnic groups
as pre-given social units.
The problematisation of ethnicity and culture of Turkish migrants in an
anti-essentialist perspective is relatively new. The Berliner Inst itut fur
Vergleichende Sozialforschung (BIVS) focuses on the ethnic group formation
processes and shifting boundaries between ethnic groups (Blaschke, 1983;
Schwartz, 1992). Ruth Mandel (1989, 1990, 1996) emphasises the construction
of new ethnicities amongst the Turkish diaspora, and sheds light on the formation
of what Avtar Brali (1996) calls 'diasporic space' (gurbet). She considers this
space heterogeneous, whether articulated as gurbet or as a potential dar al-Islam.
Similarly, Thomas Faist (1991, 1995) deals with the exclusion of Turkish youth
from the labour market and schooling. Herman Tertilt (1996) did a research on
the life-worlds of a Turkish gangsta group located in Frankfurt. Bridging the
theories of sociology and ethnology, and referring to the 'subculture' notion of
the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, Tertilt tries in his work to portray the
individual members of the gang, Turkish Power Boys, and the significance of
parental culture, migration, peer groups, masculinity, drug and violence in their
expressive culture.'°
10 Although Faist (1991) has a Barthian perspective, he paradoxically refers to the
'second generation' Turks as migrants. Similarly, Thomas Tertilt (1996) also has the
same tendency to place the children of immigrants in the category of migrants.
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There are some Turkish scholars and intellectuals who also start off from
the syncretic notion of culture in their interpretation of the cultural formation
processes within the transnational Turkish migrants. Ayse caglar (1994, 1990)
prefers to explore the cultures and life-worlds of the first generation Turkish
migrants in the context of their own social spaces rather than within a framework
encapsulated in a reified ethnicity and/or an immutable 'Turkish culture'. She
denies the conventional holistic notion of culture and considers the cultural
practices of German Turks, like any other 'culture' in today's world:
the product of several interlocking histories and cultural
traditions, mediated and transplanted by the media and the host
society. The traces of different cultural traditions and languages
are visible in these new forms, created by the fusion of these
distinct traditions, but the emergent forms are reducible to none
of them. Hence, they can neither be explained in relation to a
fixed, unitary, and bounded traditional Turkish culture, nor
within an acculturation framework. In fact, migration is one of
those processes that aggravate the flow of images and cultural
forms bringing about results in surprising combinations and
crossovers of codes and discourses. The emergent cultural
forms and practices of German Turks need to be understood
first as products of such processes (caglar, 1994: 7).
Likewise, Gundiiz Vassaf (1982) refuses some conceptualisations which are
attributed to the children of Turkish migrants in Europe especially by the Turkish
'experts' -concepts like 'in-betweenness', 'lost generation' and 'split identities'.
Rejecting the treatment of migrants' children as problematic, he rightly claims that
those children have developed their own cultural space. "This is the new cultural
space", says Vassal "which has been recently built up in the West by all the
constituent ethnics of Europe such as Austrians, Algerians, Turks, Germans,
Surinamese, Norwegians, Moroccans, Swedes" (1982: 155).
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In the same manner, Feridun Zaimoglu (1995), who is a German-Turk,
attempts to conceptualise the way the German-Turkish youth speak. He calls this
newly-emerging language Kanak-Sprak (kanake language), which forms a 'creole
art'. Giving examples of this language, Zaimoglu demonstrates the main
characteristics of this language: sentences without comma, full stop, capital letter,
or any kind of punctuation, with frequent switches between Turkish and German -
a point which I will touch upon later. All these scholars, whose notion of culture
springs from the principle of syncreticism, call attention to the creative and hybrid
aspect of migrants' practices rather than seeing them as symptoms of a long list of
problems and crises. The consideration of diasporic cultures in the framework of
syncreticism is linked to the process of globalisation which leads to cultural
heterogeneity and bricolage. In what follows, I will demonstrate the link between
globalism, syncreticism and identity.
Globalisin and Syncreticisin
Modernity has resulted in. 'cultural flows in space', loosening up of social and
cultural boundaries, migration, expansion of global culture, cultural melting-pots
known as 'global cities', cultural variety, transculturation, transnationalism,
syncreticism and new social movements (Berman, 1983; Hannerz 1992, 1996;
Melucci, 1989; Aiund-Schierup, 1991). All these features and aspects of late-
modernity are known as constituents of the age of globalism. Globalism as one of
the primary conditions of modernity has been raised by many scholars in various
social, political and economic fields (cf., interalia, R.Robertson, A.Giddens,
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S.Hall, A.Appadurai, U.Hannerz, J.Brecher et al., L.Sklair and R.Cohen)." In this
thesis, I shall limit my focus to the social impacts of globalisation and with what
Brecher et al. (1993) have called 'globalisation from below'. In this sense,
globalism indicates, as Roland Robertson (1992: 8) posits, 'the compression of the
world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole' by
means of communications and transportation. This definition simply reminds us of
Giddens' interpretation of globalisation (1990: 52-53) as 'radicalising of
modernity'. What comes out of the compression process of the world as a whole
is a global culture which is unlike conventional culture, i.e., timeless, memoryless,
contextless and translocal. As Arjun Appadurai posits the global culture consists
of five significant flows which move in non-isomorphic paths:
ethnoscapes produced by flows of people: tourists, immigrants,
refugees, exiles and guest workers. Secondly, there are
technoscapes, the machinery and plant flows produced by
multinational and national corporations and government
agencies. Thirdly, there are finanscapes, produced by the rapid
flows of money in the currency markets and stock exchanges.
Fourthly, there are mediascapes, the repertoire of images of
information, the flows which are produced and distributed by
newspapers, magazines, television and film. Fifthly, there are
ideoscapes, linked to flows of images which are associated with
state or counter-state movement ideologies which are
comprised of elements of freedom, welfare, rights, etc. (1990:
6-7, as paraphrased by Featherstone, Introduction).
With reference to the global cultural flows displayed by Appadurai, an
interest in 'diaspora' has been equated with anthropology's now commonplace
anti-essentialist and constructivist approach to ethnicity (Hall, 1994; Clifford,
For a very brief summary of the various theories of globalisation, see Leslie Sklair
(1993: 7-10) where he classifies the theories of globalism into three types: (a) world-
system model by Immanuel Wallerstein, (b) globalisation of culture model by Theory,
Culture and Society group (TCS), and (c) global system model by himself.
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1994; Harinerz, 1996; Vertovec, 1996b). In this approach, the fluidity of
constructed styles and identities amongst generic diasporic communities is
particularly emphasised. These contemporary studies partly focus on the
construction of diasporic youth cultures which emerge in the crossing of local-
global and past-present. These cultural forms are sometimes called syncretic,
creolised, translated, crossover, cut 'n' mix, hybrid or alternate (Vertovec, 1996b:
28). In this work, I will interchangeably refer to the notions of 'bricolage',
'hybridity' and 'creolisation' in order to demonstrate transnational and
transcultural formation and articulation of culture in Turkish diaspora. I shall
briefly clarify these terms.
Hybridity -etymologically linked to animal husbandry and crop
management- may presuppose the 'pure' origin of elements -that is their fixed and
essential identities- prior to their hybridisation. As one of the definitions found in
Oxford's English Dictionaiy clarifies, a hybrid is 'an animal or plant that is the
offspring of individuals of different kinds.' On the other hand, the etymology of
bricolage points to the construction or creation from whatever is immediately
available for use, as exemplified in The Savage Mind by Levi-Strauss (1966: 17)
to define 'bricoleur':
The bricoleur is adept at performing a large number of diverse
tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of
them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived
and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of
instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to
make do with 'whatever is at hand', that is to say with a set of
tools and materials which is always finite and is also
heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the
current project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions
there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it
with the remains of previous constructions or deconstructions.
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The process of bricolage involves a 'science of the concrete' as opposed to our
'civilised' science of the 'abstract' because the 'bricoleur' attaches more
importance to the 'things' rather than to the 'thoughts'. Unlike hybridity,
bricolage foregrounds political -rather than natural- paradigm of articulation and
identity. To put it differently, the notion of bricolage, unlike hybridity, presumes
the individual as a social agent who is capable of making decisions. As far as
Turkish hip-hop youth in Kreuzberg are concerned, the act of bricolage as a
conscious action of diasporic subject will be readdressed in terms of lingual code-
switching, graffiti painting/writing and daily life-worlds in the following chapters.
In the same way, creolisation takes place in the process of interchange
between the cultural centre and periphery (I-iannerz, 1989, 1996). Ulf Hannerz
uses the term, creolisation, to refer to the process of globalisation, which is what
Roland Robertson (1992: 6) calls 'the compression of the world into a single
place.' To paraphrase Hannerz (1996: 12), 'The third world is in the First World,
and the First World in the Third; the North is in the South, and the South is in the
North; the centre is in the periphery, and the periphery is in the centre.' Speaking
on such a conceptual basis, Hannerz (1996: 153-154) introduces another concept
to demonstrate the two-way character of creolisation in the European context:
'double creolizing'. Berlin, for instance, is subject to two quite separate forms of
creolisation processes. On the one hand, there is the creolisation of German
national culture in the form of what Hannerz calls 'Americanization', on the other,
there is that multifaceted creolisation process which involves the greater majority
of immigrants, coming in as labour migrants and refugees, and mostly having to
adopt to German circumstances.
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Creolisation was once something that happened to the colonial others of
the world, and now, it happens to a larger world population by means of global
telecommunications systems and global market forces (Friedman, 1994: 208).
Although the process of creolisation in the age of colonialism was based on the
introduction of 'high cultures' and 'civiisation' to the 'uncultured' and
'uncivilised' lands, the new form of creolization is different from the previous one
in the sense that it introduces what Clifford calls 'post-culture'. Clifford (1988: 95)
proposes the notion of 'post-cultural' in his apprehension of a postmodern
condition:
In a world with many voices speaking all at once ... where
American clothes made in Korea are worn by young people in
Russia, where everyone's 'roots' are in some degree cut ... I
evoke this syncretic, 'postcultural' situation only to gesture
toward the standpoint (though not so easily spatialised), the
condition of uncertainty from which I am writing.
It is evident that globalism and localism are two simultaneous phenomena
of the late modern times.' 2 Globalisation of the world in the form of the spread of
global mass media, mass education and of the main international language
(English), dominance of monetary economies, identical clothes, household goods,
ideas, fantasies, books, music, communication networks, on the one hand, spreads
all our identities all over the map (Berman, 1983: 35), and brings about
deterritorialisatipn.' 3 On the other hand, localisation, in the form of desperate
allegiances to ethnic, national, cultural, religious, class and sexual groups, is
12 Mike Featherstone (1990: 17), in order to imply the fusion of the terms local and global
in a blend, employs a new term, i.e. glocal.
13Deterritorialization is one of the main parameters of the modem world, which implies
the transparency of territories for some transnational actors such as modem diasporas,
transnational corporations, money, and global communications networks (Appadurai,
1990: 295-310; Friedman, 1994: 210).
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thought to give us a kind of 'firm' identity (Berman, 1983: 35). The simultaneous
intensive flows of global and local dynamics seem to have an essential influence
on the construction of new identities and cultural forms. Henceforth the link
between globalisation and new identities will be expounded upon.
Glocalised Identities
The relationship between 'local' and 'global' has become increasingly salient in a
wide variety of intellectual and practical contexts. The compression of time and
space in the age of globalism has led to the formation of new identities. These
identities have been grounded on the paramount antithetical forces of 'local' and
'global', or on what Featherstone (1990) calls 'glocal' (gLqbal and locai). It is
evident that the increase in knowledge and interaction between the social and
individual agents through the modem means of communication and transportation
have awakened individuals, minorities and nations to differences, and repositioned
themselves in a new social setting. As Hall (1991a: 21) rightly emphasises, "when
you know what everybody else is, then you are what they are not". In other
words, intense contact with new social and political environments, confrontation
with personalities of various ethnic and national backgrounds in the age of global
capitalism, rapid industrialisation and urbanisation deepen local and particularistic
responses as well as giving the individual, groups or nations a global perspective.
Accordingly, this 'glocal' condition creates new perceptions of identity, and
changes the world of meanings and symbols of the respective units (Featherstone,
1990: 14).
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Before describing the particular aspects of this 'glocal' condition, let me
briefly outline the principal dynamics of the question of identity and ethnicity. Our
identity, be it individual, political, communal, ethnic or national, is shaped by
recognition, non-recognition or mis-recognition of the 'others' (Taylor, 1994:
25). The genesis of the human mind develops in a dialogical sense, not in a
monological sense. We can construct our identities only if we are able to
experience others' reactions to our attitudes and behaviour. Unless we are defined
by others we cannot represent ourselves. Thus, it is impossible to build an identity
without a dialogue with the 'other'. Here, 'the other', as Baudrillard (1973: 174)
states, is what allows us not to repeat ourselves forever.
Considering the perpetual encounters with the constitutive 'others',
identities, as Stuart Hall (1 991b: 47) stated, "are never completed, never finished;
they are always in process of formation". If we go further, we can argue that the
condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation of a difference, the
determination of an 'other' that is going to play the role of a 'constitutive
outside'. The inevitable relationship between identity and difference is implied by
the Derrida-ean term of dfferance. D(fferance signifies the combination of
identity and difference (otherness) which is the trace of the other on the self; or in
other words, refers to the impossibility of constructing an identity without a
notion of difference provided by the 'others' (Derrida, 1981: 8-9; Itzkowitz,
1978). "The identity narrative", which promotes the construction of identity on a
binary opposition with the 'Other', "frequently requires an ideological dimension:
it produces a theory on differences which very often drifts into legitimising the
devalourazition of the Other, possibly, hostility towards him/her" (Martin, 1995:
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10). Tn this sense, belonging to an ethnic community, or having an ethnic identity,
is a dependent variable of the 'ideology of difference', but not simply a primordial
attachment.
Likewise, the construction of ethnic identity follows a similar path. Fredrik
Barth (1969, 1994) has convincingly articulated the notion of ethnicity as mutable,
arguing that ethnicity is the product of social ascriptions, a kind of labelling
process engaged in by oneself and others. In the Barthian approach, ethnic
identity is regarded as a feature of social organisation, rather than a nebulous
expression of culture. Thus, one's ethnic identity is a composite of the view one
has of oneself as well as the views held by others about one's ethnic identity. To
put it differently, ethnic identity is the product of a dialogical and dialectical
process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the
individual's self-identification and outsiders' ethnic designations - i.e., what you
think your ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is (Nagel, 1994:
154). Ethnic boundaries, and thus identities, are explicitly socially constructed in
relation to the 'Other'.
The advent of global capitalism, transnationalism and urbanisation has
brought about a radical demographic change all over the world. Such an intensive
demographic, change, which has accelerated after the World War H, has, in fact,
led to a kind of reverse invasion of the colonial-capitalist centre by its periphery.
As Kevin Robins (1991: 25) put it "the periphery infiltrated the colonial core" in
terms of culture, religion, language and ethnicity:
In a process of unequal cultural encounter, 'foreign'
populations have been compelled to be the subjects and
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subalterns of western empire, while no less significantly, the
west has come face to face with the 'alien' and 'exotic' culture
of its 'Other'. Globalization, as it dissolves the barriers of
distance, makes the encounter of colonial center and colonised
periphery immediate and intense.
Since no group can now claim explicit superiority, each group can emphasis its
own language, religion, and culture (ibid.: 170). Accordingly, ethnicity could
openly and proudly be represented, vocalised and politicised. In this sense, the
subjects of the age of globalism, in this case transnational communities, have
constructed 'new ethnicities' as their new social identities. These new ethnicised
social identities have become the principal characteristic of the modern 'glocal'
condition. This 'glocal' condition, as Alexandra Alund (1995) accurately states, is
characterised by a parallelism between centrifugal and centripetal forces where
processes of transnational compression are accompanied by processes of
fragmentation.
The coexistence of the global and local in the form of 'glocal' results in
the devaluation of authenticity, thus in the acceleration of the processes of cultural
bricolage. This century has been mainly characterised by a drastic expansion of
mobility, including tourism, migrant labour, immigration, modern diasporas, and
urban sprawl. The cities all over the world have become stages on which
heterogeneous populations interact (Clifford, 1988: 13-14). Thus, the cultural
authenticity partly ends in the urban world where different cultural baggages
intermingle and become subject to bricolage. People belonging to such cultures of
bricolage have had to 'translate' themselves to the newly emerging urban-global
48
culture, and have had to live with more than one identity (Hall, 1993: 310).'
Asad is an eloquent exponent of this state of cultural bricolage, or of what he calls
melange:
In the vision of a fractured, fluid world, all human beings live in
the same cultural predicament.... Everyone is di1ocated; no one
is rooted. Because there is no such thing as authenticity,
borrowing and copying do not signify a lack... (Asad, 1993: 9-
10).
In a sense, authenticity is replaced with cultural bricolage in the era of late-
modernity because the growing trend of 'global homogenisation' no longer allows
national-cultural islands to exist. Thus, 'glocalised' identities are brought into
open by the concomitant dynamics of local/global, traditional/translational, and
past/future.
Etimic minority youth cultures are also subject to these processes of
globalism and localism. In what follows, I will sunimarise the previous schools
working on the youth cultures under the designation of 'subcultural theory' in
order to see the differences of the contemporary minority youth cultures from the
earlier youth cultures. Thereafter, contemporary hip-hop youth culture will be
briefly outlined to display the insufficiency of the subcultural theory in
investigating the global-local youth cultures, and to expose the impact of global
cultural streams on local cultural forms.
Subcultural Theory
The concept of 'subculture' often refers to separateness by highlighting cultural
contrast in terms of cultural clashes. The notion of 'subculture' was traditionally
14 Although all cultures without any exception are subject to a bricolage quality, the
ju.xtapositions of elements and practices in transnational migrant cultures are more drastic
than those in relatively more established cultures.
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used as a convenient label to define some groups of people that had something in
common with each other which distinguishes them in a significant way from the
members of other social groups. The concept has its origins in research on
American society. In the late 1940s it came to be linked to the sociology of
deviance. Studies of subculture, as I shall briefly touch upon in a while, pictured
common people not only as highly differentiated, but as active and creative.
Subcultures have usually been considered to be opposed to both the 'public' and
the 'masses'. While the 'public' has been conceived as a body of rational
individuals, responsible citizens who are able to form their own opinion and
express it through officially recognised democratic channels, the 'mass' has often
been portrayed as undifferentiated, irrational and politically manipulated.
The Chicago School of sociology, in which the tradition of subcultural
studies has its roots, was interested in exploring the diversity of human behaviour
in the American city. The notion of a mass society, on the other hand, was
developed by critical theorists working in an entirely different scholarly tradition
at the Frankfurt School (which was relocated at Columbia University in New
York during the Second World War). These two academic legacies are to some
extent fused in the subcultural studies in the Birmingham tradition of the 1970s,
which focused on the relations between subcultures and media, commerce and
mass culture.
The Chicago School of sociology concentrated on the investigation of
human behaviour in an urban environment. Robert E. Park et al. (1925) portrayed
the changing face of the modern city in relation to the division of labour, money,
50
transportation, communication and social mobility. The subsequent members of
the School dealt with the existing consequences of industrialisation and
urbanisation. Cressey (1932) touched upon the social mobility of woman
migrants; Milton M. Gordon (1947) studied the children of migrant ethnic groups;
and Howard Becker (1 997/1963) worked with the jazz musicians as another form
of deviant 'subculture'. During the 1960s the perspective on society's various
'subcultures' began to shift from the negative notion of 'deviation' to the positive
notion of 'cultural multitude', as exhibited by Becker (ibid.) in explaining the
cultural productivity of the 'deviant' jazz musicians. Jock Young (1971),
influenced by both the Frankfurt School's Marxist vision of a mass society and the
Chicago School's liberal-pluralist studies of 'subcultures', alternately considered
'subcultures' resistant and subordinate, politically hopeful and spectacularly
impotent.' 5 Young's main contribution to the theory of 'subcultures' was the way
he defined 'leisure': leisure is purportedly non-alienated activity which is
undertaken by individual to win personal space. In fact, Jock Young's work acts
as a bridge between the distinct theoretical and political agendas of the work
associated with the Chicago School and those of the later Birmingham School.
The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University
(CCCS) was established in 1964, and profoundly shaped the theories of
'subculture' for the next two decades. Researchers turned their attention precisely
In his work Young (1971: 134) concludes that 'it was not the drug per se, but the
reason why the drug was taken determined whether there would be an adverse social
reaction to its consumption. The crucial yardstick in this respect is the ethos of
productivity [-a point which I will return in the coming sections]. If a drug either stepped
up work efficiency or aided relaxation after work it was approved of; if it was used for
purely hedonistic ends it was condemned.
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to the category of 'youth'. Their analyses were influenced by the work of a
number of British Marxist critics -Raymond Williams, T.H.Thomson and Richard
}Ioggart, but also by continental theorists such as Louis Aithuser, Antonio
Gramsci and Roland Barthes. The primary aim of the Birmingham theorists was to
locate youth subcultures in relation to three broader cultural structures, the
working-class or the 'parent culture', the 'dominant' culture, and mass culture.
Analysts at the CCCS emphasised the expressive culture of youth which is subject
to the market forces. Culture of the post-war youth was shaped by the affluence
of the consumer market, the rise of mass culture, mass communication,
telecommunication, education facilities, and the arrival of the whole range of
distinctive styles in dress and rock-music (Clarke et al., 1975).
The analysts at the Birmingham School defined 'subcultures' as 'subsets -
smaller, mere localised and differentiated structures within one of the larger
cultural neorks' (Clarke et al., 1975: 13). Subculture is both distinct from, and
overlaps with, the culture of which it is a part. The school always dealt with
working-class youth 'subcultures', and their subcultural status was linked to their
class subordination. Changes in leisure activities as well as commercialism
fostered a 'generational consciousness' for working-class youth in a way that
unbalanced their class- and family-based identity. 'Generational consciousness' is
likely to be strong among those youngsters who are upwardly and outwardly
mobile. It involves that young persons value the 'dominant' culture, and sacrifice
the 'parent' culture (Clarke et al., 1975: 51). Working-class youth, having
generational consciousness, affirm the 'dominant culture' while protesting it. In
this sense, the theorists sharply differentiate working-class youth cultures from
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middle-class youth cultures. Middle-class youth cultures -such as the hippie
movement, student protests, and drop-out 'subcultures'- attempt to transform the
dominant culture as in new patterns of living, of family life, or work, because they
spring from the social space of the dominant culture which shapes the structure.
The working-class youth cultures, on the other hand, affirm the dominant culture
while they criticise the 'parent' culture from which they originate.
The key aspect of the agenda for the CCCS was a kind of' symptom of
class-in-decline. The main hypothesis was: when working-class communities were
undergoing change and displacement and when the 'parent' culture is no longer
cohesive, working-class youth responds by becoming 'subcultural'. Phil Cohen
(1972) claimed that youth attempts to replace a lost sense of working-class
'community' with subcultural 'territory' -a shift which is symptomatic of the
relocation of youthful expression to the field of leisure rather than work. In his
work where he explained the post-war British youth living in the East End of
London, Cohen (1972: 26) defines 'subculture' as "a compromise solution to two
contradictory needs: the need to create and express autonomy and difference from
parents and, by extension, their culture and the need to maintain the security of
existing ego defences and the parental identifications which support them".
Although they may win space, 'subcultures', thus, play an essentially
conservative role. Their conservative role is furthermore strengthened because
they fail to bring about a major structural change and fail to provide career
prospects for youth. Subsequently, John Clarke, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson and
Brian Roberts, in their theoretical introduction to Resistance Through Rituals
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(1975) carried the notion of 'subcultures' further, acknowledging the increasing
role of 'affluence' and leisure in youth activity while insisting on youth's
continuing location in class-based categories. To explain this dynamic relation
between leisure and class, they returned to Antonio Gramsci, drawing on his
notion of hegemony -a term which describes the means by which the ruling classes
secure their authority over subordinate classes, not by coercion but by obtaining
the latter's consent. This is done through on-going processes of negotiation and
regulation between ruling and subaltern classes. The subaltern classes operate by
winning space back, by issuing challenges. The working-class 'subcultures', thus,
consistently win space from the dominant culture (Clarke et al., 1975: 42). Clarke
et al. thus emphasise 'resistance' more than Cohen, giving subcultures a more
creative kind of agency. Yet, these analysts agree with Cohen's narrative of failure
in a wider context: working-class youth's 'resistance' is acted out in the 'limited'
field of leisure, rather than in the work-place.
In contrast to most of the researchers at the CCCS, Angela McRobbie
(1991/1978) has offered a very different perspective on youth subcultures,
looking at the way subcultural analysis had tended more or less to equate
subcultural youth with boys and to ignore the role of girls altogether. Dick
Hebdige, on the other hand, reshaped the main focus of the school. His
spectacular work, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979), offers a genealogy
which is less bound up with class than the other researchers at the CCCS. Indeed,
in his book priority is given to ethnicity rather than class. Subcultural style is
always culturally syncretic -for instance, Ska borrows from both reggae and the
Caribbean traditions. To explain this syncretic process, he borrowed Claude Levi-
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Strauss's concept of bricolage. Hebdige saw punks as bricoleurs par excellence,
using dislocation as a form of 'refusal'.
The legacy of the CCCS was also seen in the subsequent works of Stuart
Hall (1988, 1991, 1992, 1997) and Paul Gilroy (1987, 1993, 1995). My
theoretical framework is partly indebted to the works of both the Chicago and
Birmingham theorists. Yet, in my work I seek to go beyond the approach of
subcultural theory. As Chris Waters (1981) argued, subcultural theory seems to
reify separate hornogenous and oppositional cultural groups, and regards
'cultures' as static entities. As pointed out before, from my point of view there are
no static entities called 'cultures', there are, instead, 'constitutive social processes,
creating specific and distinctive ways of life' (Williams, 1977: 19). Furthermore,
subcultural theory does not seem to be applicable for the study of contemporary
minority youth cultures which are, to a high degree, subject to transnational
streams. Minority youth cultures such as hip-hop are based on a bricolage of
styles, discourses, signs, symbols, meanings and myths which travel throughout
the world. They emerge in a time of impurity and blending. The term subculture is
not sufficient to explore cultural forms of minority youth, whose identity
formation processes are subject to a more complex set of dynamics rather than
that of majority youth. Subsequently, I will explore the major landmarks of the
formation of one of the minority youth cultures, i.e., hip-hop. Hip-hop youth
culture will be scrutinised in line with its origins and its impact on a remarkable
number of working-class Berlin-Turkish youth who have been practising
structural outsiderism.
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Outsiderism: Ethnic Minoriy hip -hop youth culture
Today, youngsters live in a time of crisis, a time of exceptional damage and
danger. Since the 1970s, deindustrialisation, post-Fordism, consumerism,
economic restructuring and resurgence of racism and xenophobia have created
fundamentally new realities for young people. Our discussions of minority youth
cultures are incomplete if we fail to locate them within the racialised and
ethriicisized social crisis of our time, but our understanding of that crisis is also
incomplete if we cannot distance ourselves from the nostalgia of 1960s and if we
fail to understand what young people are trying to express through their dance,
dress, speech and visual imagery (Lipsitz, 1994: 18).
Unwanted as workers, underfunded as students, undermined as citizens,
and wanted only by the police and the courts, minority youth recently seem to be
subject to a state of structural outsiderism. Structural outsiderism can create
minority youth cultures which offer the youngsters an identity and a sense of
belonging in a harsh world. Modem cities tend to be fragmented into patchwork
diasporic homelands such as Kreuzberg, Southall and Rinkeby. Despite the
cultural stigma surrounding them, such minority youth cultures and diasporic
homelands offer intimacy and security. It is the feeling of being subordinate
outsiders that creates toughness, gangs and rap groups within ethnic minority
youth as a form of reaction. Protest and opposition are simultaneously created in
these occasions. The formation of gangs, rap groups, conflict, symbolic disputes
and violence reflects the new poverty, civil insecurity and homelessness in society.
The cultural markers of protest and opposition are frequently cosmopolitan in
nature. Global hip-hop youth culture which is inspired by the Bronx, Harlem and
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the NBA (National Basketball League) is an instance of such cosmopolitan
minority youth cultures. Hip-hop trousers, Rasta hair, new linguistic expressions
with a strong black-American accent, and a permanent 'cool' posture "are
scattered around the symbolically loaded 'dramaturgy' to provide roots but also
to build barriers" against the life-worlds of dominant ethnic majority and migrant
parents (Alund, 1996: 27). These cultural markers serve to unite divided young
people in one life style which symbolises protest and counter-culture. They
attempt to create space for themselves by their peculiar music sound, noisy cars,
expanding graffiti boundaries, rebellious dressing style, and symbols. All these
cultural markers urge the youngsters to form an alternative family network in the
street and youth centres. These relations formed in opposition to the outside
world give potency to the youths to form a peculiar diasporic cultural identity on
the parameters of 'authenticity', transculturalism and transnationalism.
In Berlin, as in many other big cities of Western Europe, new cultures
transcending frontiers, cultural amalgamations and transethnic urban social
movements have taken successive forms. Kreuzberg is illustrative in this sense.
Young people in general are socially conscious and critical of the increasing
discrimination, segregation, exclusion and racism in society. Consciousness of a
shared position of subordination in society is expressed via the words of rap
music, graffiti on the city walls, paintings and drawings in a way that branches out
into new and growing social movements against racism and enforced ethnic
boundaries. These new syncretic forms of expressive minority youth cultures
expose a social movement of urban youth which already has a distinct political
ideology. Gilroy (1987) defines this movement in the British context as an utopian
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extension of the boundaries of politics, a powerful cultural formation, and an
alternative public sphere which may offer a significant alternative to the misery of
hard drugs and the radical powerlessness of inner urban life.
Hip-hop youth culture, which is an amalgamation of rap, break-dance and
graffiti, was first created throughout the 1970s by predominantly black and Latino
dancers, musicians and graffiti artists in New York. Rap as a musical form started
to appear on recordings from the late 1970s and drew on the Caribbean vocalising
associated with Jamaican sound systems, African rhythm and blues and soul
styles. These were later connected to fragments of Euro-disco music. Rap was
created out of a series of musical exchanges across the Atlantic, forged together
with the techniques of scratching and mixing, using turntables, mixers and drum
machines. It was formed initially out of specific conditions within the Bronx area
of New York City. Following blues, jazz and reggae, the ghetto became central to
the emergence of rap. Unlike reggae artists, who were responding to the
experience of immigration, rap in the USA was formed out of the experience of
urban segregation. Rap, thus, emerges as the cultural form of resistance against
social exclusion in the age of deindustrialisation. In other words, rap has become
the music of the tense present for those who do not have a past to celebrate or a
future to rely on.
The American rap scene is dominated by two different schools of rap: the
rap of the West Coast and East Coast. The East Coast rap refers to the non-
commercial rap made in New York by the emergent artists, many of whom are
women, Chicano, Korean and Samoan. The orientation of the lyrics is more
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significant than the rhythm and melody; and what is crucial is the message and the
narrative of the artists. Contrarily, the West Coast rap is more commercial; and
rhythm is more important than lyrics. Some scholars, in their exploration of hip-
hop youth culture in the USA, neglect the East Coast rap tradition due to the
focus on a very partial and commercial L.A. pop-rap scene (Brennan, 1994;
Cross, 1993). Afrika Bambaataa, DJ Kool Herc and Grandmaster Flash are some
examples of the East Coast rap. Ice-T, Tone Loc, Ice Cube and Easy-E are the
examples of the West Coast rap.
New York City is the source of the global hip-hop youth culture. Just
before the gangs of the Bronx disintegrated in the summer of 1972, there had
been an explosion of writing on the walls of the Bronx. Early pioneers included
Taki, Super Kool and Lee. This was the beginning of the social practice we now
know as graffiti. There had always been writing on walls, but the figurative and
written type of graffiti of the dispossessed black and Chicano youth created a new
form of art in the Bronx. In 1973 Kool Herc began to formulate what later
became known as hip-hop by playing James Brown, doing shout-outs from the
microphone, and screaming 'Rock the house'. He called his dancers B-boys.
These 'break' (B-) dancers battled on the floor to see who could bust the most
outrageous moves. They would dance solo or in crews. Breaking advanced very
quickly into an astonishing combination of gymnastics, jazz and kung-fu moves all
held together by a pacing to the beat that marked out the territory of the breaker.
Grandmaster Flash and Afrika Bambaata who were in competition with Kool
Herc also made major contributions to the hip-hop culture (Cross, 1993).
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In the early 1980s, the intervention of Hollywood transformed the local
black & Hispanic American hip-hop youth culture into a global youth culture. The
movies such as Flashdance, Breakin Wild Syle and Breakin and Entering
brought the new dance to the world. Accordingly, the meaning of the black and
Chicano origin hip-hop youth culture was stripped away by means of mass media,
modern technology and the entertainment and music industry. Although a great
size of world youth population was attracted by this new youth culture, it was the
minority youths who were largely fascinated by the message and content of the
hip-hop culture. This new cultural form was attractive for the working-class
ethnic minority youths who have been subject to structural outsiderism, exclusion,
segregation, racism and xenophobia in their countries of settlement, because it
was providing them a great opportunity to articulate their social and cultural
identities. Rap turned out to be an efficient informal way of articulation for the
ethnic minority youths in an environment where they could not express
themselves formally through media.
As an exceptional global youth culture which emerged through
contemporary transnational means of communications with a particularist local
focus, hip-hop has also introduced an opportunity to the ethnic minority youths in
the West to express their ethnicity and 'authentic' (parental) cultures (Alund and
Schierup, 1991; Alund, 1996; Sansone, 1995). The daily life of the descendants of
migrants depends very much on the management of ethnicity. Their ethnicity
implies a great deal of self-reliance, skills in the presentation of self in different
circumstances and a degree of integration in, and familiarity4 with, German
majority society. In fact, their use of traditions requires both detachment from the
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parental culture and a particular form of ethnic allegiance. Through the agency of
hip-hop and the rap lyrics, Berlin-Turkish youths, for instance, are capable of
celebrating their Turkishness and diasporic positionings as I shall specifically
explain in the coming chapters.
Since the rappers are the major producers of the hip-hop culture, they
seem to have a great impact on the construction of cultural identity of the
minority youths. As 'organic intellectuals' and 'contemporary minstrels' of their
own ethnic communities, they can transform 'common-sense' knowledge of
oppression into a new critical awareness that is attentive to ethnic, class and
sexual contradictions (Decker, 1992: 80; Negus, 1996: 105-113). As I shall later
point out in drawing up the framework of the deployment of the parental culture,
the Turkish rappers in Berlin also verbalise a 'double diasporic consciousness'.
The working-class youth groups I worked with were highly attracted by Turkish
arabesk music and hip-hop. Arabesk is a hybrid form of urban music which
appeared in Turkey in the late sixties as a reflection of their parents' first
experience of immigration in the homeland. It narrates and musicalises the
troublesome experience of dislocation, dispersion and longing for home. Hip-hop,
contrarily, reflects the experiences of migration and urban segregation in the
diaspora. On that account, as arabesk music taste manifesting the continuation of
parental culture represents one side of the 'double diasporic consciousness' of
these youngsters, hip-hop represents the other side (see Chapter 6).
The study of modern diasporic consciousness has recently become a
crucial aspect within the field of cultural and ethnic studies. In this work, I
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perceive the diaspora communities becoming more active, rational social agents
making decisions, developing ethnic strategies and transnational networks to
survive and to maximise their gains in their country of settlement. The Turkish
diaspora in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, constitutes an illustrative
sample in terms of the processes of identity and ethnic strategy formation of the
modern diaspora communities. It is evident that the Turkish diaspora in West
Europe with its three million members constitutes a transmigratory feature by
which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link
together their societies of origin and settlement. The Turkish diaspora can no
longer be exclusively defined as the foreign workers who have been driven away
from their homeland as a necessity of the global capitalism; rather they should be
seen as having become political and social actors in their new countries of
residence.
*	 *	 *
To recapitulate, this chapter has been primarily concerned with the
redefinition of notions of culture and minority youth culture. It was stated that
there have been two dominant understandings of culture: holistic and syncretic.
While the holistic notion of culture perceives transnational migrants and their
descendants as 'victims of displacement', conversely the syncretic notion sees
them as 'bricoleurs' and active social agents. Subsequently, it was expounded
that the study of ethnic minority youth cultures should consist of the analysis of
global cultural flows which shape the identity formation processes of the displaced
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individuals. Accordingly, the question of identity has been outlined as a matter of
politics and process, but not of essence and inheritance.
This chapter has also explored the theories of youth culture and
'subculture', which were put forward by the Chicago School of Sociology and
CCCS at Birmingham University. This chapter has claimed that these two schools,
which have studied youth cultures through the notions of 'deviation' (by the
Chicago theorists), class parameters and generational conflict (by the Birmingham
theorists), have serious pitfalls. The theories of 'subcultures' have been found
insufficient to study ethnic minority youth cultures. This is why my work attempts
to go beyond the limits of these theories, combining the concepts of ethnicity,
cultural bricolage, globalism and diasporic consciousness. To do so, Berlin-
Turkish hip-hop youth culture will be thoroughly explored in the following
chapters.
It is evident that the 'transmigrants" 6 take actions, make decisions, form
political, religious, ethnic organisations, constitute discourses, and develop
subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect
them simultaneously to both their country of origin and settlement. Accordingly,
in the next chapter I shall scrutinise the political participation strategies employed
by the Turkish population in Berlin since the beginning of the migratory process
in the 1960s. The mapping-out of these strategies will be reflecting on all of the
Turkish communities in order to be able to locate the working-class minority
16 The term 'transmigrants' has been introduced by L. Basch, N. G. Schiller and C.S.
Blanc (1994, 1995). 'Transmigrants are immigrants whose daily lives depend on multiple
and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are
configured in relationship to more than one nation-state' (1995: 48).
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youth culture within a broader framework. In this context, I will also suggest the
notion of 'diasporic youth' as an alternative term to those problematic
conceptualisations on Turkish-origin youth in Germany such as 'immigrant youth'
and 'foreign youth'.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSTRUCTING MODERN DIASPORAS
This chapter sets out to provide a theoretical context to understand the way in
which the cliasporic identity is constructed and articulated by the Berlin-Turkish
hip-hop youth. In doing so, my aim is not to reinscribe the ideology of cultural
difference by locating the descendants of Turkish migrants as Berlin-Turks in a
continuous space between Germany and Turkey. Neither am I attempting to
exoticise these youths in their cultural space by pinning their identity on a kind of
essence. What I want to do is to demonstrate that the whole question of identity is
a matter of politics and process rather than of inheritance. In order to reveal a
fuller view of the diasporic consciousness displayed by the working-class Berlin-
Turkish hip-hop youth, I shall explore the nature of ethnicity as an expression of
collective identity within the Turkish population in Berlin. Therefore, I will firstly
examine bow ethnicity is historically employed by the Berlin-Turkish population
as a survival strategy during the process of negotiation with majority society.
Secondly, I will scrutinise the notion of diaspora under the guidance of
contemporary scholars who offer various interpretations of the concept. Finally, I
will contemplate the cultural identity of the Berlin-Turkish youths in the light of,
and in relation to, the notion of diaspora.
The Changing Face of Ethnic Group Political Strategies
Contemporary labour-ethnic minorities in Europe can no longer be simply
considered temporary migrant communities who live with the 'myth of return' or
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the passive victims of global capitalism. They have rather become permanent
settlers, active social agents and decision-makers in their destination countries.
The strategies and organisations developed by the migrants and their descendants
in their countries of settlement may spring from various material and political
sources: the racial and exclusionary immigration policies of the country of
settlement, the repressive political regime of their country of origin, their
homeland's relations with other countries, the changing streams in world politics,
inter-diaspora relations and class interests. These factors, which are strengthened
by global interconnectedness, have recently become the main determinants of the
politics of identity undertaken by ethnic minorities in the West.
As these factors are applied to the Berlin-Turks, it becomes apparent that
both internal and external factors have impelled them to construct some ethnic-
based political participation strategies and identities. There is enough' evidence
that Turkish labour migrants in Europe have developed two various political
participation strategies depending on the nature of problems they have
encountered in time: a migrant strategy and a minorfty strategy. Both strategies
have been principally formed along ethnic lines due to the institutional and
political context of Germany since the recruitment treaty in 1961.
In, what follows, after a brief history of recruitment and migratory process
in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), I shall examine how these political
strategies have been constructed and articulated by the Berlin-Turkish migrants
along ethnic lines. Subsequently, I shall introduce the notion of diasporic identity
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as a form of ethnic consciousness which is peculiar to the working-class Turkish
hip-hop youth in Berlin.
The Migratory Process
Migration into post-war Germany started as labour recruitment to mitigate
shortages in specific industries. Between 1955 and 1968, the FRG concluded
intergovernmental contracts with eight Mediterranean countries: first Italy
(1955), then Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961 and 1964), Morocco
(1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). The German
Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit -BFA) set up recruitment
offices in the countries concerned. Employers seeking workers had to apply to
the BFA and pay a fee. The BFA then selected suitable workers, tested their
work skills, gave them medical check-ups and screened police and political
records.'7 Migrants were recruited at first for agriculture and construction, later
by all branches of industry, where they generally had low-skilled manual jobs
(Castles and Kosack, 1973). Guest-worker programmes were designed to solve
immediate labour shortages in Germany by recruiting workers on temporary,
short-term residence and work permits (Castles et al., 1984). The Turkish
population in the FRG rose from 6,700 in 1961 to 605,000 in 1973 (Table 1).
17 The story of migration from the 'developing' countries to the FRG was successfully
exhibited by John Berger et al. (1975) in the book, The Seventh Man. The photographs in
the book taken during the journey from home to Germany can partly express the
difficulties which the immigrants had to experience during the migration. The photos
taken during the medical check-ups, for instance, evidently prove how degrading was the
way the selection of the workers was conducted by the 'experts' of the recruiting country.
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1.0
16.5
15.2
12.9
34.3
33.3
32.0
30.3
28.6
27.9
28.1
1.2
4.3
6.4
6.4
6.9
7.7
8.4
7.3
8.0
8.5
8.6
1961
1970
1973
1977
1987
1989
1990a
1992
1993
1994
6,700
249,400
605,000
508,000
1,453,700
1,612,600
1,675,900
1,779,600
1,854,900
1,918,400
1,965,577
686,200
2,600,600
3,966,200
3,948,300
4,240,500
4,845,900
5,342,500
5,882,300
6,495,800
6,878,100
6,990,510
Table 1. Germany's Non-German population and Turkish Minority
Sources: Statist isches Jahrbuchfiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1992, 1994, 1995.
Notes: a) Data from 1961-1990 for the 'old Lander'; b) data from 1991 for the 'old' and
'new' Lander.
In the early stages of the migration, Turkish migrants were mainly men
between the ages of 20 and 39, relatively skilled and educated in comparison to
the average working population in Turkey, and from the economically more
developed regions of the country (Abadan-Unat, 1976; Abadan-Unat and
Kemiksiz, 1986; Martin, 1991). The ratio of rural migrants at this stage was just
17.2 %. In the second half of the 1960s, recruitment consisted of rural workers
(Gökdere, 1978). Berlin was relatively late in recruiting Turkish workers. Since
the textile and electronics sectors demanded cheap female labour, it was
conversely the women who first migrated to Berlin in 1964. Turkish workers who
migrated to Berlin by 1973 were primarily from the eastern provinces and from
economically less-developed regions of Turkey.
As shown in the Table 1, there has been a continual increase in the non-
German population through the post-war period. The exceptions are the figures
for 1977 which can be explained because the entry of non-European Community
workers was banned in November 1973 by the German government due to the oil
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crisis, the consequent economic stagnation and political considerations. Since
1973, the composition of the Turkish migrant population has tended to become a
more general population migration in the form of family reunification and political
asylum rather than mainly labour migration.
The formation of ethnic-based political strategies
Der Spiegel (14 April 1997), a prominent liberal weekly magazine, denounced the
'foreigners' in the country as 'dangerously alien' and as the cause of the failure of
the 'multicultural society'. In the magazine, Turkish youths in Germany were
presented as 'criminals', 'fundamentalists', 'nationalist' and 'traumatic'. A similar
trend to the media coverage of the Turks in Germany has also recently been
exhibited in the academia. Wilhelm Heitmeyer (1997), who was referred to in the
Der Spiegel article, has become a polemical name after the publication of his book
on the German-Turkish youth, Verlockender Fundamentalismus (Enticing
Fundamentalism). In his book, he concluded that it is the Turks who are not
tempted to integrate and to incorporate themselves into the system. His main
criterion in declaring the self-isolationist tendency of the Turkish-origin youths
was their contentment to live with Islam and Turkishness. What was missing in
both works was the underestimation of the structural constraints of Germany,
which have remarkably shaped the survival strategies of migrants and their
descendants. Such an approach, which does not consider the impact of the
institutional structure of the receiving country on immigrant political mobilisation,
is quite essentialist and exciusionist.
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Patrick R. Ireland (1994) has drawn our attention to the legal conditions
and political institutions of the receiving counties in mapping out the nature of
immigrant political mobilisation. He has stated that "certain immigrant
communities have withdrawn voluntarily from host-society political life in the face
of institutional indifference and hostility" (1994: 8). Ireland has formulated the
'institutional channelling theory' as an alternative to the class and race/ethnicity
theories to understand immigrant political strategies. Accordingly, he claims that
the reason behind migrant groups' organising themselves politically along ethnic
lines is primarily because 'host-society' institutions have nurtured ethnicity
through their policies and practices. Similarly, Turkish migrants have hitherto
organised themselves politically in Germany along ethnic lines because the
institutional context in which they have been has primarily made them to do so.
The primary constituent of the German institutional context to which the
immigrants are subject, is the laws of citizenship which frame the legal status of
minorities. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) constitution, the Basic Law
(Grundgesetz), recognises two categories of rights: general and reserved. General
rights apply to all individuals in the FRG and include freedom of expression,
liberty of person, and freedom of conscience (Art. 2,3,4 and 5). Reserved rights
are restricted to German citizens, and include the right of peaceable assembly,
freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of occupation (Art.
8,9,11 and 12). The Basic Law does not prescribe how citizenship is recognised
or conferred, but the criteria are based first and foremost on ethnic nationality.
The rules governing the acquisition of citizenship are defined by the Basic Law
Article 116, the preamble to the Basic Law, and the 1913 Imperial and State
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Citizenship Law (Reic/is- und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz), and provide that
citizenship is passed by descent from parent to child.' 8 Basic Law article 116
reads as follows:
(1)... A German within the meaning of this Basic Law, unless
otherwise regulated by law, is a person who possesses German
citizenship, or who has been received in the territory of the
German Reich as of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee
of German stock or as the spouse or descendant of such a
person.
(2) Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and
8 May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political,
racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall be
granted citizenship on application...
The Imperial Naturalisation Law of 1913 was designed to make the acquisition of
German citizenship difficult for aliens out of fear that the Reich was being invaded
by immigrants from the East, especially Poles and Jews. At the same time, the law
sharply reduced the barriers to the repatriation of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler)
from outside the Reich (Brubaker, 1992: 114-119; Klusmeyer, 1993: 84;
Marshall, 1992).
The claim to naturalisation has always been difficult for the non-EU
'foreigners' in the FRG, and has required repudiation of the citizenship of the
country of citizenship. The non-EU 'foreigners' are denied the right to dual
citizenship; even the children of migrants born and raised in Germany could not
automatically receive the rights of citizenship.' 9
 The 'foreigners' who are willing
to renounce their previous citizenship can be naturalised only after they have been
18 Until 1974, the father detemiined a child's nationality, but now either parent is
sufficient.
19 It is common for Turkish applicants to re-apply immediately after their Gemian
naturalisation for their temporarily-lost-Turkish citizenship.Turkey allows dual citizenship
once the military service of the applicant has been resolved.
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living in Germany for at least fifteen years. In contrast, the Volksdeutschen (ethnic
Germans defined by the Article 116 of the Basic Law) -primarily Poles and
Russians who can improve German ancestry- have a constitutional right to
naturalisation.
However, the German government recently established two mechanisms
which, for the first time, provide migrants with the right to claim citizenship.
According to the new Auslandergesetz (1991) and the Gesetz zur Anderung
asylverfahrens, ausländer- und staatsangehOrigkeitsrechtlicher Vorschrften
(1993), two groups of Ausländer have been legally entitled to naturalisation
(paragraphs 85 and 86 of the Auslandergesetz). Paragraph 85 declares that
'foreigners' between the ages of 16 and 23, who have been resident in Germany
for more than eight years, attended a school in Germany for at least six years and
who have not been convicted of seridus offences, have the right to be naturalised.
On the other hand, paragraph 86 introduces that those 'migrants', who have been
resident in Germany for at least 15 years and possess a residence permit, have the
right to naturalisation -the absence of a conviction of a serious criminal offence
and financial independence of the applicant are also primarily crucial for the
acquisition of citizenship according to this paragraph.2°
Non-European Union immigrants, or resident aliens, mostly have been
given what Marshall (1950) defined as social and civil rights, but not political
rights. The immigrants built a very real political presence in Germany where their
political participation in the system was not legally allowed. The legal barriers
20 For further information about the new German citizenship laws and regulations, see
Brandt (1996).
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denying political participation provided a ground for the Turkish immigrants in
Germany to organise themselves politically along collective ethnic lines. As a
response to the German insistence on the exclusionary 'Ausländerstatus', Turkish
migrant communities have tended to develop strong ethnic structures and
maintain ethnic boundaries. 2 ' The lack of political participation and representation
in the receiving country made them direct their political activity towards their
country of origin. In fact, this home-oriented participation has received
encouragement from Turkey which has set up networks of consular services and
other official organisations (religious, educational and commercial). Homeland
opposition parties and movements have also forged an organisational presence in
Germany.
This early form of political participation which was home-oriented has
cross-cut with the migrant strategy, the framework of which I shall discuss below.
In the later stages of the migratory process, the legal position of the immigrants
with regard to residence and political rights have remained provisional. They have
been given the same rights as Germans in the unions and in work-place co-
determination under the law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), but they are still
excluded from all other forms of formal participation or personal influence in
political decision-making process. This is the stage when the Turkish immigrants
have been systematically marginalised by the state. As a response to this 'ethnic
minorisation' they started forming their own associations along ethnic lines -a
point which I shall again explore in the following section.
21 This strong ethnic boundry construction is what Rex (1994: 2) calls "differential
incorporation".
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In addition to the constitutional bathers, the absence of a general
immigration policy has also compelled the Turkish immigrants in Germany to
isolate themselves in ethnic enclaves from the dominant society. 22 From its
inception to the present, the Federal Republic's official policy has been that
"Germany is not a country of immigration". Lacking a general immigration policy,
the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) issued the Ausländergesetz (Foreigners Law)
in 1965. This law did not give foreigners a right to residence, merely stating that
"a residence permit may be granted, if it does not harm the interests of the Federal
Republic of Germany". This term is a key phrase in policies regarding migrants. In
the 1960s and early 1970s it was not only the granting of political rights to foreign
immigrants, which was certainly not seen as being in the interests of the German
Federal Republic, also the law of 1965 specifically excluded them from other civil
rights:
Foreigners enjoy all basic rights; except the basic rights of
assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement and
free choice of occupation, place of work and place of education,
and protection from exiradition abroad (Aligemeine
Verwa1tungsvorschrft zur Ausflihrung des Auslandergesetz,
paragraph 6).
Thus, the German state established a system of 'institutional discrimination',
through which temporary guest workers could be recruited, controlled and sent
away, 'as the interests of capital dictated' (Castles, 1985: 523). The main concern
of the first stage of the Ausländerpolitik between 1965 and 1973 was economic
considerations. The second stage of the law was shaped by concerns of increasing
social problems and political tensions. The early policy was impracticable, not
Fredrik Barth (1969) has defined such withdrawal from the majority society as
'isolation'.
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only because of the various international agreements granting rights of family
reunification, to which Germany was a party, but also because many firms found
that rotation led to problems of labour fluctuation and high training costs (ibid.).
Accordingly, in November 1973 the entry of further labour force from non-EC
countries was banned, and family reunion permitted. Afterwards, the Federal
Labour Office decreed that work permits for migrant workers were not to be
renewed if West German workers were thought to be available for the job
concerned. This meant that in some cases the migrant workers were forced to
leave their jobs and return home.
The third stage of the Auslanderpolitik started when the Christian
Democratic Party (CDU) came into power in 1983. By the early 1980s the
'foreigners problem' had become a major issue in West German politics. While in
power, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had moved towards increasingly
restrictive policies on migrant rights. On the other hand, the CDU was proposing
to implement stricter policies for the control of foreigners and encouragement of
repatriation. A CDU resolution in the Federal Parliament in 1981 stated: "The role
of the Federal Republic of Germany as a national unitary state and as part of a
divided nation does not permit the commencement of an irreversible development
to a multiethnic state" (Castles, 1985: 528). Consequently, Chancellor Helmut
Kohl's government in coalition with Christian Socialist Party (CSU) and Free
Democratic Party (FDP) radicalised the Ausländerpolitik, aiming for the
restriction of further immigration and encouragement of repatriation. By
'integration', the conservative government meant that those foreigners who were
unable to adapt themselves to the German norms, values and laws were to be
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deported to allow those remaining to be assimilated. In addition to the so-called
'integration' the government restricted the entry of further immigrants, spouses
and dependent children of immigrants by applying new quotas. Finally, the
government encouraged repatriation with a decree between October 30, 1983 and
June 30, 1984 by offering premiums of DM 10,500 plus DM 1,500 per dependent
child if they left the country immediately. The government also 'guaranteed' the
reintegration of repatriating children to the new conditions in Turkey by subsiding
some adaptation schools and providing German teachers in these schools.23
The alteration of the ethnic strategies amongst the Berlin-Turks has
considerably been bounded to the transformation of the Ausländerpolitik in Berlin
as well as to the ethnically defined citizenship laws. The periodisation of the
Ausländerpolitik in Berlin is slightly different from the rest of the Federal
Republic of Germany. Thomas Schwartz (1992: 121-138) provides an overview
of three phases of Auslanderpolitik in Berlin. In the first phase (late 60s and early
70s), when the wall was constructed, the law was characterised mainly in terms of
addressing problems of urban planning. Accordingly, demographic and
employment factors became the key concerns of policy makers, and 'integration'
There are five adaptation schools in Turkey as such: one in Ankara, one in Izmir and
three in Istanbul. These secondary and high schools are subject to the curriculum of the
Ministry of National Education in Turkey. The schools are called Alman Anadolu Lisesi
(German Anatolian Grammar School) where the medium of education is German. These
schools were formed under the joint Cultural Treaty signed between Turkish and German
governments in 1984. By this treaty it was agreed that the German government would
contribute to finance the education of the returnee children and to provide 90 German
teachers. In the first year of their arrival in Turkey, the students are placed in a prep-
school where there are only returnees. Here, they are given intensive courses on Turkish
language and literature, Turkish history, and Turkish geography. The following year they
are placed in mixed classrooms with the local students. The rationale behind the mixed
classrooms programme is to assimilate them to the Turkish culture and way of life more
easily. For a detailed information about the reintegration of the returnees, see Abadan-
Unat (1988).
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was considered a structural concern. Later, in the second phase of the
Auslanderpolitik (1980s), 'representative politics' (Beuftragtenpolitik) emerged
as the central orientation of Berlin government. Berlin was the first Land in the
Federal Republic to establish an office of Auslanderbeaufiragte (Commissioner
for Foreigners' Affairs). The office was originally envisioned as a liaison between
local government and the various ethnic organisations. Finally the third phase is
that introduced by the Red-Green coalition in 1989. This phase, which is in a
sense peculiar to Berlin, has been dominated by concepts of anti-racism and
multiculturalism -a point to which I shall return shortly. These phases of
Auslanderpolitik have shaped the form of political participation of those Turkish
migrants who lack legal political rights. In the following section, after pointing out
the three phases of Ausländerpolltik, I will elaborate the main landmarks of the
ethnic strategies developed by Berlin-Turkish communities in relation to the
Ausländerpolitik.
Migrant strategy
The first generation of migrants, who conceived themselves as temporary, arrived
in their country of residence by leaving their families behind a painful experience.
The nature of the migration to the West from Turkey is mostly chain migration.
This type of migration has played a major role in the incorporation of kin and
fellow villagers into the migration stream. Chain migration in Berlin has two
aspects. The first aspect is the in-coming spouses and children who joined the
process of migration with the family reunification in 1973 and onwards. The
second aspect of chain migration is the dense in-coming of migrants from disaster
areas in Turkey, in a way that led to high representation of people from the
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Varto/Erzurum and Gediz/Kutahya areas (earthquakes) as well as Konya and
Isparta (floods) (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 93).
Chain migration makes migrants' family relations or local conmiunity
relations both in the country of origin and in the country of immigration more vital
and instrumental. When the migrants arrive in the receiving country they are given
shelter, advice and support by their kin and former neighbours. Their previous
social group status and class, lack of language, the exciusionist incorporation
regimes as well as the segregationist housing policies of the receiving countries
make them stick together and develop a solidarity by means of informal local
networks. Their desperate will to return has made them invest at home rather than
in Berlin. The migrant strategy is formed in their own local neighbourhood in
which they stick together, isolated from the rest of the society. Most socialising
has been carried out with other Turks, preferably hemsehris (fellow-villagers,
Landsmannschaften), in private homes, mosques, public restaurants, and coffee
houses (the exclusive domain of men), and on structured occasions such as the
large parties frequently held in rented halls to celebrate engagements, weddings
and circumcisions (Mandel, 1990: 155). It is the development of social networks,
based on kinship or common area of origin and the need for mutual help in the
new environment, that made possible the construction of migrant strategy (Castles
and Miller, 1993: 25).
The first generation migrants, who were recruited by Germany on the
basis of Gastarbeiter (guest worker) system, have called themselves gurbetci. The
gurbetci is the one who lives in a state of gurbet. Gurbet is an Arabic word which
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derives from garaba, to go away, to depart, to be absent, to go to a foreign
country, to emigrate, to be away from one's homeland, to live as a foreigner in a
country. It is important to note that gurbet does not necessarily refer to a foreign
country; one can perfectly be in gurbet in one's own country: the state of gurbet
covers, for instance, Turkish migrants living in Berlin as well as those living in
Istanbul. The gurbetcis feel that their primary identification is with the village
where they were born rather than the city. The emergent literature and music
genres produced by Turkish artists in western Europe draw upon a long tradition
of exile and gurbet experiences (caglar, 1994; Mandel, 1990). The term gurbetci
dominated first generation German-Turks' discourse. Defining themselves as
gurbetci, Turkish migrants raised the points which prevented Germany from
becoming a homeland for themselves. A feeling of security, trust, behavioural
confidence, certainty, assurance and finding social recognition are the dominant
needs that the notion of Heimat fulfils. Germany could not meet these needs of
the first generation immigrants. The discourse of gurbetci in alliance with the
'will to return', in this case, has become an essential survival strategy for the
migrants in the process of quest for home.
The Gurbetcis used to mystify the homeland in their arts, literature and
musical genres as a place to which they would return someday. It would be
misleading to abstract them from their attachments to their traditional past, and
Continuous process of migration in exploring their migrant identity. In their
expressive culture they have tended to romanticise the past, and continuously
sought the Turkey of the times they left behind in the 60s and 70s. The first
generation migrants still keep the same discourse in their daily lives. Most of them
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are twice-migrants -an experience which they express as 'gurbetin gurbeti' (exile
of exile). Although such a 'double migrancy' discourse is still partly alive for most
of the first generation migrants, they tended to change their ethnic strategies as
the migrants have started to be visible in the public space, and come to understand
that the 'will to return' was nothing but a myth, and that they were treated as
strangers in both their country of residence and homeland. In Germany, they have
been simply called as Ausländer (foreigner), and in Turkey as Almanci (German
like).
The migrant strategy was constructed sometime during the first decade
of the migration wave in the sixties when the socialisation process of migrants was
based on a non-associational community formation, ethnic enclave, hemsehri
bonding, and a Gastarbeiter ideology. In this very early period of migration, the
primary concern of migrants was to earn money and return to Turkey. In this
stage, Turkish workers were demographically more homogenous, densely
accommodated in Wohnheims (dormitory-like hotels) and were not very visible in
the receiving society. In such conditions they need not form associations to
become socialised and politicised. Yet there were some informal Turkish worker
associations prior to the family reunification in mid 70s. They were followed by
the growth of religious and politically conservative associations in the 1970s.
Until around 1981 it was possible to categorise the majority of Turkish
associations within one of the two extreme poles of Turkish society. They were
either affiliated with one of the Turkish worker associations attached to a centre-
Almanci literally means German-like which bears witness to a combination of
difference, lack of acceptance, and rejection.
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left political party in Turkey, or they were more religiously organised, some
aligned with the extreme right parties (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 107). It was in
the early 1980s that Turkish migrants started to form ethnic and political
associations. 25 It was a time when issues of 'integration' were highly discussed in
Germany and became present in the Ausländerpolitik, and also a time when a new
policy of 'assimilation or return' was put into force by the government of Helmut
Kohl in Germany.
Minority strategy
In 1983 the federal parliament passed a law encouraging Ausländer (foreigners)
to leave Germany, and paying them to do so. However, since the beginning of the
1980s many German cities, especially Berlin, also established official institutions
(Ausldnderberaufiragte) for working with minorities of foreign origin. In this
second stage of Ausländerpolitik, integration and/or assimilation became the
major concern of the Federal Republic (Schwartz, 1992; Vertovec, 1996a). Since
the beginning of the early 1980s, the government of Helmut Kohl reflected the
rising tide of rightist sentiments by putting into practice an Ausländerpolitik based
on restricting all forms of new immigration and a policy of 'assimilation or return'
in relation to all 'foreigners' present in the country (Vertovec, 1996a: 384). At
this stage of the Ausländerpolitik, the orientations of Turkish formal associations
reached a turning point in Berlin. Those ethnic organisations which were
established at this stage were highly oriented towards Germany. The rising
foundation of numerous ethnic associations was not only bounded to the rightist
For a detailed explanation about the history of Turkish ethnic associations in Berlin and
Germany, see Ozcan (1994), Seidel-Pielen (1995) and Gitmez and Wilpert (1987).
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Auslanderpolitik radicalising between 'assimilation' and 'return', but also to the
exclusionary laws of national belonging26, rise of racist attacks, institutional
racism, structural outsiderism, family reunification, growing consciousness of
long-term settlement, upward social mobilisation, and to the widespread control
of political movements in Turkey after the advent of the military regime in 1980.
Accordingly all these aspects enforced the formation of ethnic and political
associations amongst the Turkish population in Germany to come to terms with
the problems emerging in both the countries of reception and origin.
Despite the existence of a modern welfare state which provides the most
basic social services in terms of health, education and social security, Turks found
it necessary and opportune to set up their own services to mediate between
individuals and German institutions. Turks may have previously accepted German
advocates; recently, "they are finding their own voice, their own advocates, and
their own understanding of what it means and what should mean to be of Turkish-
origin in German society" (Horrocks and Kolinsky, 1996: xx). The emergence of
ethnic communities with their own institutions such as ethnic associations, cultural
associations, youth clubs, cafés, agencies, and professions 27 give rise to the birth
of a new ethnic-based political strategy, i.e. a minority strategy. The permanent
settlement brings about the necessity of a long-live strategy, rather than the
migrant strategy, in order, not only to maintain culture, but more importantly to
cope with disadvantage, to improve life chances against political exclusion and
For a detailed information about the laws of belonging in Germany, see Senders (1996)
and Klusmeyer (1992).
27 For a detailed map of these associations, see TBB Türkce Danisma Yerleri Kilavuzu.
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socio-economic marginalization, and to provide protection from racism (Castles
and Miller, 1993: 114).
Depending upon the integration policies of the receiving country, the
formation of ethnic minority organisations might spring from various material
reasons. Ethnic minorities may be seen as social groups which are the result of
both 'other'-definition and 'self'-definition. On the one hand the ethnic minorities
are defined by dominant social groups in regard to their perceived phenotypical or
cultural characteristics, which leads to the imposition of specific economic, social
or legal situations. On the other hand, their members generally share a self-
definition or ethnic identity based on ideas of common origins, history, culture,
experience and values (ibid.: 28). Thus, the construction of ethnic minority is
highly related to the political structure of the receiving society. As Castles and
Miller (ibid.: 26) state,
At one extreme, openness to settlement, granting of citizenship
and gradual acceptance of cultural diversity may allow the
formation of ethnic communities, which can be seen as part of a
multicultural society. At the other extreme, denial of the reality
of settlement, refusal of citizenship and rights to settlers, and
rejection of cultural diversity may lead to formation of ethnic
minorities, whose presence is widely regarded as undesirable
and divisive. In the first case, the immigrants and their
descendants are seen as an integral part of a society which is
willing to reshape its culture and identity. In the second,
immigrants are excluded and marginalised, so that they live on
the fringes of a society which is determined to preserve myths of
a static culture and a homogenous identity.
The experience of discrimination and racism in western European countries forced
immigrants to constitute their own communities and to define their group
boundaries in cultural terms (ibid.: 28). This is the new form of racism "which
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differs from the vulgar and compromised racism of biological differences" (Alund,
1994: 63). The 'new racism' continues to focus on simplified and reified cultural
differences, and it does not claim that different cultures have different values, but
that they are different and remain so (Barker, 1981). The ideological pillar of new
racism is the holistic understanding of culture which does not encourage the
cultures to mix and construct a bricolage. The rationale behind the holistic notion
of culture which leads to new racism, is that the dominant national identities could
become uncertain. The formation of community in response to the racialisation
process, in return, reinforces fears of separatism and ethnic enclaves on the part of
the majority society, leading to the furtherance of exclusionary practices and
racism.
These conditions have set certain parameters for the life of a Turkish
minority in Berlin and the socialisation of the following generations. The internal
social structure of Turkish population in Berlin presents additional contingencies
which contribute to the perception and evaluation of world views and collective,
ethnic and national identities (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987: 91). The prominent
advocate of ethnic minority strategy in Berlin is a conservative ethnic association,
Tiirkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB, Turkish Community of Berlin) (Gitmez and
Wilpert, 1987: 115; Ozcan, 1994: 319). TGB aftempts to eradicate the use of the
label 'migrant', and to be officially perceived as an ethnic minority in the long run
like the Danish ethnic minority in Schleswig-Holstein and the Sorben ethnic
minority in southern Brandenburg. 28 Acceptance as a minority implies that
Danish and Sorben ethnic groups enjoy minority status in Germany with accompanying
language and cultural rights.
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residency, and not nationality, matters. It also implies that cultural diversity is not
perceived as a danger but condoned as a social reality (Horrocks and Kolinsky,
1996: xiii).
Their attempt to go beyond the perception of being 'migrant'
demonstrates the sharp discursive transition they have had after the former
migrant strategy. The notion of 'migrant' has very negative connotations for the
TGB members. Firstly, as Mustafa cakmakoglu, the former head of TGB, put it,
those 'who betray Turkey' qualify as migrants. Here, the former category of
'those who betray Turkey' is a political categorisation; it contains left-wing and
Islamic-universalist immigrants. TGB has a Turkish-Islamist ideology which gives
priority to Turkishness. Hence, those who underestimate Turkishness are
considered 'traitors'. By subtracting themselves from this notion, the members of
TGB attempt to differentiate themselves from those 'traitors'. Secondly, their
refusal of the notion of 'migrant' is related to the term's negative historical
connotations within the Turkish context. Migrants (goçmen and/or muhacir) in
Turkey are those Balkan-Turks, Afghans and Kurds who migrated to Turkey.
These migrants have usually been considered by the Turkish people to be sharing
the scarce resources of Turkey with themselves. That is why the TGB members
do not want to enjoy such an undesirable label.
Moreover, it is evident that a minority status can provide them with
substantial cultural and religious rights such as acquiring bi-lingual education and
gaining financial support from the Federal government for their mosques, schools
and other cultural projects. To be perceived as an ethnic minority by the German
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constitution, the members of the concerned group should be German citizens. For
this purpose, TGB tries to convince Turks not to neglect gaining German
citizenship. Their minority strategy derives from their practical expectations from
such a political category. As Abdul Janmohamed and David Lloyd (1990: 9)
remind us, their discourse indicates that
becoming minor is not a question of essence (as the stereotypes
of minorities in dominant ideology would want us to believe)
but a question of position: a subject position that in the final
analysis can be defined only in 'political' terms that is, in terms
of the effects of economic exploitation, political
disenfranchisement, social manipulation, and ideological
domination on the cultural formation of minority subjects and
discourses...
Minority strategy develops within a binary relation with majority society.
In this binary relation, the minority attempts to negate the prior hegemonic
negation of itself by the majority society in a way that reaffirms its minor location.
The collective nature of all minority discourses derives from the fact that
"minority individuals are always treated and forced to experience themselves
generically" in many fields of social life such as in the literary and/or political
system (ibid.: 10). The literary system in Germany is an excellent example to
illustrate the way in which a 'foreigner', say a 'Turkish' novelist, expresses his/her
feelings and emotions generically as a member of Turkish minority, not as a
member of the German literary system. Aras Oren, YUksel Pazarkaya, Zafer
Senocak, Emine Sevgi Ozdamar and Zehra çffk are some of the Turkish-origin
literary figures in Germany, writing from the margin. These novelists and poets
are considered to belong to the so-called Gastarbeiterliteratur (guestworker
literature) or Ausländerliteratur (foreigners literature) sphere (Suhr, 1989;
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Teraoka, 1990). These literary figures are expected to reflect the problems of
their own communities, and regarded as the spokespeople of the speechless by the
dominant culture.
Most of these Turkish-origin literary figures such as Aras Oren and
Zebra çirak reject the label of 'Turkish' novelist/poet because they "emphasise
universal human values rather than cultural, national, or even class differences;
[they are] global in scope rather than local in focus and concern; and. they attempt
to be unifying rather than oppositional" (Teraoka, 1990: 304) 29 As someone
coerced into a negative, generic subject-position, the migrant individual is forced
to respond by transforming that position into a positive, collective one. In our
example it is the Turkish-origin literary figures who are forced to become the
spokespeople of a Turkish minority.
The ethnic formation of minorities is not solely a product of ethnic
groups' rational choice to come to terms with the discriminatory and racist
polities of the receiving country. It is also evident that ethnic minorities can be
formed 'from above' by the state itself as a result of the exclusionary political
system. Immigrant workers in Germany are, on the one hand, integrated into the
social system, but, on the other, hand not admitted to the political platform. This
is due to the concept of the 7us sanguinis' which is expressed in the Article 116
of the German Basic Law, reserving citizenship to ethnic Germans based on
blood. As non-citizens, 'foreigners' do not have the right to political rights. They
cannot themselves struggle for their interests in the political system and have to
For further information on 'Gastarbeiterliteratur', see also Horrocks and Kolinsky
(1996) and Gursoy-Tezcan (1992).
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find 'deputising majority speakers' (Radtke, 1994: 33). When the constitutional
restrictions for migrants' political participation are combined with the
contemporary local polities of 'multiculturalism' in Berlin, migrants are strongly
encouraged into 'ethnic minorisation' by the state itself (Rath, 1993). As Radtke
(1993: 36) reminds us, it is partly the official discourse of 'multiculturalism' which
has induced migrant groups in Germany to form homogeneous communities
around religious and traditional symbols not only to protect a cultural identity in
an unfriendly and sometimes racist environment, but also to present themselves in
the way that the majority wanted to see them.
The construction of ethnic-based political strategies is strictly dependent
on the policies implemented by the government of the receiving society. As I have
tried to explain, those varying governmental policies concerning the 'foreign'
immigrants -no matter if they were formed by the conservatives or social
democrats- have contributed to the othering and minorisation of Turkish
population in the FRG. Aras (3ren, Turkish novelist and poet, warns of the
dangers inherent in the acceptance of otherness and cultural difference:
[I am afraid that while] the conservatives lock us into our
cultural ghetto by preserving the culture we brought with us as
it is and by denying that there can be symbiosis or
development,.. .the progressives try to drive us back into that
same ghetto because, filled with enthusiasm, by the originality
and excotism of our culture, they champion it so fervently that
they are even afraid it might disappear, be absorbed by German
culture (Quoted in Suhr, 1989: 102).
The former political participation strategies which have been developed by the
Turkish migrants along ethnic lines were both based on binary relation between
the migrants and the majority society. The first strategy, migrant strategy, was
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characterised by a 'will to return'. It was a response to the early German
recruitment politics which was built on the notion of Gastarbeiter (guestworker).
On the other hand, the minority strategy was a response to the culturalisation and
minorisation of the Turkish population by the German institutional structuring.30
These two ethnic-based political strategies have primarily been developed
by the first generation immigrants as a set of survival strategies. Conversely, their
descendants who were born and raised in Germany have followed different
patterns, depending on their class, gender and social status. Those who live in
Kotbusser Tor, Kreuzberg, where I conducted my research, having grown up in
an ethnic enclave have carried the norms and traditions of their parents in
themselves as well as receiving those of the majority society and international
society. Additionally, they also employed ethnicity, religion and culture for the
construction and articulation of their identities. They have acquired a cultural
identity which springs from parental, dominant and global cultures. This cultural
identity can be defined as diasporic. Diasporic consciousness refers to individuals'
awareness of a range of decentered, multi-location attachments, of being
simultaneously 'home away from home' or 'here and there' (Vertovec, 1997:
100).
The enhancement of telecommunications and the ease of travel made
possible the emergence of alternate cultural forms and multiple identities for the
diasporic youth. Above all, these transnational networks helped the descendants
3° It should be stated that ethnic strategies developed by Kurds and Alevis have different
dynamics and need further inquiry. However, Alevis and their ethnic structuring will be
explored in the following chapter.
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of the immigrants to dissolve the 'inevitable' binary relation between minority and
majority. The following section will be an attempt to expose the main parameters
of the modern notion of diaspora by referring to some scholars, and also to
demonstrate the two inter-related main approaches on diaspora, as Vertovec
(1997) put it: 'diaspora as a form of consciousness' and 'diaspora as a mode of
cultural production'. Thus, it attempts to provide a theoretical ground for the
understanding of the diasporic cultural identity of the working-class Turkish male
hip-hop youth in Kreuzberg.
Diaspora Revisited
Recently, the notion of diaspora has been extensively used by a wide range of
scholars aiming to contribute to the definition of transnational migrants. The new
trend of diaspora studies defines the diasporas as exemplary communities of the
transnational moment. The term 'diaspora' is derived from the Greek verb sperio
(to sow, to scatter) and the preposition dia (through, apart). For Greeks, the term
referred to migration and colonisation, whereas for Jews, Africans, Palestinians
and Armenians the same term acquired a more unfortunate, brutal and traumatic
dispersion through scattering (Cohen, 1997: ix). Yet, the contemporary notion of
diaspora is not limited only with Jewish, Greek, Palestinian and Armenian
dispersive experiences; rather it describes a larger domain that includes words like
immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker, exile community and ethnic
community (Tölölian, 1991: 5). The primary difference between the old and
modem form of diasporas lies in their changing will to go back to the 'holy land',
or homeland. In this sense, the old diasporas resemble the story of Ulysses while
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the new ones have been like that of Abraham. 3 ' After the Trojan war, Ulysses
encountered many problems on the way back to Ithaca. Although he had many
obstacles during his journey, he was determined to go back home. Conversely, the
experience of the modern labour diasporas resembles the prophet Abraham's
biblical journey. In the first part of the Bible, it is written that Abraham, upon the
request of God, had to journey with his people to find a new home in the
unknown and he never went back to the place he left behind.
The classification of Robin Cohen is quite influential in mapping out the
difference between modern diasporas and old diasporas. His historical explanation
of diaspora goes back to the Biblical Jewish diaspora which was based on a forced
dispersion experience. He has a clear picture of old and new diasporas which he
separates on the basis of the genesis of global economy. Old diasporas are
twofold: a) forced diasporas such as Jewish and Armenian; b) colonising
diasporas such as Greek and British. On the other hand, the modern diasporas are
threefold: a) trading diasporas like Jewish and Lebanese; b) business diasporas
such as British; and c) labour diasporas such as Irish, Indian, Chinese, Sikh and
Turkish. The main driving force behind the construction of modern labour
diasporas is the global economic needs which bring about an extensive
immigration from periphery to the global and regional centres.
31 The analogy of Ulysses and Abraham belongs to Emmanuel Levinas (1986: 348; 1987:
91). In explaining the attempt of conventional philosophy to seek the knowledge about the
'Other', Levinas stated that the history of philosophy has been like the story of Ulysses
who 'through all his wanderings only returns to his native island' (1986: 348). He
preferred the story of Abraham to that of Ulysses. Conventional philosophy has always
sought to return to familiar ground of 'being', 'truth' and 'the same', Levinas' endeavour
was to take it elsewhere. He proposed that philosophy should accept that we do not, can
not and should not know the Other, rather than seeking knowledge of it.
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William Safran, in his study of "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of
Homelands and Return", draws up the general framework of an ideal type of
diaspora. He defines diaspora as 'expatriate minority communities' (1) that are
dispersed from an original centre to at least two peripheral places; (2) that
maintain a memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland; (3) that believe
they are not fully accepted by their host country; (4) that see the ancestral home
as a place of eventual return, when the time is right; (5) that are committed to the
maintenance and restoration of this homeland; and (6) of which the group's
consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by this continuing
relationship with the homeland (Safran, 1991: 83-84). Safran's ideal type of
'centred' diaspora, oriented by continuous cultural connections to a source and by
a teleology of 'return', is inapplicable to the recent experiences of diaspora like
African/American, Caribbean/British, South Asian/British, Turkish/German and/or
Algerian/French. These histories of displacement fall into a category of what
Clifford calls 'quasi diasporas'. Similarly, Turkish diaspora (like the South Asian
diaspora) "is not so much oriented to roots in a specific place and a desire for
return as around an ability to recreate a culture in diverse locations. Such a state
of diaspora falls outside the strict definition of diaspora" (Clifford, 1994: 306).
Clifford also states that the old version of 'centred' diaspora which has
been formed around a teleology of return is getting looser because of the global
social changes that mainly derive from de-colonisation, immigration, and
globalisation. He avoids the old notion of diaspora to scrutinise and enlighten the
modem diasporas because,
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the transnational connections linking diasporas need not be
articulated primarily through a real or symbolic homeland -at
least not to the degree that Safran implies. Decentred, lateral
connections may be as important as those formed around a
teleology of origin/return. And a shared, ongoing history of
displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance may be z
important as the projection of a specific origin (Clifford, 1994:
306. emphasis mine).
Thus, Clifford suggests that some groups can become identified as more or less
diasporic, having only two, or three, or four of the six basic features of Safran's
ideal type of diaspora.
The changing nature of space and time in the age of globalism facilitates
the emergence of diasporic consciousness. Globalisation, which appears in the
form of global capitalism, the rise of communications and transportation, the rise
of migration, modem diasporas, internationalisation of world financial markets,
de-monopolisation of national legal systems, new international division of labour,
and the emergence of a global culture empowers the minorities against the
hegemony of nation-state, and breaks up the conventional power relations
between majority and minority. The modem "communicative circuitry has enabled
dispersed populations to converse, interact and even symbolise significant
elements of their social and cultural lives" (Gilroy, 1994: 211). For instance, the
Turkish TV programmes are easily received in Europe by the Turkish diaspora.
The official TRT International channel and some other private channels and
newspapers spread out the official ideology of the Turkish nation-state through
the diaspora.
Thus, Turkish official ideology which has recently become more
hegemonic and nationalist has a very important role on the construction of
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Turkish diaspora nationalism at the imaginary level, which gives a special
emphasis on Turkishness. 32 For instance, during the intervention of the Turkish
Armed Forces into the Northern Iraq in the winter of 1996 to prevent the logistic
settlement of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the region, the Turkish TV
channels organised an international campaign to collect money for the Turkish
Armed Forces. In Germany, a large amount of money has been collected from the
Turkish people. This is evidence of the transnational exploitation of the masses by
the nation-state, and of the power of the ideology of nationalism. This change in
the homeland's orientation to the diaspora is a part of the realpolitik because the
homeland governments tend to exploit diaspora sentiments for their purposes
(Safran, 1991: 93).
These changes in the global network, international politics, and internal
politics have played an important role in the making of diaspora consciousness.
The diaspora consciousness seems to be supplementing minority strategy by
means of these global transformations. As Clifford (1994: 310-311) rightfully
states, transnational connections with homeland, other members of diaspora in
various geographies, and/or with a world-political force (such as Islam) break the
binary relation of minority communities with majority societies as well as giving
added weight to claims against an oppressive national hegemony. Through the
agency of these connections, diasporic subjects have the chance to create a home
away from the homeland, a home which is surrounded by rhythms, figures and
For a detailed map of Turkish TV channels and the spread of Turkish official ideology,
see Aksoy and Robins (1997).
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images of the homeland provided by TV, video cassettes, tapes, radio, and by the
local network they developed in time.
The diaspora consciousness requires the idea of dwelling here in the
country of residence and a connection there in the homeland. The modern
diasporas are no more immigrant communities, they are rather settlers. Diasporic
discourses, as Clifford (1994: 311) states, reflect the sense of being part of an
ongoing transnational network that includes the homeland, not as something left
behind, but as a place of attachment in a 'contrapuntal modernity'. Clifford
borrows the term 'contrapuntal' from Edward Said who has used the term to
characterise one of the positive aspects of conditions of exile:
• . .For an exile, habits of life, expression or activity in the new
environment inevitably occur against the memory of these things
in another environment. Thus, both the new and the old
environments are vivid, actual, occurring together
contrapuntally (Quoted in Clifford, ibid.: 329)
Diasporic subject constructs his/her cultural identity in a dialogue between the
past and the future, 'there' and 'here'. The particular experiences of diaspora
bring back the memories of the counterparts of those experiences which were
once undertaken in the homeland. Memorising those experiences, on the one
hand, reinforces the habits of life; on the other, reminds the diasporic subject the
condition of dispersal or diaspora.
The contemporary diaspora discourses are developed on two paramount
dimensions: universalism and particular/sm. The universalist axis refers us to the
model of diasporic transnationalism, in the form of 'third space' (Bhabha, 1990),
or 'process of heterogenesis' (Guattari, 1989), or 'third culture' (Featherstone,
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1990) -a point to which I shall shortly return in the following chapters. The
universalist dimension, which contains the use of all the aspects of globalism and
transationalism, refers to that the diasporic consciousness constitutes a post-
national identity. The members of the post-national diasporic communities can
escape the power of the nation-state to inform their sense of collective identity. In
this new space it is possible to evade the politics of polarity and emerge as 'the
others of our selves' (Bhabha, 1988: 22). This is the cultural space where the
quest for knowing and othering the Other becomes irrelevant, and cultures merge
together in a way that leads to the construction of syncretic cultural forms.
On the other hand, the particularist axis presents the model of cultural
essentialism, or diasporic nationalism. The process of home-seeking, as Clifford
offers, might result with the existence of a kind of diaspora nationalism which is,
in itself, critical to the majority nationalism, and an anti-nationalist nationalism
(Clifford, 1994: 307). The nature of diaspora nationalism is cultural, which is
based on alienation, and celebration of the past and authenticity. For migrants as
well as for anybody else, fear of the present leads to mystification of the past
(Berger, 1972: 11) in a way that constructs 'imaginary homelands' as Salman
Rushdie (1991: 9) has pointed out in his work Imaginaiy Homelands:
It is my present that is foreign, and.., the past is home, albeit a
lost home in a lost city in the mists of lost time... [Thus,], we
will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but
invisible ones, imaginary homelands.
As Clifford rightly states, those migrant and/or minority groups who are alienated
by the system, and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West, no
longer invent local futures. What is different about them remains tied to traditional
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pasts (Clifford, 1988: 5). Remaking the past, or recovering the past, serves at
least a dual purpose for the diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way of coming
to terms with the present without being seen to criticise the existing status quo.
The 'glorious' past is, here, handled by the diasporic subject as a strategic tool
absorbing the destructiveness of the present which is defined with exclusion,
structural outsiderism, poverty, racism and institutional discrimination. Secondly,
it also helps to recuperate a sense of the self not dependent on criteria handed
down by others -the past is what the diasporic subjects can claim as their own
(Ganguly, 1992: 40).
Although, the main driving forces behind the construction of diasporic
consciousness are compression of time and space in the form of globalisation, and
the internal institutional context to which the minority community is subject in the
country of settlement, homeland government's orientation towards the diaspora
communities is quite determinant too. The changing nature of the orientation of
the Turkish government to the Turks in West Europe has an influential impact on
the construction of a kind of diasporic consciousness within the Turkish
communities. The official attempts of the Turkish government to form a Turkish
lobby in Germany make the Turkish communities, that have various political and
ideological stand points, compete with each other for the claim to be the mere
representative of the Turkish minority. These ethnic organisations which are in
search for recognition by both the country of residence and homeland, tend to
improve their orientation to the homeland, and to work for the political and
economic interests of the homeland. Thus, such a transnational political network
leads the Turkish minority organisations to play more on the axis of Turkishness
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as a result of the hegemonic ideology of the Turkish nation-state. Here, it should
be stated that, while the official lobbying activities attempt to contribute to the
creation of a diasporic consciousness on the one hand, they deepen the ideological
cleavages between the extremely heterogeneous Turkish communities on the
other. For instance, the competition between Tllrkische Gemeinde zu Berlin
(TGB, Turkish Community of Berlin) and Tllrkische Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg
(TBB, Turkish Association of Berlin-Brandenburg) to conduct the lobbying
activities, expands the divisions between the groups.
Therefore, the notion of 'diaspora' (with lower-case 'd') should be
considered a theoretical concept which meets the contemporary needs of the
study of ethnicity and nationalism in a broader transnational level. The term
'diaspora' might also be useful as an intermediate concept between the local and
the global, transcending the national perspectives which often limit transnational
cultural studies (Gillespie, 1996: 6). The term 'Diaspora' (with a capital 'D') was
once a concept referring to the traumatic dispersion of the Jews and the
Armenians from their historical homelands throughout many lands. The
connotations of the term were usually negative as they were associated with
forced displacement, victimisation, alienation, and loss. Now, 'diaspora' is often
used by the scholars as a beneficial term to describe practically any community
which is transnational.
Contemplating the modern diasporic situations as the unsurprising
feature of globalisation (particularly involving the advance of telecommunications
and the ease of travel), Vertovec (1997, 1996b) states that there are three
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different approaches to the notion of modem diaspora, put forward by
contemporary scholars. In sum, the first standpoint regards diaspora as a social
form (Boyarin and Boyarin, 1993; Safran, 1991). Diaspora as a social form refers
to the trarisnational communities whose social, economic and political networks
cross the borders of nation-states. The second approach conceives diaspora as a
type of consciousness which emerges by means of transnational networks
(Clifford, 1994, 1992; Hall, 1994, 1991; Bhabha, 1990; Gilroy, 1993, 1987;
Cohen, 1997; Vertovec, 1997, 1996b). This approach departs from W. E. B. Du
Bois' notion of 'double consciousness', and refers to individuals' awareness of
being simultaneously 'home away from home' or 'here and there'. And the last
but not the least, is the understanding which regards diaspora as a mode of
cultural construction and expression (Gilroy, 1987, 1993, 1994; Hall, 1994). This
approach emphasises the flow of constructed styles and identities among diasporic
people. Subsequently, I shall provide a theoretical framework for the exploration
of the construction and articulation of the diasporic cultural identity of the
working-class Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin.
Diasporic consciousness
The labour migration into Europe is mainly a post-war phenomenon resulting in
the permanent settlement of millions of people away from their country of origin.
After a few decades these peoples who used to be merely temporary workers, and
treated so, have become settlers, and constructed homes away from their
homelands. The centring of ethnic minorities around an axis of origin, ethnicity
and religion leads to the construction of a modern diasporic cultural identity
which leans on both inheritance and politics. Diasporic cultural identity becomes
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the major politics of identity for the descendants of migrants who were born and
raised in the country of residence. The gap between the institutional-societal
treatment of the new generations and their own identification which they exhibit
with the presentational or expressive forms of representation in the country of
residence brings about the 'problem of identity'. The quest for identity for these
new generations results with the employment and maintenance of ethnicity and
religion as a source of identity. The self identification of second/third generation
Berlin-Turks is predominantly shaped by the symbolic ethnic and religious
connotations.
The working-class Turkish hip-hop youngsters construct a form of
diasporic cultural identity by. means of global culture which transcend the
boundaries of territorial nation-state. In this way, diaspora is described as
involving the production and reproduction of social and cultural phenomena on a
transnational axis (Vertovec, 1996b; Clifford, 1994; Appadurai, 1990; Hannerz,
1996). The diasporic identity constructed by ethnic minority youths has been a
'valuable component of the critique of absolutist political sensibilities' within
nation-state (Gilroy, 1994: 210). As I will explain below, the construction of such
a diasporic cultural identity has connections with the production and articulation
of culture on a transnational level. This is evident in the production and
reproduction of forms which are sometimes called 'syncretic', 'bricolage',
'creolised', 'translated', 'crossover', 'cut 'n' mix', 'hybrid', 'alternate' or
'melange'. Hall's metaphorical insights regarding diaspora, ethnicity and identity
draw up the framework of the existing modern diaspora identities:
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.diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose
identity can only be secured in relation to some sacred homeland
to which they must at all costs return, even if it means pushing
other people into the sea. This is the old, the imperialising, the
hegemonising, form of ethnicity. We have seen the fate of the
people of Palestine at the hands of this backward-looking
conception of diaspora -and the complicity of the West with it.
The diaspora experience as I intend it here is defined, not by
essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary
heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of 'identity' which
lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridiy.
Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing
and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and
difference (Hall, 1994: 235).
Hall explicitly distances himself from the old 'imperialising', 'backward' notion of
diaspora, and celebrates the modern notion which hosts hybridity and creolization.
The production of such 'hybrid' cultural phenomena and 'new ethnicities' is
especially to be found among diasporic youth whose primary socialisation has
taken place with the cross-currents of differing cultural fields (Vertovec, 1996b:
29).
The construction of diasporic cultural identity derives from cultures and
histories in negotiation, collision and dialogue. Diasporic identity is a
disaggregated identity, and it disrupts the very categories of identity because it is
not national, not genealogical, not religious, but all of these in dialectical tension
with one another (Boyarin and Boyarin, 1993: 721). Thus, the existence of the
diaspora idea invites us to see the formation of cultural bricolage within the
boundaries of the contested domains between the local and the global, between
binary oppositions, between 'here' and 'there', and between past and present.
This permanent state of 'double consciousness' takes the diasporic subject beyond
the modern nation-state and its institutional order. The main determinants giving a
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diasporic character to these cultures are, for Clifford (1994: 306), the obstacles,
openings, antagonisms, connections which the respective group has experienced,
and the transnational links facilitated by globalised communication and transport.
Transnatjonal connections constitute what Clifford calls a 'multi-locale
diaspora culture' amongst the multiple communities of dispersed immigrant
population (Clifford, 1994: 304). By the multi-locale diaspora culture, we do not
mean a specific geographical boundary, but cultural boundary which is linked with
the homeland culture. Those dispersed people, once separated from homeland by
geographical distance and political barriers, increasingly find themselves in 'border
relations' with the homeland and their fellow diasporic 'mates' by means of
modern technologies of transportation, communication and labour migration. The
measis of transportation, telephones, faxes, internet, TV, radio, tape and video
cassettes, and mobile job markets reduce distances and facilitate two-way traffic
between diasporic subjects and homeland. Today, it is much easier to live in two
worlds than it was two decades ago.
Most sociological studies have broadly described German-Turkish youth in
terms of stereotypical notions like 'identity crisis', 'in-betweenness', 'lost
generation', 'split identities' and 'disoriented children' (Abadan-Unat, 1976,
1985; Kagitçibasi, 1987; Mushabe, 1985; Onder, 1996). German-Turkish youth
were predominantly problematised in the Turkish scholarship. This is the rationale
behind opening adaptation schools for the returnee children in Turkey with the co-
operation of Turkish and German governments. This problem oriented image
drawn by many scholars is full of contradictions, and lacks sufficient empirical
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data. The 'second generation' (German: die zweite Generation; Turkish: ikinci
kusak), often described in melodramatic terms as 'caught between two cultures
but part of neither', constructs its identity in a social field where they successfully
negotiate various cultures (Mandel, 1990: 155). German-Turkish youngsters, like
the other diasporic youths, tend to form a bricolage of cultures and identities,
while at the same time keeping to their ethnic and cultural 'roots'. Thus, diasporic
cultural identity should be mapped out within the coordinates of global (diaspora)
and local (national-regional). These are as Hall comments "cultures of hybridity
which have renounced the dream or ambition of rediscovering any kind of 'lost'
cultural purity, or ethnic absolutism. They are irrevocably translated" (Hall, 1992:
310).
Turkish youth experience a permanent tension between homelessness and
home in a way that leads to the construction of more meaningful, complex and
multiple identities. Diasporic cultural identity of Turkish youth springs from their
constant quest for home. For the modern diasporic subject home is the place to
which they cannot return. It is this perpetual dream of return, but not the act of
return, which shapes the modern diasporic cultural identity. Should the condition
of multiple identities, which is situated by the diasporic youth, be treated as the
indication of their state of 'in-betweenness'? Or, should it be conceived as
representing the 'third space', or 'third culture'? This is the essential question
which I have tried to answer in my work. In the following chapters, I shall, from
time to time, return to this question and elaborate upon the diasporic cultural
identity of Turkish hip-hop youth living in Kreuzberg.
*	 *	 *
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To recapitulate, this chapter has portrayed the transmission of the
ethnic-based political strategies which the Berlin-Turks developed since the
beginning of the migratory process. These strategies have been outlined as
migrant strategy and minority strategy. The change in the political strategies of
the immigrants has been primarily presented as subject to the social, political, and
economic relations between receiving society and ethnic minority. Then, it has
been stated that, the more the ethnic minorities suffer from racism, exclusion,
segregation, and majority nationalism, the more they tend to have associations
with the homeland, co-ethnics, or with a world-political force such as Islam.
Secondly, it was stated that this change is also a product of the globalisation
which appears as an individual consciousness of the global situation. Thus, the
ethnic communities who are dispersed away from homeland acquire the chance
to feel strong attachments, at symbolic level, to their homelands and co-ethnics
by means of modem technology. Thirdly, it was argued that the homeland
government's changing orientation to the expatriates has become a very
determinant factor in the changing face of the ethnic-based political strategies.
Accordingly, it was concluded that they always tend to exploit the immigrants'
sentiments for their own purposes.
It should also be stated that there are no clear-cut boundaries between the
strategies outlined above, they are rather overlapping. Diasporic consciousness
has been introduced in this chapter as the contemporary form of ethnic
consciousness. Diasporic identity is initiated by the expanding networks of
communication and transportation. The Berlin-Turks tend to develop more
transnational attachments with their homelands. By doing so, they transcend the
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obligatory binarism between themselves and the German nation-state. They
rather prefer to be attached to their 'imaginary homelands'. As Cohen (1996:
516) has stated, modern diasporic identities are mostly constructed on an
imaginary axis:
[D]iasporas can be constituted by acts of the imagination... In
the age of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held
together or re-created through the mind, through cultural
artefacts and through a shared imagination.
In the following chapters, the construction and articulation of the
diasporic consciousness of the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth and
the formation of this complex diasporic culture will cover a wider space. By
doing so, I will demonstrate that the whole question of diasporic identity is a
matter of politics and process rather than of essence and inheritance.
Accordingly, the following chapter will scrutinise the formation of a diasporic
space in a multicultural setting. The delineation of the diasporic space shaped by
the Turkish migrants in Kreuzberg will help us understand the nature of the urban
landscape housing the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth.
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CHAPTER 3
KREUZBERG 36: A DIASPORIC SPACE IN
MULTICULTURAL BERLIN
Turkish migrants in Kreuzberg have constructed a social space of their own -a
diasporic space where they have developed a web of social institutions, norms and
values. This diasporic space has provided the Turkish population with a ground to
acquire a set of positive and resistant articulations of identity in a country such as
Germany that has an exciusionist ideology towards the immigrants. Resistance to
exclusion in the Turkish diaspora context can take the form of distinct national
and religious aspirations. I do not want to claim that diasporic cultural politics are
somehow free of nationalist, religious and chauvinist agendas, but one should also
remember that, as Clifford (1994: 307) has put it, such discourses are usually
weapons used by relatively weak groups.
In modern diaspora experience which is facilitated by transnational
circuit of communications and transportation, identities are constructed in a way
that bends together both roots and routes, inheritance and politics, past and
present. As I pointed out in the former chapters, modern diasporic identity is
formed and articulated in both particularist and universalist axes. Kreuzberg 36, as
a typical example of diasporic space, gives the individual the sense of
simultaneously being 'here' and 'there'. What are the main constitutive
entanglements which turn this urban space into a diasporic space? What are the
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components of the particularist dimension of the modern diasporic identity? To
what extent do the transnational Turkish media contribute to the construction of a
distinct diasporic consciousness? What kind of discourses do the major Turkish
ethnic organisations articulate to partake in the social and political life in
multicultural Berlin? What kind of multicultural institutions have emerged in
Berlin to incorporate the ethnic minorities into the mainstream? And how do the
Turkish ethnic associations respond to the dominant discourse of
multiculturalism? Accordingly, this chapter will primarily aim to answer these
essential questions as well as to expound the principal features of Kreuzberg 36 as
constituting a diasporic urban space for Turkish migrants.
A Turkish Ethnic Enclave
Kreuzberg is a densely populated area located in the centre of Berlin. It is full of
various social and cultural undercurrents. On the one hand, it is the ever-lasting
dream of many left/liberal Germans to buy a flat by the picturesque
Landwehrkanal which crosscuts Kreuzberg; 33 on the other hand, it has been the
main quarter of the working-class cultures throughout history. Kreuzberg has
always been defined as a working-class area since the mid 17th century. It
provided immigrants, guestworkers (Gastarbeiters) and asylum-seekers with
shelter. In the seventeenth century, French Huguenot refugees found asylum
there. In the nineteenth century, indigent, landless immigrants from Silesia,
Pomerania, and eastern Prussia came in search of work. At the turn of the last
century, the district served as home to industrial workshops and small factories, as
u Gunther Grass (1981) has described Kreuzberg as an 'utopia' of ethnic admixture and
intemationalisation. In this sense, Kreuzberg has exotic connotations with its multi-ethnic
demography in the imagery of left/liberal Germans.
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well as to the workers employed in them (Mandel, 1996: 149; Knödler-Bunte,
1987: 219-238). Until the division of Germany in the aftermath of the World War
II, Kreuzberg was situated adjacent to the district of Mitte that houses many
historical monuments and the bureaucratic settlement of the Second Reich,
Weimar Republic and Third Reich. After the division, it has become the very
periphery of the west Berlin, hosting the 'Gastarbeiters' from Turkey, Greece,
Lebanon and Portugal. Reunification has brought a new outlook to the district.
Recently, it is becoming one of the new centres of the metropolitan city of Berlin
which is spreading out. In this section I will explore the socio-cultural geography
of Kreuzberg, but only with a limitation to Kreuzberg 36 and Kotbusser Tor
where I conducted most of my research.
The topography of the ethnic minorities in Kreuzberg has entirely changed
since the reunification in 1991 (Table 2). For instance, the positioning of the
Turkish minority has undergone a drastic shift. While the 'Gastarbeiter', who are
predominantly Turkish and Kurdish, were previously dwelling in the south-eastern
periphery of West Berlin, they have suddenly found themselves in the centre of
the city with the reunification. Kreuzberg 36 resembles a kind of 'Kleines
Istanbul' (Little Istanbul), which is surrounded by the images, signs, rhythms,
music, foods, shops, banks, traditional cafés, and major political issues of Turkey:
a Turkish diaspora. Beyond that, in many senses, it resembles a cultural island
within the urban landscape. With the ethnic minorities, working class groups, left
wing political groupings, anarchists and marginal youth, Kreuzberg represents a
permanent state of festiv4y. It is literally a multi-cultural neighbourhood.
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Turkey	 28,913
	
18.70
ex-Yugoslavia	 3,211
	
2.06
Poland
	
1,681
	
1.07
Greece	 1,497
	
0.95
Italy	 995
	
0.64
Croatia	 1,320
	
0.85
ex.Soviet Union	 538
	
0.52
Iran	 620
	
0.34
Bosnia-Herzegovina	 1,611
	
1.04
Lebanon	 740
	
0.47
Others	 10,864
	
7.02
Germans in Total
	
102,553
	
66.34
Kreuzber in Total
	
154,543
	
100.00
Table 2. Demographic Structure of Kreuzberg, 25.07.1996
Source: Statistisches Landesamt, Einwohneregister
Kreuzberg is surrounded by the districts of Neukölln in the south,
Schoneberg in the west, Tiergarten in the north, and Mitte in the east. Traffic
connections to Kreuzberg have extensively increased in time. Traffic has gradually
been diverted towards Kreuzberg after the reunification in order to provide an
efficient link between the east and west. As the youngsters express, Kreuzberg is
no more a peripheral district where the children used to freely play in the streets
without traffic. Noy1 it is a central place where there are frequent traffic jams.
The metro is the main form of public transportation. Ui and U15 are the regular
trains connecting Kreuzberg to the rest of Berlin. The metro railway crosscuts the
district through the bridges built just after World War I. There are also regular
public busses passing through Kotbusser Tor such as 129 and 141.
For the Turkish population, Kreuzberg, or Berlin, is better connected to
Turkey than to the other cities of Germany. Kreuzberg is full of Turkish travel
agencies offering both regular and charter flights to various cities in Turkey such
as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Trabzon, Antalya and Adana. Onur Air, Pak Tur, Oger
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Tur, Turkish Afrlines, and Turk Tur are some of these agencies. Sometimes, it is
possible to find a return ticket to Istanbul with a price of 250 DM (approximately
£ 100). This price may well rise to 800 DM in the summer vacation periods. Since
the internal war commenced in the country once called Yugoslavia, these agencies
have also provided ferryboat tickets to people who want to travel to Turkey by
their own private cars. The boats generally depart from the Italian harbours in the
Adriatic and arrive at the Turkish harbours in the Aegean Sea. As far as domestic
transport is concerned for the Berlin-Turks, Kreuzberg is not efficiently connected
to the other parts of Germany. It is almost out of question for them to travel by
German Railway because it is not easily affordable, or by cheaper travel
alternatives such as coaches and Mitfahrzentralen. 34 Turkish migrants, from time
to time, visit their friends and/or relatives who live in the west. Almost all the
members of the family join these kinds of visits; it is like a reaffitmation of family
rituals. As this is a kind of family ritual, they prefer to drive to their destination
using their own cars.
Berlin-Turks have multiple links with their country of origin. The growth
of modern communication and transportation networks has given rise to the
Berlin-Turks' orientation to Turkey. TV channels, video tapes, newspapers,
internet facilities and charter flights facilitate and increase the pace of the
communication between Germany and the homeland. To give an example: a
commercial in the window of a travel agency in Kotbusser Damm was advertising
"Weekend Shopping in Istanbul: 395 DM, 3 Days + Hotel". These modern
Mithfahrzentralen are private travel agencies which provide a service to the customers
to travel by private automobiles to many different destinations, sharing the cost of petrol
with the driver.
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constituents of globalism allow the Turkish migrants to construct a local network
which is sustained by the images of homeland. At first glance, Kreuzberg is like a
very condensed copy of Istanbul. Restaurants, banks, mosques, cafés, music
shops, döner kebab kiosks, graffiti, taggings and billboards on the walls, dressing
style of the residents, and the faces around the district, they were all reminiscent
of the atmosphere of Istanbul. On the walls of Kreuzberg one can see all kinds of
political graffiti from various groups, radical left to radical right. Also one can
witness various political organizations' buildings standing side by side, although
they are ideologically quite oppositional in their groupings. While playing tavia
(backgammon) in one of the traditional Turkish cafés in Kreuzberg occupied by
the middle-aged and elderly males, I had the impression that I was in a time
tunnel which took me back to the Turkey of the sixties. The clothing type of the
men, the way they shave their moustache, and the way they speak reminded me of
a very secular section of people raised by the young republic of Turkey. That was
an unchanging view in Berlin since the beginning of the migration: a frozen
moment, or a picture in time.
Turkish migrants have set up their own community networks in all
respects. They not only have döner kebab kiosks and bakeries, but also many
other special services such as dentists, accountants, printing houses, TV stations
etc. The bilingual telephone guide is an indication of such a community network.35
From catering to mechanics, from pet shops to doctors, the 190-pages of the
Berlin Yellow Pages (Altin Sayfalar) provides a wide variety of services to the
Berlin-Brandenburg Is Rehberi: Altin Sayfalar (Berlin: Karma Verlag &
Werbeagentur, 1995).
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Turkish-origin residents of Berlin. Another indication of the community network
is the Turkish Guide for Advisory Centres (Tllrkce Danisma Yerleri Kilavuzu)
which was published by the Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (Berlin-
Brandenburg Turkish Community) in 1996.36 The guide provides an extensive
network of advisory centres where Turkish residents of Berlin could apply in case
of necessity. From employment to housing, from anti-racist initiatives to
sheltering for women, the guide aims to compensate for the lack of information
for the Turkish migrants and their children.
'Kleines Istanbul' (Little Istanbul)
Most of my research took place around Kreuzberg 36 and Kotbusser Tor which
literally constitute the centre of the Turkish ethnic enclave in Kreuzberg. Thus, in
this section, I will precisely concentrate on the socio-cultural mapping out of this
quarter rather than the other parts of Kreuzberg. Kotbusser Tor is surrounded by
a mix of late 19th century Gründerzeit houses and post-war 'modern' buildings.37
Leaving the train at Kotbusser Tor U-Bahn station, the first thing that confronts
one is a newsagent whose owner is Turkish. A journey then starts through the
heart of Kreuzberg. At the U-Bahn exit to Adalbertstrasse, is another Turkish
store selling flowers. Stepping out on the Adalbertstrasse, one faces the Mevlana
Camli (mosque) on the right hand, and a Turkish open market on the left hand.
36 Turkce Danisma Yerleri Kiavuzu: Beratungsflihrer Für Türkische Berliner/-Innen
(Berlin: Karma Verlag & Werbeagentur, 1996).
' The urban renewal and housing rehabilitation projects in Kreuzberg have been carried
out with massive public aid and a host of regulations and laws enforced by the offices of
the Senate for Housing and Construction and the Senate for Social Affairs since the mid
1970s. All urban renewal and housing rehabilitation projects have been pursued in close
cooperation with private property owners, the tenants, the State and other public and
private non-profit development cooperatives (Holzner, 1982).
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Meviana Camii is quite different from the classical mosques in that it does not
have a minaret. 38 It is located just over the Kaiser's shopping centre which is
popular among the Turks due to its lower prices. Meviana Camii is the factual
centre of the Berlin Milli Görus Vakfi (Berlin National Vision Foundation) which
has organic connections with the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) in Turkey. On the
left side is the open market selling food, vegetables and fruits, mostly imported
from Turkey. Further on, a passageway under a building permits the
Adalbertstrasse to continue. This 'bridge' is called Galata in remembrance of the
historical Galata KOrüsii (Bridge) in the old centre of Istanbul (Figure 2). Above
the passage there are situated two 'traditional' Turkish cafés: the centre of the
conservative Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, and the meeting point of the extreme
left wing 'Emek, Bans ye Ozgürliik Blogu' (Labour, Peace and Freedom Block).
This corner of Kreuzberg mirrors the diversified nature of the Turkish population.
While the small café is the meeting point of the adult Ale vi community, the big
one is popular for men of every age. Under the passage are a Turkish book store,
two döner kebab imbiss (kiosk), and a Turkish bakery called Misir caisi. Misir
caisi literally refers to Egyptian Bazaar. The name again springs from the
historical Misir caisi which is located near the Galata KOprüsü in Istanbul.
Considering the architectural unity and order, the local authorities have rarely permitted
the foundation of a mosque with a minaret in Berlin. Also, the petitions of the
neighbourhood are taken into consideration by the local government in evaluating the
applications of the Islamic groups to construct a mosque. That is why, the Muslims are
allowed to worship in converted mosques which are not supposed to change the original
architectural style of the city. For the discussion about minaret in Berlin and Germany,
see "Gebetsrufe? -Ja bitte!" Daily die Tageszeitung (7 January 1997); "EinUbung in mehr
Toleranz," Daily Taz (6 March 1995); "Gurke des Tages: Moschee in Bobingen," Daily
Taz (4 December 1992); and "No Rest in the Ruhr," Time (24 February 1997).
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Figure 2. Galata KOpriisii (Galata Bridge) in Ada/he rtstrasse. Kotbusser Tor.
Another stimulating phenomenon is represented by the posters and
billboards stuck onto each leg of the Galata bridge. Most of the posters are
political slogans from the far right to the far left. The left wing slogans mostly
denounce the illegitimacy of the political order in Turkey which bans the existence
of Marxist, Leninist and Maoist organisations, which remains silent about the
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'massacre' of the Alevis, and which has no peaceful alternative solutions to the
Kurdish question. On the other hand, the right wing slogans consist mainly of the
messages of the Turkish Grey Wolfs and religious groups. Sometimes, some
concert and festival posters might be seen here as well, e.g. 'Live Music: Trio
from Istanbul at Kestane Bar', or 'Concert: Bans Manço and Cartel at
Tempodrom'.
Walking along through Adalbertstrasse, one comes across many döner
kebab kiosks, travel agencies, groceries, bakeries, banks, glassware stores, and
music stores. They are all Turkish. The Street is surrounded by the classical Berlin
buildings facing each other around an inner courtyard. In Kreuzberg, a particular
form of building structure was erected to serve the working and living needs. This
multilayered, structurally dense and complex configuration was known as the
Hinterhaus (back/rear house, or building), designed around a series of HinterhOfe
(back/rear courtyards). This living/working arrangement distinctly delimited a
highly stratified social ordering, in brick and mortar, of classes and functions. The
rear buildings, unlike those in front, were built of plain brick, lacked direct access
to the street and sunlight, had no private toilets, and were invariably noisy and
crowded (Mandel, 1996: 149). The courtyards are the playground of children
and the meeting place of youngsters when the youth centres are closed.
The majority of apartments occupied by Turkish migrants used to be substandard. For
instance, in the district of Kreuzberg as a whole, seventy-one percent of all housing units
were constructed before 1918, twenty-eight percent had no bath, twenty-seven percent had
neither bath nor toilet, and seventy-four percent had individual room stove heaters only.
Through their insecure status in Germany most Turkish immigrants preferred to invest in
Turkey rather than spending on housing in Berlin. As a result, they continued living in the
cheapest, oldest and least desirable apartments. After the rehabilitation of the housing
units in Kreuzberg, Turkish tenants could not, or did not want to, afford to pay the rising
rents. Thus, some of them had to find cheaper places outside Kreu.zberg. A big proportion
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Adalbertstrasse previously used to terminate at the Berlin Wall in the
northern part. The street is cut across by three streets, i.e. Oranienstrasse,
Naunynstrasse, and Waldemarstrasse. The first, Oranienstrasse, is a quite
popular place both for German and Turkish youngsters. On the left side of the
street many modem cafés run by Kurds and Turks may be found. The customers
of these cafés are very mixed, which is not the norm in Berlin generally. On the
right side of the street, there are a lot of German stores selling books, Irendy
clothes, tapes and CDs for the German rockers, hip-hop and techno youngsters.
Sometimes, in this corner of the street, a few multicultural carnivals and festivals
are organised by either Haus der Kulturen der Welt, or SFB4 Radio Multikulti. In
these organisations, Turkish music groups also perform their pieces, such as the
rappers Islamic Force and Azize-A. In such festivals, it is common to see some
Turkish faces around, interacting with Germans, but most Turks prefer to watch
the festival through the windows of their houses facing the street.
The second street cutting across Adalbertstrasse is Naunynstrasse where
the Naunyn Ritze youth centre is located. Opposite the youth centre is Balihaus
where some small size concerts and theatre plays are put on stage. This street is
mainly occupied by the residents themselves. They are mostly Turkish and
Kurdish Ale vis from Erzincan and Erzurum. The third Street 5 Waldemarstrasse
which is also composed of Turkish and Kurdish residents. On the right part of the
street is a kindergarten in which there is one Turkish youth worker. The
of those rehabilitated housing units have attracted the liberal intellectual individuals or
families of upper income levels who consider it chic to live in modem comfort amidst the
charm of 19th century Gründerzeit housing such as the apartments by the
Landwehrkanal, Spree river (Holzner, 1982). Waldemarstrasse and Naunynstrasse, on
the other hand, have remained occupied by the immigrants from Turkey.
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kindergarten, clviii Park, is combined to Naunyn Ritze. Next to civlli Park, is
Bethanien which is a monumental building with yellow bricks. The building,
which resembles a Middle Ages feudal castle, used to be a hospital, but is now
composed of various sections providing public services for the Kreuzberg people.
The Bethanien consists of a Casino, a Kllnstlerhaus (art school), a Turkish
language library called Namik Kemal Klltiibhanesi, a music school, and a print
house. The library is quite essential for the Turkish residents. There are daily
papers, magazines and quite new scientific and literary books from Turkey in the
library.
Taking the other exit at the tube-station, one arrives at Kotbusser Damm
and Reichenbergerstrasse which are parallel to each other and cut across by the
Landwehrkanai. Kotbusser Damm is also surrounded by houses, a Turkish bank,
Turkish stores and offices. Orient Bazaar is the most popular of the stores. It
faces the U-Ba/in station. It consists of a bakkal (Turkish mini market), a bakery,
a music store, a jewellery store and an imbiss (small kiosk). Kotbusser Damm
leads to Neukölln, which is a neighbouring district where there is also a dense
Turkish population (Table 3). Further on, the Maybachufer cuts across the
Kotbusser Damm just after the bridge on the canal. There is an open Turkish
market in this Street on Fridays. It is very similar to its equivalents in Turkey. The
sellers advertise their mostly Turkish goods through various screams. There is a
large variety of goods in the market from vegetable to sea foods, and from
glassware to clothing. On the other hand, Reichenbergerstrasse is dominated by
the residents whose ethnic origins are Turkish, Kurdish, German, Lebanese and
Portuguese. Unlike Naunynstrasse, it is an ethnically mixed neighbourhood. Chiv,
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which is the other youth centre where I conducted my research, is located in this
street.
Mitte
Tiergarten
Wedding
Prenzlauerberg
Friedrichshain
Kreuzberg
Charlottenburg
Spandau
Wilmersdorf
Zehlendorf
Schoneberg
440
8,623
24,332
523
527
28,913
7,547
8,829
2,176
845
12,051
3,087
Tempelhof
Neukölln
Treptow
Kopenick
Lichtenberg
Weissensee
Pankow
Reinickendorf
Marzahn
Höhenschönhausen
Hellersdorf
Total
4,752
26,904
361
158
304
76
340
6,499
175
106
106
137,674
Table 3. Turkish Population in Berlin District, 30.06.1996
Source: Statistisches Landesamt, Einwohnerregister
The socio-cultural mapping out of Kreuzberg 36 is very similar to that of
some other townscape examples which exemplify a different kind of diasporic
space such as Southall, London (Baumann, 1996), Rinkeby, Stockholm (Alund,
1991, 1996), and 32nd Street, Chicago (Horowitz, 1983). Diasporic
characteristics of a particular townscape mainly spring from the way culture is
reified by its immigrant dwellers. Diasporic communities tend to reify culture at
the same time as making and remaking it. Departing from the critical judgements
of the youngsters about, for instance, the way their parents dress, one could
conclude that there is a strong 'cultural conservatism' amongst the first generation
migrants living in Kreuzberg. Knowing both modern Turkey and Kreuzberg, the
youngsters imply that some people are still living a life of twenty years ago.
Looking at the dress of the people going to the Friday Turkish bazaar in
Kotbusser Tor, it is highly possible to see many women wearing very colourful
eastern Anatolian clothes including traditional scarf, or black veil, and shalvar
119
(baggy trousers), or else to see many men wearing religious robes with full sleeves
and long skirts and turban.
For many in the Turkish diaspora, the cultural baggage brought from
home is an absolutely vital element in the negotiation of identity, but it comprises
a renovated set of practices and discourses, too. Reification of culture serves as a
social strategy for the diasporic individual. Turkish migrants are better-off in
Germany compared to their pre-immigrant social-economic status in Turkey.
Representing pre-immigrant lifestyles as in their dressing styles and recollecting
the hardships of the past as in their daily discourses, immigrants tend to justify
their act of immigration as the right option. By reifying culture, maintaining pre-
immigrant social networks (hemsehri bonds) and familial connections, those
immigrants attempt to adopt themselves in the diasporic context where they find
themselves alone and without the traditional support systems they were brought
up with.
As stated before culture is a continuous process of change, whereas it is
transformed into a heritage in the diaspora by the first generation immigrants. In
other words, as Baumann states in the Southall example in London (1996: 192),
for diasporic communities cultural processes become transformed into cultural
heritage, that could be reified in order to enculturate the young generations and to
construct a cultural fortress of their own in relation to that of the majority culture.
The process of cultural reification among the first generation Turkish migrants is
also strengthened by the Turkish media. What follows in the next section is the
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impact of the Turkish media on the construction of a distinct Turkish diasporic
identity which partly invests on the preservation of culture as a heritage.
Interconnectedness in Space
The development of tele-communication technology has made the reception of
almost all the Turkish TV channels and newspapers in Berlin possible. Turkish
media in Berlin have achieved a remarkable cultural hegemony throughout the
Turkish diaspora. To understand this one has to examine the rising interest of the
Turkish media industry in the Turkish population living in diaspora. The major
Turkish TV channels have had their own European units making special
programmes for Turks living in Europe. TRT International (state channel) is the
first of these channels. Then comes Euro Show, Euro Star, Euro D, Euro ATV,
TGRT, Kanal 7, HBB and Satel. All these TV channels apart from the TRT
International can be received via satellite antennas. TRT ht is already available on
cable (Table 4).
TRT-INT	 47.0
Euroshow	 22.0
HBB	 0.5
Eurostar	 7.0
ATV	 2.0
TGRT	 1.0
Kanal6	 0.5
Others	 20.0
Table 4. Turkish TV channels in Germany and the rate of audience
Source: Tllrkie Arastirmalar Merkezi-Zentrum Für Türkeistudium in Bonn,
1995.
The programme spectrum of all these channels may differ greatly from
each other. TRT Tnt tends mainly to give equal weight to entertainment,
education, magazine, movies and news. Since it is a state owned channel, it tries
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to promote the 'indispensable unity of the Turkish nation' by arranging, for
instance, money campaigns for the Turkish armed forces fighting in the South
Eastern part of Turkey. There are also a lot of programmes concenirating on the
problems of the European Turks. This channel can also be widely received in
Turkey. Thus, in a way, it also informs the Turkish audience about the happenings
of the European-Turks, mainly that of the German-Turks, whilst connecting the
modern diasporic Turkish communities to the homeland.
Euro Show, Euro D, Euro Star and Euro HBB are private channels
making secular based programmes. The majority of the programmes are
composed of old Turkish movies, American movies, comedy programmes,
dramas, Turkish and European pop charts, sport programmes, reality-shows and
news. On the other hand TGRT and Kanal 7 are the religious based TV channels.
Besides the actual programmes, these channels give priority to the dramas and
movies with religious motives. Traditional Turkish folk music programmes are
also a part of the policy of these two channels. Satel is another channel giving the
Turkish and European pop charts. It is the favourite channel of the Turkish
youngsters who have satellite antennae.
Apart from these satellite channels, there are a few more local Turkish
TV channels in Berlin. TD1 is one of them. Turkish video movies, local news and
sport programmes are the major components of the programme. It also provides
news and some dramas from Turkey, previously copied from Turkish channels.
There are also some other channels which can be watched on the Offener Kanal
(Open Channel) and Spree Kanal. They are both free channels to rent. Aypa TV,
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TFD (Turkisches Fernsehen in Deutschland), Alcanlar TV, Ehli Beyit TV are
some of these TV associations.4°
Most of the major Turkish newspapers are also printed in Germany to be
distributed in Germany as well as in the rest of Europe. Hürriyet, Millye4 Sabah,
Cumhuryet and Evrensel are some of the Turkish papers printed in Germany.
There are also many other sport and magazine papers from Turkey. Although the
content of the papers is extremely limited in terms of the news about the
homeland, they offer a wide range of news about Turkish diasporic communities
in Europe. Hürryet has its own Berlin supplement each Wednesday, providing
community news (Table 5).
Hurriyet
Milliyet
Turkiye
Milli Gazete
Zaman
Tercuman
Yeni Gunaydin
Ozgur Gundem
Dunya
Total:
107,634
25,000
40,000
11,000
4,000
19,000
14,000
8,000
2,500
231,134
Table 5. Turkish newspapers printed in Germany4'
Source: Türkye ArastfrmalarMerkezi-Zentrum Für Türkeistudium in Bonn 1995.
Cultural hegemony of the Turkish media partly shapes the 'habitats of
meaning' of the diasporic subject living in the West. 42 Turkish media mostly
40 Aypa TV is a secular-based news channel, combining the news both from Turkey and
Gemiany; TFD is a religious-based channel, representing the view of Mliii Gorus; and
Alcanlar TV and Ehil Beyit TV are A levi-based channels, representing different views.
41 Yeni Günaydin (liberal) and Ozgiir Gllndem (left-wing) were shut down afterwards.
Sabah and Evrensel have recently entered the market.
The notion of 'habitats of meaning' belongs to Ulf Hannerz (1996). Hannerz has
developed the notion in relation to the co-existence of local and global at once. TVs and
print media have an important impact on the formation of our habitats of meaning. As
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attempt to provide a stream of programmes which is considered to suit the
'habitats of meaning' of the diasporic subject. For instance, the German-Turks are
perceived by the Turkish media industry as a group of people who resist cultural
change. This perception, for instance, is the main rationale behind the selection of
the movies and dramas. A high number of the films on each channel are the old
Turkish films which were produced in the late sixties and seventies. 43 The
performance of the old Turkish movies, which touch upon some traditional issues
such as Anatolian feudalism, bloodfeud, migration (gurbet), desperate romance
and poverty, reinforces the reification of culture within the Turkish diaspora. As
Foucault noted these films attempt to 're-programme popular memory' to recover
'lost, unheard memories' which had been denied, or buried, by the dominant
representations of the past experienced in the diaspora (Quoted in Morley and
Robins, 1993: 10). Hence, identity is also a question of memory, and memories of
home in particular (Morley and Robins, 1993: 10). Before the private TV
channels were opened, it was the VCR industry which used to provide those kinds
of movies to the Turkish diaspora.
Berlin-Turks, whose 'habitats of meaning' have been extensively nurtured
by the Turkish media, have also a different sense of place within the diaspora. The
Turkish media play a very crucial role in the formation of a more complex form of
belonging for the Turkish diaspora. The media create for the diasporic
some people may share much the same habitats of meaning in the global ecumene, some
other people may have rather distinct and localised habitats of meaning.
Before the hegemony of the American film industry prevailed over the world market,
the Turkish film industry produced a vast amount of film until the early eighties.
J. Knight (1986) states that 80 per cent of the German-Turks used to watch Turkish
videos daily.
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communities a symbolic bond to the homeland, a symbolic bond to various
diasporic Turkish communities in Europe, and conversely also persuade the
diasporic subject to become a settler in the country of settlement. Feeding the
ethnic flame of Turkishness and Turkish culture, the Turkish media tend to create
a distinctive Turkish identity in diaspora. The construction of such a distinct
identity is indeed quite relevant to what the discourse of multiculturalism aims to
do in Berlin. In the coming section, I will elaborate some of the Turkish ethnic
organisations in Berlin and their discourses prior to the institutions and dominant
discourse of multiculturalism. Subsequently, I shall expose the impact of the
official ideology of multiculturalism on the culturalisation and minorisation of the
Ale vi community in Berlin.
Major Thrkish Ethnic Associations in Berlin
The conventional notion of diaspora presupposes the existence of a homogenous
community which had been forced to leave the homeland. This relatively
homogenous community tends to exclude the majority society rather than
diffusing into it. In fact, it would be misleading to name the Turkish communities
living in Germany as a homogenous diaspora. While there are some communities
such as the religious groups of Süleymancis, Nurcus and Kaplancis which might
suit the definition of old diasporas as a social category, most of the Turkish-origin
settlers in Germany contradict this old notion.45 Turkish religious communities
(cemaat) having fundamentalist beliefs are built around what Salman Rushdie
(1990) calls 'the absolutism of the Pure'. "The apostles of purity", he argues, are
always moved by the fear "that intermingling with a different culture will
For further inquiry about Slileymancis, Nurcus and Kaplancis, see Schiffauer (1997).
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inevitably weaken and ruin their own". What they believe is that communicating
with the 'unbelievers' does not strengthen their spiritual belief system. A seventy-
year-old Turkish Sunni hoca (religious leader, teacher, or preacher) of the Rufai
sect in the Mevlana Camii, hints at the rationale behind the consiruction of a
Islamic diasporic identity:
We [Muslims] prefer the company of the believers (miimins). It
is not enough to be Muslim. Muslim means to surrender to the
will of God, but surrendering does not prove that someone is a
trustful believer who has faith in God. There are three strata in
an Islamic community: Avam (ordinary people), Has (Faithful
people) and Hasin Hasi (most faithful people). The Holy Book,
Koran, says we must stick together with the believers to
strengthen our faith in God, and to progress spiritually against
the material world. Thus, we tend to distance ourselves from
the Avam. It gives us spiritual inspiration to be together with
the trustful believers (Personal interview, 25 January 1996).
The Islamic man whom I talked to was a retired carpenter, and was not able to
speak German, although he had come to Germany almost Pventy-five years ago.
His main concern has always been to keep the Islamic purity without intermingling
with the majority society, most of whom he called unbelievers. The interview was
accompanied by a German researcher friend of mine for whom I was doing
simultaneous translation. In the end of the interview, the hoca fulfilled his mission
by inviting my friend to convert to Islam (irshad). Like many other Turkish
Sunnis his main intention is to remain in Europe until the last European Christian
has been converted to Islam.
The elite of those religious groups had to emigrate to Germany after the
1960 military coup d'etat in Turkey. The practice of migration has gained a
mystical meaning for these religious groups. They constructed a connection
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between their experience and that of the prophet Mohammed. The prophet
migrated from Mecca to Medina in order to be able to free his Islamic community
from the oppression of the non-believers. It is believed that the experience of
migration (hUra) gave the believers the chance to test their faith in God. Thus, by
doing so, the Muslim immigrants believe that the act of migration has
strengthened their faith (Atacan, 1993: 57). These groups have formed their own
cultural and religious islands in Germany. What they form is a kind of relatively
homogenous Islamic Diaspora (with a capital 'D') •46
These separate religious groupings resemble archipelago islands which
do not have surface connections to each other. They spring from various schools
in Islam and always have different interpretations of the holy book Koran, but
their common denominator is their relation to the receiving Christian society.
They prefer to stick together within their own closed religious communities and
distance themselves from the Christian society. Although most of the religious
communities are loyal to the universal Islamic binarism between Dar'ul Islam
(Land of Islam) and Dar'ul Harb (Land of War), they are not able to free
themselves from their particularist and national understanding of the Islamic
religion. For instance, religious Turkish communities do not consider the Indian-
origin Wahabbis a valid form of Islam.
The conflict between various Islamic schools prevents the existence of a
homogenous Islamic Diaspora: it is extremely diversified. Some of the groups
have a universalist vision of Islam which is, to a certain extent, independent of
46Diaspora with capital 'D' implies the form of diaspora in which the community attempt
to preserve its own 'distinctive' culture.
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nationalist connotations. Slileymancis, Nurcus and Kaplancis are the Islamic sects
(tarikat) having a relatively universalist discourse. They attempt to disconnect
themselves both from the country of origin and settlement. On the other hand,
some other groupings have a powerful orientation to Turkey in their
understanding of Islam, e.g., Avrupa Mliii Göriis Teskilati, AMGT (Association
of National Vision in Europe). 47 AMGT has a wide network in Berlin as well as in
Europe. The organisation has a modern youth cultural centre in Kreuzberg, where
some of the Turkish youngsters go for leisure activities such as watching religious
plays, playing billiards and watching cable TV. The group also opened an
officially recognised public school in Kotbusser Tor, Kreuzberg in 1981. They run
the school covertly, since they are still considered an illegal organisation. Recently
they succeeded to get financial support for the school from the Berlin Senate. The
School of Islamic Sciences consists of primary and secondary schools. German is
the medium of education in the school, Turkish, Arabic and English are the other
languages the students are supposed to learn. The organisation also covertly runs
some Koran teaching courses in its own mosques.
All of these religious organisations are considered illegal in Germany.
The only official religious organisation is Dyanet Isieri Turk Islam Birligi, DITIB
(Turkish-Islam Union, Religious Affairs). DITIB is the official religious
representative of the Turkish government. It has the biggest Islamic audience in
Berlin. DITIB has a nationalist vision of Islam. It has a community school in
AMGT is an illegal political organisation in Germany. According to the figures of the
Verfassungsschutz-Bericht (1995), they have 3000 members in Berlin. AMOT has a wide
institutional network all around Europe. The organisation has organic links with the
Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in Turkey. For the origins of the Welfare Party, see
Toprak (1981) and cakir (1990).
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Kreuzberg, where the students are taught Turkish history, Turkish geography,
Turkish and Arabic. DITIB has thirteen mosques in Berlin out of almost fifty. In
these mosques, Koran courses are conducted. Deriving from various sources of
Islam, all these religious communities have separately constructed Islamic
Diasporas as a social practice and category.
Besides the religious-based ethnic associations, Turks have founded
some other ethnic organizations in Berlin that are based on the ideological and
political cleavages in Turkey. The first group of organizations can be gathered
under the umbrella of the Tiirkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB). The concept of
Tllrkische here means ethnic Sunni-Muslim-Turk, so it excludes other Anatolian
peoples like Kurds, Ale vis and Assurians. These groups have a conservative,
nationalist and religious basis, and have attachments to the right-wing political
parties in Turkey such as the True Path Party (Dogruyol Partisi, DYP), the
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi,
RIP), and the Nationalist Action Party (Millyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP). They
also have connections with the conservative parties in Germany like Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Socialist Union (CSU). Their preference
for the conservative Christian parties stems from their traditional opposition to the
left in Turkey, and from their political choices in the homeland. As an ethnic
organisation they have two main discourses i.e., culture discourse and minority
discourse.
These groups celebrate the authentic and mythical Turkish culture that
they trace back to the very early ages in Central Asia in contrast to the relatively
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new German culture which can only be traced back two hundred years. The
former head of TGB, Mustaf a çakniakoglu, for instance, underlines the cultural
difference between Turkish and German societies:
We [Turks] have got a strong culture which goes back two
thousand years, whereas Germans have a two hundred-year
culture. Their history consists of unification [in the nineteenth
century], nationalism, enmity towards France, warfare, Marshall
Plan and power. But we have culture (Personal interview, 2
February, 1996).
By saying so, cakmakoglu attempts to reify Turkish culture as a discrete unity.
His use of the notion of culture resembles what Clive Harris (forthcoming) calls
CULT (tire). This holistic and essentialist notion of culture grants a privilege to
cultural authenticity which is a process of self-awareness arising from the
discovery and recognition of traditional local-cultural formations in their own
historical settings. His discourse also underlines the conventional differentiation
between 'culture' and 'civilisation' in a way that celebrates the former.
TGB also claims to be the most important representative of the Turkish
minority in Berlin before the other German and Turkish bodies. The largest
Turkish ethnic-political grouping apart from TGB is Türkische Bund in Berlin-
Brandenburg (TBB). Some other group of people have come together through
their own nuclear organizations under the umbrella of the TBB. These nuclear
organizations are, for instance, some specialised organizations like doctors,
academics, students, students' parents, Alevis, some left-wing organisations etc.
Here, the concept of Türkische literally refers to 'Tllrk(yeli' (people from Turkey)
in Turkish. It is an attempt to include both the left-wing and Kurdish-origin
people that feel themselves in a kind of exile. Although they have a more
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universalist vision compared to the other Turkish communities, they also have a
visible political orientation to the homeland. They run some political activities
showing that these groups of people have become the settlers and have interest in
the internal politics of the receiving country. For instance, in the last parliamentary
elections in Berlin (October 1995) three Kurdish-origin Turkish citizens were
elected for the Berlin Provincial Parliament (2 from the Grünen and 1 from the
PDS), and 10 other Turkish citizens were elected to the municipality parliaments.
This group of organizations are also in favour of the acquisition of German
citizenship for the Turkish citizens. Yet, the elite of the TBB is against the
acquisition of an ethnic minority status in the German society because they believe
that such a political shift would increase the xenophobic sentiment in Germany
towards the Turks. So they are quite sceptical about the notion of ethnic minority.
Whatever their political orientation is toward the country of residence or
to the homeland, it is very clear that each type of organisation tends to form
interest groups which can mobilise Turkish minority in social, political and
economic respects. The setting of the earlier Turkish migrant organizations in
Berlin used to be defensive: in order to resist the feeling of exclusion and
loneliness they constructed a local solidarity network. Whereas the contemporary
ethnic organisations seek to promote the political participation of the Turks in a
way that leads to a bridge forming between the majority and the minority. Thus,
while these groups in contrast to the religious groups prefer to interact with the
majority society, it is misleading to believe that these diversified groups are
constituting a homogenous Turkish diaspora.
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All these organisations indicate that the diversified Turkish ethnic
minority, apart from those segregationist religious groups, prefer to incorporate
into, and interact with, the majority society. They tend to incorporate themselves
into the political interest groups like political parties and labour unions. This is the
indication of the construction of a Gesellschafl network, rather than a traditional
Gemeinschafi network. The institutionalisation of the Turkish minority in the
form of Gesellschafi can be observed in the economic sphere (free enterprise,
investment in Germany), the political sphere (political organisations which are
oriented to Germany, to Turkey, or to both), and the leisure time activities (music
courses, family tea gardens, folklore courses). While the Turkish minority
attempts to mobilise itself by means of interest groups formed to interact and
negotiate with the German political institutions, Berlin administration has recently
produced some multicultural organizations to answer the new incorporatist
demands raised by the Turkish minority. Accordingly, I will now briefly explore
these multicultural initiatives, and scrutinise the dominant discourse of
multiculturalism in Berlin.
Multiculturalis,n in Berlin
Berlin is one of the world cities where there is an extensive infrastructure which
promotes multiculturalism in one way or another. Berlin has always been a world
city which has housed various cultures. There are some initiatives which attempt
to embody a pluralist and multicultural city in which all the constitutive
components of Berlin could co-exist in harmony. Die Auslanderbeauftragte des
Senats (Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs), Haus der Kulturen der Welt
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(House of the World Cultures), SFB4 Radio Multikulti and Werkstatt der
Kulturen (Workshop of Cultures) are some of these multicultural initiatives.
Die Auslanderbeauftragte des Senats is an office which was founded in
1981 as a part of the Berlin Senate administration to co-ordinate policies in the
areas of the health, family, housing, education, welfare and police departments,
and to take care of the groups with particular problems. 48 Its primary function,
though, is to act as a liaison agency between the local government and various
ethnic associations established in the city. The other function of the office involves
public relations including publishing a monthly, 100-page magazine (Top-Berlin
International: Em Informationsforum), and offering an extensive list of videos
and publications on specific ethnic communities in Berlin 49 , legal procedures and
material encouraging children's and youth activities, vocational guidance for
youth and etc. Recently, the office has initiated a set of poster-billboard
campaigns with slogans such as 'Miteinender leben in Berlin' ('live together in
Berlin') and 'Wir sind Berlin: wir sind helle und Dunkle!' ('We are Berlin: we are
light and dark!') in order to be able to recapitulate the ideas and perceptions of
the Berliners on the co-existence of differences (Vertovec, 1 996a).
Haus der Kulturen der Welt serves as an exhibition venue, conference and
seminar centre, concert and festival venue. It was built in 1957 as the Congress
Hall (Kongresshalle). In 1989, it was given a new name. It is the stage where the
Barbara John -a member of the Christian Democratic Party- has held the office since its
inception in 1981 through successive governments of Social Democrat - Alternative List
coalition of 1989-1991 and the grand SPD-CDU coalition.
Most of the publications and videos are on Turks. Some of the other ethnic
communities on which publications and videos have been prepared are Indians, Africans,
Chinese, and Iranians.
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non-European cultures have been introduced to the Berliners by means of
exhibitions, conferences, movies, concerts and festivals. It aims to strengthen the
roots of multicultural Berlin. Since Turks and Kurds compose approximately
more than one third of the minority population living in Berlin, recent
developments in Turkey have always been on the agenda of the Haus. Islam is at
the core of contemporary interest. Berlin is trying to understand the current
revival of Islam through the prism of Turkey. The Haus organised two
conferences on Turkey, respectively on the 24th and 25th of January, 1996 and
12th and 14th of September 1996. Each conference had participants from Turkey,
Germany and other European countries. Both of the conferences were an attempt
to understand the German-Turks through the recent social changes in Turkey.
SF84 Radio Multikulti was founded in September 1994 as the fourth
station of Sender Freies Berlin (SFB) which is the local public broadcasting
corporation. "The whole world is at the end of the scale: FM 106.8 Mhz" is the
motto of the non-stop radio channel. It is a three-year project financed by SFB
and Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Services. It broadcasts ethnic
music programmes in sixteen different mother tongues, including German as a
foreign language (Vertovec, 1996a). None of the forms of western music are
broadcasted by the channel. Turkish is one of the languages represented amongst
the ethnic music samples. Turkish pop music, Turkish rap and Turkish art music
cover the biggest space in the Turkish language programmes. The programmes
are set up by three producers of Turkish-origin. Aras Oren, who is a popular
novelist and has been living in Berlin since the sixties, is the supervisor of the
Turkish programmes for the SFB. A recent public survey carried out among the
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Berlin-Turks indicates that 12 percent of the Turks are aware of Radio Multikulti,
and only 4 percent of them regularly listen to it. The same survey also depicts that
the radio could not be received well in Kreuzberg and Wedding (Meseth, 1996).
SFB4 also organises cultural carnivals and festivals in collaboration with
Haus der Kulturen in Kreuzberg and in some other parts of Berlin. In these
carnivals, all the 'ethnic' components of Berlin are represented with their musics
and folk dances. These carnivals and festivals might give us some clue about how
the state attempts to represent the 'ethnics' to the 'dominant' culture. Carnival-
type activities define 'ethnics' as possessing 'folk culture' and not the culture of
distinction. It can also distract attention away from the central problem of
structural inequalities in access to resources (Bottomley, 1987: 5).
Werkstatt der Kulturen was opened in October 1993 in the district of
Neukölln where there is a big Turkish population. It has been designed as a
Beg egnungszentrum (encounter centre). It is financially supported by the
Auslanderbeauftragte of the Berlin Senate and governed by a board of trustees
elected every two years from local organizations. The Werkstatt attempts to
promote understanding between the cultures of the area and to try new ways of
togetherness (Miteinender), especially among youth. It promotes exhibitions and
conferences; coordinates projects, training courses (photography, painting,
ceramics, video-making and music-making) and seminars concerning matters
surrounding expressive arts, inter-cultural dialogue, the plight of refugees, and
violence against minorities in the city (Vertovec, 1996a).
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It is evident that all these so-called multicultural institutions embody a
process of culturalisation. Culturalisation -a culture-related smoothing out of
social inequality, social anomalies and discrimination- occupies a prominent place
in the process of change currently affecting European society (Alund, 1996;
Alund-Schierup, 1991). Social differentiation, segregation, institutional racism,
discrimination and class differences are all reduced to, and legitimised in,
culturalisation of differences. Thus, actual multiculturalism in both Germany and
Europe happens to represent a form of integration of cultural diversity into a
system of structural inequalities (Alund and Schierup, 1991: 139).
Despite the existence of such strong multicultural initiatives in Berlin, it is
quite doubtful to claim that the minorities living, for instance, in Kreuzberg or
Wedding are widely aware of them. When asked, most members of the Turkish
minority reply that they are not aware of the existence of these initiatives and their
works. On the other hand, those who are aware of these initiatives, do not trust
the 'multicultural' policies. What they believe is that, these kinds of initiatives are
nothing but a 'face-saving' effort by the Berlin government.
There is enough evidence that in Berlin official multiculturalism is not able
to go beyond being a part of 'high culture'. Since these performances turn out to
be high culture activities,, culture is reduced to 'show business' as Umberto Eco
(1986: 154) has described it. High culture activities such as classical music
concerts, theatres, philosophical discussions, literature, gallery art tend to make
the audience keep their distance from the ongoing activity being performed. The
audience does not participate, just sits, listens, or watches. As long as the
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audience is not involved in these 'serious' cultural activities, culture being
performed could not transcend its boundaries and could not infuse other cultures.
Furthermore, the culture which is represented remains distant from the audience
without leading to a new form of hybridity, pastiche, mélange, or impurity.
In fact, the representation of a wide variety of non-western cultures in
the form of music, plastic arts and seminars is nothing but the reconfirmation of
the categorisation of 'the west and the rest'. The rationale behind the
representation of the cultural forms of those 'others' in these multicultural
initiatives inevitably contributes to the broadening of differences between the so-
called 'distinct cultures'. The ideology of multiculturalism tends to
compartmentalise the cultures. It also assumes that cultures are internally
consistent, unified and structured wholes attached to ethnic groups (caglar,
1994:26). Essentialising the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group,
multiculturalism risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasising
their boundedness and mutual distinctness; it also risks overemphasising the
internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitirnise repressive
demands for communal conformity.
Constructed multiculturalism in Berlin permits the supposedly 'distinct
cultures' to express themselves in some public platforms such as Haus der
Kulturen der Welt. Multiculturalist metanarrative might, at first glance, seem to be
a 'friend' as John Russon (1995: 524) stated. These multicultural platforms, in a
way, sharpen the process of 'othering the other' in the imagery of self, or in other
words, leads to a form of ethnic 'exotification'. Russon (1995: 524) explains that:
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Now, it is fairly common gesture, in the name of pluralism, to
insist that we treat others as others, and accept their ways as,
perhaps, 'interesting', 'private' to them, and especially not the
same as ours. [T]his exotification which 'tolerates the other' is
another product of the alienating gaze of the reflective ego, and
it fails in two important ways. First, it makes the other a kind of
lesser entity open to our patronising support, despite our
complete rejection of its value as analysing other than the cute
contingencies of someone else's culture; thus there is an
inherent power relation here in which the other is made
subordinate to our benevolence and superior reason. Second, it
fails to acknowledge that, just as our program of tolerance has
implications for the other-it contains that other in its view-so
too does the ethnicity of the other contain us. Our so-called
'democratic' and pluralistic ideal is as much an ethnic
expression as that of the other is an ethnicity...
Russon's remarks on 'tolerance' remind us of the way in which public and private
spheres are highly differentiated by the ideology of multiculturalism. This
ideology, as John Rex (1986, 1991) has described, involves nurturing
commonality (shared laws, open economy and equal access to state provisions) in
the former and ensuring freedom (maintain the traditions of ethnic minorities) in
the latter. Russon, first, prompts us to think that multiculturalism tends to
promote the confinement of cultures in their own private spheres with a limited
interaction with other cultures. The differentiation between public and private has
always contributed to the reinforcement of dominant class or group's hegemony
over the subaltern groups. The cultures which hardly interact with other cultures
are tempted to become a static heritage. Thus, Russon, here, draws our attention
to the point that the official discourse of multiculturalism contributes to the
reification of culture by the minority communities. Secondly, he underlines the
issue of power relations between the dominant culture and the others. This is the
clientalist side of the policy of multiculturalism -a point to which I shall return
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shortly. Clientalism tends to petrify the existing social conditions without making
any change in the power relations between 'master' and 'disciple'.
What Russon attempts to criticise by the notion of 'tolerance' is also
raised by Rosaldo in a slightly different way. Searching the correlation between
culture and power, Rosaldo (1989: 198-204) rightly claims that power and culture
have a negative correlation. In saying so, he refers to the examples of the
Philippines and Mexico. In the Philippines and Mexico, for instance, full citizens
are those who have power and lack culture, whereas those most culturally
endowed minorities, such as Negritos and Indians, lack full citizenship and power
respectively. Thus having power refers to being postcultural and vice versa: "the
more power one has, the less culture one enjoys, and the more culture one has,
the less power one yields. If they [minorities] have an explicit monopoly on
authentic culture, we [majority] have an unspoken one on institutional power"
(1989: 202).
Rosaldo takes the discussion further, and concludes that making the
'other' culturally visible results with the invisibility of the 'self'. Thus, the policy
of muiticulturalism attempts to dissolve the 'self' within the minority. Dissolution
of the 'self' is also related to the celebration of difference by minorities because
the notion of difference makes culture particularly visible to outside observers.
Thus, not only the multiculturalist policies, but also minorities themselves
contribute to the process of dissolution of the 'self' as well as of the institutional
power within the minority. In the following section, as an attempt to illustrate this
theoretical framework I will explore the construction and articulation of Ale vi
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ethnicity and culture in Berlin, in relation to the dominant discourse of
multiculturalism.
Ethnicity and Alevism in 'Multicultural' Berlin
Alevism is an heterodox religious identity which is peculiar to Anatolia. It is
practised by some Turkish and Kurdish segments of the Anatolian society.
Turkish Ale vis used to concentrate in central Anatolia, with important pockets
throughout the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal regions and the European part
of Turkey. Kurdish Ale vis were concentrated in the north-western part of the
Kurdish settlement zone between Turkish Kurdistan and the rest of the country.
Both Turkish and Kurdish Ale vis have left their isolated villages for the big cities
of Turkey and Europe since 1950s.
Alevism itself is the main source of identity for the Ale vi youngsters.
Previously, the Ale vi youngsters of Turkish ethnic origin in Germany, used to
identify themselves with their Turkishness. They used to carry Turkish ethnic
symbols to express their ethnicity as a response to the rising racial attacks and
discrimination in Germany: e.g. a Turkish flag on their belt buckles. Although
most of the urban Ale vis have always had to dissimulate their identities due to the
supremacy of the Sunni order in the public sphere (Takyye), they continued with
their rituals in their private spheres. Their children had to play with the Sunni
children in the streets without giving out any clue which might reveal their
Alevism. In a way, they had to assimilate to the dominant ideology of Sunni-
Turkism. And then what happened? Why did they suddenly need to express their
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Alevi identity publicly? While they were celebrating their Turkishness against the
racial attacks, why did they turn to celebrating their Alevism?
Ale vis have started to radically declare their religious identity publicly after
the recent tragic incidences in Turkey, like the massacre of 37 Ale vi artists in
Sivas (July, 1993) and of 15 Alevi people in a Alevi neighbourhood of Istanbul
(Gaziosmanpasa, March 1995). When the leftist-oriented Pir Sultan Abdal
association organised a cultural festival in Sivas -a central Anatolian city which is
historically divided between Sunnis and Alevis- in July 1993, numerous prominent
Alevi-origin artists and authors, including Aziz Nesin (not an Alevi), attended.
The festival was picketed by a large group of violent right-wing demonstrators
who were clearly keen on killing Aziz Nesin who had previously provoked the
anger of many Sunni Muslims by announcing his intention to publish a translation
of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses. Throwing stones and burning rags through
the windows of the hotel, where the participants of the festival were staying, the
demonstrators succeeded in setting fire to the hotel. Thirty-seven people were
killed in this fire, due to the indifferent attitude of the police forces of the 'Sunni'
Turkish state. This was a very crucial incident which has led to the radicalisation
of the Ale vi movement in relation to the sluggishness of the state apparatus.
Relations between Ale vis and the Turkish state reached even lower depths
with clashes between the police and Ale vi demonstrators in the Gazi
neighbourhood of Istanbul in March 1995. Gazi Mahallesi is a ghetto which is
dominated by Ale vi residents. The hostilities started when an unknown gunman in
a stolen taxi fired a number of shots against a group of men sitting in a café,
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killing one Ale vi. Police were remarkably slow in taking action, and the rumour
soon spread that the local police post might have been involved in the terrorist
attacks. The day after, thousands of Ale vi people from the Gazi neighbourhood
went on to the streets to protest about the murder. The police and the
demonstrators clashed, and fifteen Ale vi demonstrators were killed by the police
(Bruinessen, 1996b: 9-10). These incidences have opened a new era in Alevi
revivalism both at home and in the diaspora.
Similarly, the diaspora context, to a certain degree, alleviates the already
deep-set antagonisms, suspicion, and animosity between Sunni and Ale vi youths.
In fact, many Sunnis become still more hostile towards Alevis. The unchecked
politicisation of mosque-centred religious preaching that proliferates in Germany
is often directed against 'infidel' and 'immoral' Germans, communists, and by
extension, Alevis (Mandel, 1996: 157). The separate Sunni and Alevi value
systems and histories are, to a large extent, reproduced among the diasporic youth
in a way that reflects different patterns of socialisation in each group. These
different patterns of socialisation influence the overall future orientations of Sunni
and Alevi youth towards Turkey and Germany (Mandel, 1990: 167).
Diasporic Ale vi youngsters have experienced something different from
their Ale vi counterparts living back home. After those crucial incidents happened
in Turkey, their Turkishness, which they used to celebrate in reaction to the
notorious racist incidents in MöIln and Solingen, no longer offered a refuge for
them. The homeland Turkey, which has become a land of repression and sorrow,
has turned into a 'lost homeland' for Ale vi youngsters. The orientation of the
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Ale vi youngsters to homeland differs from that of Sunni youngsters. While the
Sunni youth may keep alive their orientation to homeland, the Ale vi youngsters
may well be in search of homing in Berlin. Another aspect which reminds them of
the 'bitter' reality of homeland is the conditions of their counterparts in Turkey.
Since the milieu which they visit in the summer vacations is either in the ghettos
of the big cities or in the small towns and/or villages, they have a restricted vision
of youth in Turkey. What they describe, when asked, is mainly the working class
youth. They suppose that all the youngsters in Turkey are suffering, and have to
work all the time.
The incidents of Sivas and Gazi Mahallesi have become the pillars of the
political Ale vi revivalism both in and outside Turkey. They have recently founded
some political-cultural organisations in Berlin and Germany. Anatolian Ale vis'
Cultural Centre (Anadolu Ale vileri Kültiir Merkez4 AAKIvV, Democratic Ale vis
Association (Demokratik Aleviler BirligO, Ehl-i Beyt Path (Ehl-i Beyt Yolu) are
just some which have been established in Berlin. The AAKM is the most popular
one of those Ale vi organisations centred in Berlin. This organisation was founded
in 1989. It is run by a committee of people and financed by the Berlin Senate and
the Alevi population in Berlin. The members of the AAKM is a mix of Zaza-
Kurdish Ale vis and Turkish Ale vis. 5° The centre is located in Wedding which is
50 Kurds are divided into two main tribes: Zazas and Kirmanchis. Zaza-Kurds are mostly
from Dersim, Tunceli. Unlike the Kirmanchis, they are predominantly Alevi. Kirmanchis
belong to the Sunni Islam which is the 'official' religious school in Turkey. Although
there is an overwhelming Kurdish nationalism blowing in Turkey and all around Europe,
the Zazas have recently tended to identify themselves distinctively from the rest of the
Kurds. Most of the Zaza population in diaspora recently have a tendency to give priority
to their Alevi identity rather than to their Kurdishness. Their identification of themselves
might differ, depending on their political or religious orientations. The dominant ethnic
identities which the Zazas employ in diasporic conditions are either Alevi, Zaza, or
Dersimli (being from Dersim). Since the Zazas are mostly centrifugal Kurdish-Alevis,
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another Turkish enclave in Berlin. There is a 'Cemevi' in the centre. Cernevi
literally means communion house where the co-religious people meet up and have
their religious ceremonies. The religious ceremony is called ayn-i cern (Mass),
which springs from the word cemaat (community).
The authentic style of the cern rituals which take place in the Anatolian
Alevi villages are very small-size social and religious gatherings where the Ale vi
residents of the village meet up, worship and solve their mutual social problems in
the presence of a holy communal guide. The spiritual guide is called Dede, orpir.
The Dedes are considered to be descending from holy lineage. They typically
wander much of the year, travel from one group of his taltv followers to the next,
and lead ayn-i cerns. In these mystic ayn-i cerns, love of god, which is reflected on
the human being, is celebrated. According to the teachings of Ale vism, human
being is the reflection of the beauty of God. Unlike the Sunnis, who turn towards
the Kaaba during the pray, the Ale vis face each other in a circular position.
Human being is the Kaaba in the Ale vi teaching. Facing the other refers to seeing
the spiritual light of saintliness (nur) which is considered to be appearing on the
other's face. Besides being the platform of worship, Cern is also the place where
the public court (halk meclisi) is organised to solve communal and individual
problems in a very democratic and egalitarian way. In the court, everybody has a
say.
they have got a peculiar history of their own. Dersim rebeffion against the young Turkish
Republic in the late 1930s is considered as an Alevi and Zaza uprising (Bruinessen,
1996a).
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There are two other very important elements of the Ale vi teaching. The
first one is 'ser ver, sir verme!', which literally means 'better die than give away a
secret'. This element of Alevism is not only an ethical value. That is also a
political manoeuvring which springs as a result of the need for takyye
(dissimulation). Another determinant of the Ale vi matrix is 'eline, beline, diline
sahi,, olmak', which means 'to control one's hands, tongue and sexual needs'.
This is the very ethical motto of the Ale vi teaching which is inevitably taken in
childhood. 5' Alevism has a strict set of social control norms and rules, which
defines the framework of 'correct behaviour'. In case of violation of these rules,
sect members might be penalised by exclusion from all group activities and
payment of fines. No one could escape from the judgement at the major annual
rites called görgll or ayn-i cern where the Alevi creed is renewed and reviewed,
and serious offences are admitted publicly before the community. The Dede, in
these communal gatherings, aims to maintain peace and harmony between sect
members by helping them reconcile their differences. These rituals have always
been carried out in closely-knit village units throughout history. After the
migrations from rural to urban areas in Turkey and abroad, Ale vi communities
faced the danger of losing those rituals. Recently, new Ale vi organisations have
been set up in the urban spaces to provide community services for the Ale vi
people. By doing so, Ale vis tend to restructure their rituals and institutions in
accordance with the urban needs.
51 This parental teaching is what Bourdieu calls the 'ideology of virility' which adults tend
to employ towards young generations as a way of keeping wisdom -and therefore- power
for themselves (Bourdieu, 1993: 94).
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Other activities conducted by the AAKM include the organisation of sema
dance courses for the Ale vi youth and public concerts. Sema dance is a ritual
signifying the love of God. The audience dances sema in small mixed groups, an
atmosphere of dignity and restraint prevails. Each dancer takes his or her place
according to traditional choreography with an air of detached, deep concentration
and without any suggestion of bodily contact. The sema dance is accompanied by
an authentic Turkish musical instrument with strings, called saz or baglama. The
sema courses have a social function besides being a cultural teaching. These
courses attempt to get the children of the community away from the 'dangerous'
streets, and to give them self-respect.
The Centre also organises public concerts for the Ale vis in Berlin. 'Ale vi
Cultural Night' is one of those organizations. It was held on the 28th of
September, 1996 in the Berlin Erika-Hess-Stadium, Wedding. It was a huge event
with approximately two thousand people in the audience. Most of the participants
were Ale vi folk singers who were invited from Turkey for this special occasion.
They sang Ale vi poems (Degis) from the Turkish folk poets (halk sairi). Amongst
the guests were Barbara John (Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs), Hans
Nisblé (mayor of Wedding, SPD), Franz Schulz (mayor of Kreuzberg, die
Grilnen), Ismail Hakki Kosan (member of the Berlin Senate, die Grünen), the
members of the Türkische Bund, and the Turkish and German media. The way the
AAKM members represented themselves in the programme was very instructive.
The speakers of the AAKM stressed the killings of the Alevis in Sivas and Gazi
neighbourhood. They reconfirmed, or reconstructed, the fact that these incidences
have become two crucial landmarks of the Alevi mythology. Since this was a
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chance for the AAKM members to represent themselves in front of the high-
ranking German politicians and the German media, they also stressed the
difference between Alevism and Shiism. 52 They, in a sense, attempt to make a
distinction between themselves and the orthodox version of Shllsm.
The speeches of the German politicians were also very instructive in their
own respects. Barbara John emphasised the pluralist structure of the city of
Berlin, and the place of the Ale vis in this scene. She stated her willingness to see
the Ale vis freely expressing their cultural identity in the public space. The dubious
culturalist discourse raised by Barbara John tends to relegate social conflicts to
the domain of culturalised iconography (Schierup, 1994: 38). Her discourse of
multiculturalism raises three crucial aspects. Firstly, it reveals the negative
correlation between culture and power in the context of minorities, which I
previously touched upon (Rosaldo, 1989: 198-206). Secondly, Alevis as well as
many other minority groups such as Iranians, Kurds and Chinese are allowed by
the institutional power to express their difference in the 'puplic sphere'. The
expression of 'difference', although, has the advantage of making culture
particularly visible to outside observers, it posits a problem because such
differences are not absolute. Thirdly, her discourse hints that the majority society
might benefit from the appearance of Alevis in the public space because the Ale vis
have developed a stronger subjectivity like many other minorities living in a
permanent turmoil. Thus, she attempts to reproduce and strengthen the binary
opposition of 'us' and 'them'.
52 Alevism is also known as Anatolian version of Shiism, but it is a much more hybrid
form of belief consisting of many different rituals and religious undertones such as
Sufism, Shamanism, Christianity, Judaism as well as Islam.
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A minor group among the German liberals such as Barbara John and Hans
Nisblé are aware of the differences between Sunnis and Ale vis. They are quick to
appropriate the Alevis for their own political project and to use them as an
example of Turks who 'successfully integrate' (Mandel, 1996: 156). Similarly,
Hans Nisblê attempted to place Alevism as a political balance of power against
Islamic revivalism. In the concert, he called the German people to stand by the
Ale vis against the challenge of 'radical Islam within' prevailing over Europe and
Germany. Nisblé's speech was very ifiuminating in the sense that he was
announcing a general view which is quite dominant in the western way of
thinking. The favourable perception of Alevism by the German intelligentsia and
media is, of course, highly related to the Western textual reading of the
contemporary Turkey, which was, at that time, governed by a religious based
coalition. This view conceives Alevism as a shield of secularist regime in Turkey
against the radical Islam. Such an interpretation of Alevism has become the
dominant paradigm both in Turkey and Europe. This paradigm inevitably
contributes to the radicalisation of Alevism in political sense. Accordingly, the
way Ale vis are defined by the German media and politicians also encourages
Alevis to form a community discourse.
It is not only the institutional power of multiculturalism which encourages
Alevis to develop a community discourse, but it is also the fact that, paraphrasing
Hall (1992), speaking from margins sometimes could make more echo. It is
evident that Ale vi organisations tend to construct a community discourse by
reifying some aspects of the Alevi culture. Mobilising many Ale vi-ori gin people by
those public concerts and mass ceremonies, for instance, provides, to use Gilroy's
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words, "important rituals which allow its affiliates to recognise each other and
celebrate their coming together" (Gilroy, 1987: 223). Thus, in diaspora, highly
effective informal networks forge a community of a sort that has never existed at
home, as it attempts to worship and celebrate in concert (Mandel, 1996: 161).
Habitual adherence to the rituals, as Russon (1995: 514) rightly posits, allows us
to recognise ourselves as an 'us', as a 'we'. Borrowing the Hegelian terminology,
the demand for self-consciousness is met in a dialogue of mutual recognition
which takes place in a collective process. Thus, there only remains a singular
space for the individual at the margin to form his/her self-consciousness, i.e. the
communal acts of mutual recognition. In this communal life, rituals and customs
define who 'I' is. It is the Ale vi communality which offers the individual a ground
to achieve self-consciousness.
As Mandel (1996: 162) has rightly put it, some Alevi groups in Germany
have taken advantage of Western freedoms to adopt a more conservative, inward,
communal orientation, unfettered by past political and social constraints. The
highly politicised group of Alevi Gençligi (Ale vi Youth) is an illustrative example
for this radicalism. In July 1996, there were a lot of posters on the walls hung by
the Alevi Youth to commemorate the massacre of the Ale vi intellectuals in July
1993 in Sivas to the Ale vi residents of Kreuzberg. Those posters, which were
written in a 'Kanak Sprak' 53 -a point to which I shall return shortly-, were overtly
interpreted as a challenge to the 'others' who were not Alevi (Figure 3). Alevi
Youth is a fraction in the AAKM. They have recently become very radical. The
'Kanak Sprak' is the creole language spoken and written by the working-class Berlin-
Turkish youth.
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name, A/en Youth, reminds mc of the radical Islamic Youth (!slamd (ei'ç'Ii)
that is organised in Turkey.
Figure 3. An A/en Youth billboard underneath the (ia/ala Kii,'ricii. Knihusser
Tor: "Da.c inassaka in Sina.c ;rcrden wir nic/il nc'F;cic.ce!z. .4/eviii.cclu' )'u,s,'rm/"
(We will not forget the massacre in Sivas. AIei'i Youth). In the hiIlh ard. the term
'massacre' (niassahcr in German) is written as Turkish vernacular. ,nas.caka.
The way the A/ens are represented in the diasp ira 1w themselves,
politicians, and media does nothing but increase the cleavages and the polarisalion
among the Turkish minority in Berlin. Such a representation of A/ei'ism also
contributes to the reduction of S( x'ial pmhlcms In cssentialisl ethnic and rcligi( 1115
clashes. This polarisi1i m within the Turkish C( immunity is also reflected in Turkey
because these Ak'ni organizations have strong links with their equivalent partners
and political organisations in Turkey. Thus, the rising cleavages and competition
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between the diversified Turkish groups is directly transferred to Turkey. This is
how diaspora has an influential impact on the homeland political affairs. To
illustrate the case, the AAKM had organised free flights for Ale vis to attend the
opening ceremony of an Ale vi-based political party (Democratic Peace
Movement) in August 1996, in Ankara. It is an example of the impact of the
diasporic subjects on the homeland politics.54
On the other hand, although the youngsters in Naunyn Ritze and Chtv are
quite distant from the political loading of religion, Alevism and Sunnism have
become the main determinants of the matrix of youth ethnicity. The Alevi
youngsters in Naunyn Ritze rarely talk about the differentiation and conflicts
between themselves and the Sunnis. On the other hand, the Sunni youngsters
usually raise this conflict by saying that Ale vi youngsters are discriminating
against the Sunnis. The girls whom I interviewed in Chiv were all Sunnis. They
have Ale vi friends from Naunyn Ritze. Although they sometimes meet these
friends, they complain about the differentiation which the Ale vi friends have made
against their Sunni friends. They argue that this differentiation is advanced by
their friends to exclude them. In fact, it would not be surprising to hear exactly
the same discourse from the Ale vi youngsters vis-à-vis their Sunni friends. It
seems quite normal for the Ale vi youngsters to distance themselves from the
Sunnis and to re-establish the boundaries after those incidences in Sivas and
Gaziosmanpasa. Thus, they do not think that they are discriminating, whereas the
Another example would be the religious based Mull Göriis association centred in Berlin
transporting its own audience to Turkey to vote in the early general elections held in 1995.
The flight was free of charge, and also the vote-goers were paid extra on top of their
travel expenses.
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Sunni youngsters, who have a majority consciousness and who have been raised
by the official doctrine, cannot yet accept the fact that the Ale vi minority is
declaring its identity publicly by threatening the previously existing order.
Some graffiti samples which I have seen nearby Chiv In
Reichenbergerstrasse were giving some essential clues about the conflictual
temperament of the Sunni and Ale vi youngsters in Kreuzberg. The first example
of graffiti was
"Ale vileri S.K.M"
which means "I fuck the Alevis". 'S.K.M.' is a kind of hidden expression of 'fuck'
in Turkish. Above the same graffiti, there was another example which was most
probably written by the same person, saying
C
BozkurtC
C
which means 'Grey Wolf -three crescent'. Three crescents are the symbol of the
extreme right wing grey wolves in Turkey. The nationalist Turkish mythology
depicts that it is the grey wolf (Bozkurt) which accompanied and guided the
Turkish nation all the way through the massive migration from Central Asia to
Anatolia. The grey wolf is considered by the Turkish nationalists to be the
mythological guide of the Turkish nation. These two examples of graffiti written
on the same wall are quite complementary. It signifies that Turkish nationalist
ideology excludes the Alevis. The clash between the Sunnis and Ale vis has also
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been carried onto the symbolic level. As I shall point Out in the coming chapters,
ethnic symbols are extensively used by the Turkish youngsters as a constituent of
their identity.
As far as the construction of ethnic-based political participation strategies
(migrant strategy and minority strategy) is concerned, Ale vism in the diaspora
conveys a similar process to the other Turkish diasporic communities which I
outlined in the previous chapter. Yet, Alevism nowadays corresponds to a further
radicalised community discourse due to the recent incidences in Turkey. This
radical Ale vi revivalism can be contemplated as one of the new social movements
in the sense that Alain Touraine and Alberto Melucci mentioned earlier (Touraine,
1977; Melucci, 1989). The common denominator of contemporary social
movements such as the peace movement and the ecology movement is that they
are not directly involved in struggles focused on production and distribution of
material goods and resources. Instead they are increasingly concerned with
debates about symbolic resources. Moreover, participation in these movements is
no longer simply a means to an end but it is considered a goal in itself.
The contemporary metanarrative of multiculturalism has something to do
with the transformation of the recent social movements. Multiculturalism tends to
transform social conflicts into ethnic and religious ones. Radtke (1994: 32-37)
points out that this transformation takes place under the hegemony of the state
which forms a kind of neo-clientalist system:
The clientele of the state are organizations which have a
clientele of individuals themselves. In both cases the
dependency is reciprocal: The institutional or individual client
will try to present himself as fitting into the programme of the
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patron; the patron will only continue to exist if he has the
lasting support and trust of his clientele.. .The liberal model of
competing interests ends up in patronage, lobbyism and
paternalism.. .The effect of Multi-Culturalism in connection with
clientalism is not ethnic mobilisation but self -ethnicisation of the
minorities. As long as they do not have any political rights and
as long as there is no policy of affirmative action, Multi -
Culturalism inevitably ends up in foildorism. Minorities in
Germany are kept away from the public sphere and invited by
the legal system to form apolitical communities
(Gemeinschafien) in the private sphere instead of interest
groups... Multi-Culturalism translates the concept of plurality of
interests into a concept of plurality of descents.. .Multi-
Culturalisni is only a reversal of ethnocentrism...
Accordingly, the AAKIIvI can be interpreted as a clientele organisation
fulfilling the requirements of multiculturalism. As an obedient subject of the state,
the AAKM, thus, reaffirms the hegemony of state whilst reifying Ale vi culture and
tradition. Furthermore, it seems to imprison the social reaction of a subordinated
working-class group in a cultural cage which is offered by the state.
Multiculturalist metanarrative gives a chance to the masses to represent, vocalise
and narrate their own ethnicities and cultures freely without undergoing any
change in the relations of production and distribution. The policy of
multiculturalism gives 'space' to the minorities to express themselves, but not
'rights' such as political rights. In other words, as Gilhian Bottomley (1987: 4)
stated in the Australian context, multiculturalism has tended to obscure the
primacy of economic and political structures in determining the limits of
possibilities for migrants to Germany. They have concentrated on culture and
have, in doing so, made the cultural field an important terrain of struggle.
Similarly, having restrictive regimes of incorporation for the migrants and
'foreigners', Germany attempts to give the Turks a sense of belonging by means
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of multiculturalism. The ideology of multiculturalism provides the German
government with a form of what Michel Foucault (1979) called governmentally.
Governmentalizy refers to the practices which characterise the form of supervision
a state exercises over its subjects, their wealth, their misfortunes, their customs,
their souls and their habits. Foucault's modern 'administrative state' is based on
the idea of a 'society of regulation' which differs from 'the state of justice' of the
Middle Ages which was built on the idea of a 'society of laws' (Foucault, 1979:
21). According to Foucault the modern state regulates our bodies, souls, habits
and thoughts by giving us a sense of freedom. In the modern societies freedom
has become a fruitful resource for government. Accordingly, the policy of
multiculturalism enables minority cultures to present themselves 'freely'.
*	 *	 *
To summarise, Turkish migrants living in Kreuzberg have created a new
home away from their homeland. This diasporic space reflects various snapshots,
discourses, images, rhythms, narratives, social networks (henisehrilik) and familial
connections from the pre-immigrant life-worlds of the migrants. The formation of
a diasporic space through images, sounds, symbols and traditions from the
homeland has served the migrants as a 'fortress' protecting them against
institutional discrimination, assimilation and racism. The presence of the networks
of transnational communications and transportation connecting the diaspora to the
homeland has also strengthened the construction of a diasporic identity. Thus, the
diasporic identity which has been built by the migrants as a social strategy, has
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been reshaped and reinforced through transnational networks extending the
official ideology of Turkishness.
It was also concluded in this chapter that the major Turkish ethnic
associations in the diaspora have developed a culture discourse which is based on
the holistic notion of 'CULTure'. This demotic discourse of the ethnic minority
associations in fact parallels the dominant discourse of multiculturalism which
aims to locate the minority cultures within discrete and fixed boundaries (cf.
Baumann, 1996). The policies of multiculturalism in Berlin have mainly
encouraged the ethnic minorities to organise themselves along culture lines. The
mobiisation of ethnic associations along culture lines has limited their prospects in
undertaking political initiatives for any structural change. This chapter has also
outlined the social, political, economic, ethnic and demographic structure of
Kreuzberg 36 to provide us with a broader perspective in order to scrutinise the
diasporic consciousness of the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth. The next
chapter wifi examine the sense of place and 'homing' for the Turkish hip-hop
youth in the diaspora.
156
CHAPTER 4
IDENTITY AND HOMING OF DIASPORA
Kreuzberg as a Turkish ethnic enclave connotes a very particular set of images,
signs, symbols, sounds and associations, which revolve around its reputation as
'Kleines Istanbul' (Little Istanbul). As portrayed in the previous chapter,
Kreuzberg has become a 'diasporic space' for the Turkish migrants, which
exhibits a cultural continuum between the homeland and the country of
settlement. Kreuzberg as a diasporic space has a crucial impact on the identity
formation of the Turkish youngsters. The way the youths construct their identities
in the shifting boundaries of various life-worlds is imbued with the social, cultural
and political landscape of this ethnic enclave. In this sense, this chapter, on the
one hand, aims to investigate the main life-worlds of the working class Turkish
youths, which shape the process of their identity construction. In doing so, the
multicultural competence, which they develop in the process of negotiating within
and between these distinct social spaces, will be demonstrated. On the other hand,
I will also briefly recite the multicultural discourse of the middle-class Turkish
youth living outside Kreuzberg in order to build, by way of contrast, a broader
view of the working-class youth.
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L?fe-worlds of the Working-Class Turkish Youth in Kreuzberg
The increasing autonomy of life-world forms, which goes beyond the boundaries
of production, results in a higher level of individual differentiation in everyday life
and in a release from traditional family ties. As Alberto Melucci (1989: 51) has
stated, the consequences of such an autonomy might be as follows: increasing
independence felt by individuals from family bonds; increased social mobility at
both everyday life level and occupational level; and multiplication of cultural
identities and life-styles. Turkish ethnic minorityouU ii Kri z6a r always shifts
between the spaces of home, street, school and youth centre. There is always a
clear-cut boundary between these social spaces produced by the diasporic youth.
In this section, I will scrutinise the multiplication of cultural identities in these
various higly gendered life-worlds and how the male diasporic youths manage to
construct a syncretic form of culture by crossing various milieus and discrete life-
worlds. These non-conscious acts of 'crossing' or cultural reproduction by the
youngsters will be explicated by a set of examples on code-switching.
Youth Centre
Undoubtedly the youth centre occupies the biggest space in the lives of the
youngsters. The youth centre serves as a refuge from the parental discipline for
the minority youth and acts as a haven from the hostility of the 'outside world',
and as a place in which dignity, self-respect and recognition are internally defined.
They live like 'brothers' and 'sisters' in the centre. The youngsters consider the
centre a substitute 'family' environment where they congregate, cook, entertain,
communicate and protect themselves against external challenges. There is always
a hierarchy in this 'family' setting amongst the youngsters. The elders feel
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themselves responsible for the younger members; and the young ones respect the
elders. To illustrate the situation of respect, when the younger members realise
that a relatively older member of the group is arriving into the café, they stop
making noise and become more respectful to each other. Rather than the German
youth workers the youngsters respect better the 'elder brothers' who they see as a
part of their own community. This respect from the youngsters springs from the
hierarchical structure behind in-group relations.
The ethnic minority youths are stuck with a kind of 'language of fatalism'
(Hebdige, 1987: 40), or to an arabesk way of life. The common lines which they
use to express their state of being are "Ahh ulan ahh!" (deep sigh with an inner
resistance), "Acimasiz diinya!" (cruel world), "Bütiin insanlar suçlu!" (human
beings are all guilty), or "Jsyanlardayim!" (I am fed up!). Most of them have no
future prospect in their own eyes. They attend the vocational schools
(Berufschulen) to gain a degree, but they actually do not feel attached to those
related occupations. Although most of the youngsters have job training such as
mechanics, hairdressing, and building construction, they do not prefer to carry on
the profession they had in the school.
Street
Street is another space where the youngsters form another life-world. The streets
of Kreuzberg 36, in a broader sense, are the simultaneous product of struggles of
resistance, local political cultures, a particular articulation of a post-industrial
political-economy and urban myths of gang violence. Street as a 'public space' is
iransforrned into a 'private space' by the working-class youths. When the centre is
closed, for instance before 15.00 hour, and during Sunday and Monday, the street
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becomes the favourite meeting space where the youths congregate and 'hang out'.
Streets become essential for the working-class youth in terms of the 'production
of space' in the sense that Henri Lefebvre (1989) stated. Listening to music in
their own sport-cars with high-decibel volume, having a chat with their own
'mates' on some particular Street corner, speaking loudly, and staring at strangers
are all some of the spatial practices of the youths to produce their own social
space and territory in relation to the strangers and parental discipline.
Street, which is a safe habitat for the residents, might well be irritating for
some others. The streets in the peripheral space, such as ethnic neighbourhood,
have their own mythified stories. The streets of Kreuzberg have many such
diversified stories. Those streets have hosted many spontaneous riots and
uprisings as well as many multicultural festivals. May Day in the year 1989
witnessed one of these riots in Kreuzberg. 55 Taner, one of the participants,
narrated the incidences with nostalgic mimics:
In the May Day we plundered almost everything we saw. We
exploded. This social explosion might happen again. We were
plundering the posh shopping centres and cars in the streets,
even the Turkish pilgrims were plundering. Approximately ten
shopping-centres were plundered by Turkish, German, Kurdish,
drunk, pilgrim etc. It was like Los Angeles in 92, and Kadikoy
in May Day 1996.56 We were dancing while plundering. I was
extremely happy that day, I was fighting against the system.
These incidences happened mostly in Kreuzberg. It was like a
For further information about the 1989 May Day demonstrations, see "Steine in die
Senatskosmetik," Daily Taz-Berlin (2 May 1989); "DGB zahlte 610.000 beim Tag der
Arbeit," Daily Taz (2 May 1989); and "In Kreuzberg kommandieren wir," Der Spiegel
47/1990.
56 In the May Day demonstrations of 1996, a youth was killed, many others were
wounded and many shopping centres, banks, offices were plundered by the underclass
people living in the margins in Kadikoy, Istanbul. The riot was partly organised and
partly spontaneous. To put it differently, spontaneity in this occasion was the
metalanguage of the peripheral space and/or marginality.
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'revolution'. We were all together, Turk, Kurd, German,
Fascist and Arab.
Taner's narrative gives us more clues about the character of the streets of
Kreuzberg. The streets house some united battles of Turkish and German in the
May Day uprisings as well as in some other spontaneous uprisings such as anti-
racist demonstrations.57
Previously, the main occupants of the streets were the mythical gangsta
groups like 36rs, 36 Boys and 36 Juniors in Naunyn Ritze. Taner, who is one of
the founders of the 36rs, said that the gangsta group was providing them with an
alternative sense of family: "My group was my family. We were all together with
the younger ones like a family. For instance we did not let the little kids smoke,
and we used to protect them". The youngsters roaming around the streets are
aware of the fact that, someday, they might risk imprisonment through fighting,
carrying guns and drug use. Since they have been living with this risk for so long
in their ethnic enclave, it seems that they have internalised this risk. The
experience of imprisonment turns Out to be a source of distinction for the boys.58
This distinction makes them feel 'cool'. It is as if the youngsters, who previously
have been jailed, affirm the meaning of the word 'cooler' in American slang:
'cooler' means jail, a place where someone cools down. The youngsters see their
elder friends who have spent some time in jail, as a role model. Bulent (20) was a
new face in Naunyn Ritze. He was previously in jail for drug use and violence. For
Here, paraphrasing from Antoni Gramsci (1971: 198), it should be stated that
'spontaneity is the characteristic of the history of subaltern classes and indeed of their
most marginal and peripheral elements'.
I am using the term distinction in the sense that Pierre Bourdieu has used it. Bourdieu,
in his work Distinction (1984), calls attention to how different kinds of capitals (social,
cultural, symbolic and economic) have been put into play by members of each social class
and group in order to create a difference or distinction.
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Bülent, the jail experience has ruined his life. He thought that he had nothing left
to lose or to win. He has been in such a pessimistic state of mind. On the other
hand, as a person who has had a jail experience, he was highly respected by the
youngsters within Naunyn Ritze. Apart from the other elder 'brothers', he was
another symbol of authority in the centre.
Another source of distinction which the ethnic minority youths tend to
have on the street is the mobile phone. Almost all the guys have a mobile phone,
which is a symbol of masculinity. They have no money but they have 'handy'
(mobile phone). It gives a 'cool' style to the youngsters. Sitting in a Turkish café,
such as Café 1001 in Charlottenburg, many mobile phones could be seen on the
tables. It is as if the phones are, in a symbolic battle on the table. Gülsen (16)
explained that if she quits smoking, her elder brother promised to buy her a
mobile phone.
Friendship is also a vital constituent of the life-world in street. Turkish
youngsters express that after a certain age it becomes easier to communicate with
the co-ethnics because the mimicry counts to a wider extent in the age of
adolescence. It becomes difficult for them to have a silent communication with the
Germans through mimics, and to have serious talks with them. They see it as a
cultural difference between their German friends and themselves. Thus, they tend
to give up 'hanging around' with the German friends. They imply that at this age
they need mature and satisfactory talks with their friends, whereas their German
'mates' seem very childish to them. They can't have a proper 'muhabbet' (in-
depth talk) with their German 'mates'. The difference between diasporic Turkish
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youths and their German 'mates' springs from the fact that they have a rather
different mimicry and subjectivity. Raising the difference in mimicry as a reason of
not getting on well with German 'mates' is, in fact, a way of representing
difference in the process of identity construction. Bhabha's definition of mimicry
is quite illuminating in finding out its importance for the identity formation:
Mimicry is at once resemblance and menace.. .In mimicry, the
representation of identity and meaning is rearticulated along the
axis of metonymy. As Lacan reminds us, mimicry is like
camouflage, not a harrnonisation of repression of difference, but
a form of resemblance, that differs from or defends presence by
displaying it in part, metonymically (Bhabha, 1994: 90).
Mimicry attempts to include some while excluding some others. What really
matters in mimicry is the expression of resemblance with the co-ethnics as well as
expressing difference from 'others'. The discourse of mimicry constructed by the
Turkish youth is "a form of defensive warfare, which marks those moments of
civil disobedience within the discipline of civility: signs of spectacular resistance"
(Bhabha, 1994: 121). Raising mimicry as a difference provides an instrumental
ground for minority youths, where they could develop a form of resistance against
the dominant regimes of representation.
On the other hand, subjectivity is also an essential element of inter-ethnic
friendships between Turkish and German youths. Migrants' children or
grandchildren have a permanent negotiation between the world of youths and the
world of grown-ups due to their particular subjectivity: for instance being able to
summarise or translate the key points of a news story, engage in dialogue with
adults, form opinions, take a stand on issues, and even challenge and attempt to
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change elders' views makes a young person feel 'grown-up' and encourages
others to perceive them as such (Gillespie, 1996: 118).
Courtship is another constituent of the street life to be mentioned. Going
out with a German girl is quite normal for the Turkish boys. In the Naunyn Rit.ze
youth centre, there were some boys going out with German girls, and living with
them. Nevertheless, both the Turkish boys and girls held a strong belief that the
Turkish boys' relationships with German girls will not result in marriage. One of
the Turkish girls stated that "The reason why 'our' guys are going out with the
German girls is just to use them and to do that thing which they cannot do with
the decent Turkish girls." Claire E. Alexander's classification of 'private women'
and 'public women' in mapping out the modes of courtship of the male black
Londoners (Alexander, 1996: 157-186) is also applicable to the working-class
Turkish youth in Berlin. Turkish boys generally consider Turkish girls to be 'our'
women. it is significant that when the boys encounter Turkish women in
Kreuzberg, or in other districts of Berlin, they rarely entered into interaction with
them. Having been contemplated as sexually inaccessible, at least for casual
encounters, by the Turkish youth, the Turkish women have their own place in the
private sphere of the Turkish boys, whereas the German women belong to the
public space which is easily accessible. The association of the German women
with the public space allies Turkish boys more closely to the power relations
reflected in wider society.
The youngsters have also been used to living together with the presence of
police in the street. They call the police officers 'amca' which literally means
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'uncle' in Turkish. Neco says "we are so close to the police officers, so we
consider them our 'relatives". The youngsters can easily recognise the civil police
officers 'hanging out' or driving around in the Street. Since there is a drug traffic
around Kotbusser Tor and the youth centre, the police always inspect the district.
While the presence of police in the streets is tolerated by the youngsters, they are
seriously disturbed by the police occupying their own space in the youth centre
because the youth centre is considered somewhere safe from police interference.
School
School is also one space which is quite distinct from the other social spaces in
regard to the differentiation of the people with whom they interact. The
youngsters who attend the high school always complain about their teachers. They
believe that the reason behind their failure is the racist and discriminatory
behaviours of their German teachers to whom they have to be subject. Be it male
or female, never-ending discussions with the teachers is the common problem.
They always tend to blame the teachers, but not themselves, for the failure they
experience.
A remarkable amount of the youngsters were raised in Turkish classrooms
where there were almost no Germans. The children of the migrants have been
subject to certain regulations with regard to education. The official policy in most
of the provinces of Germany requires that 'foreigners' in the classroom should not
exceed 20 % of any school class (in Berlin the quota could be extended up to 50
%) This regulation is considered to be one of the factors behind the presence of
Article 35a of the Berlin-Brandenburg Education Act required a 30 per cent quota for
the 'foreigner' students. if the number of foreign students exceeded the 30 per cent quota,
then either this quota could be extended to 50 percent under the condition that all the
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high numbers of Turkish children in Sonderschule (Table 6). Sonderschule is a
different kind of primary school having special classes for children who are
believed to have 'learning difficulties'. Most of the immigrants' children are asked
to attend these schools because of their 'impotence' in German language.
Depending on their success, the students of Sonderschule have a chance to switch
to the other schools. Then, these students most likely encounter some other
problems such as the incompatibility of the previous Sonderschule curriculum to
the new curriculum. The hierarchical structure of the German educational system,
in a way, tends to imprison the children of immigrants who are in rather
disadvantageous position.6°
A. Grundschulen
Class 1	 803	 866	 52.9
Class 2	 924	 942	 50.5
Class 3	 856	 892	 51.6
Class 4	 948	 763	 44.6
Class 5	 815	 752	 48.0
Class 6	 751	 747	 49.9
B. Hauptschulen
Class 7	 158	 262	 62.4
Class 8	 159	 270	 63.0
Class 9	 192	 180	 48.4
Class 10	 151	 198	 56.7
foreigner students spoke fluent German, or the 'foreigner classrooms' could be formed.
Article 35a was declared void in September 1995 through the initiatives of the
Association of Berlin-Brandenburg Turkish Parents (ABBTP). According to the figures
of the ABBTP, the percentage of the Turkish students who have been educated in the
'foreigner classrooms' in Berlin was 20 percent for the Grundschule and 50 per cent for
the Hauptschule. For further information, see 10 Jahre Elternarbeit 1 985-1995: Eine
Documentation des Türkischen Elternvereins in Berlin-Brandenburg e. V.
'° According to the figures of the Stat istische VerOffentlichungen der
Kulturministerconferenz Dokument No.119 (Dec. 1991), 55.8 per cent of the foreigners
in Sonderschule in Berlin was made up by the Turkish students (Table 6).
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C. Realschulen
Class 7	 64	 74	 53.6
Class 8	 58	 53	 48.0
Class 9	 61	 69	 53.1
Class 10	 103	 118	 53.4
D. Gymna.sien
Class 7	 191	 59	 23.6
Class 8	 171	 46	 21.2
Class 9	 154	 41	 21.0
Class 10	 183	 57	 23.8
E. Gesamtschulen
Class 7	 289	 189	 39.5
Class 8	 297	 167	 36.0
Class 9	 263	 210	 44.4
Class 10	 262	 201	 43.4
F. Sonderschulen
Class 1,2	 67	 29	 30.2
Class 3	 36	 17	 32.1
Class 4	 21	 17	 44.7
Class 5	 14	 12	 46.2
Class 6	 33	 20	 37.8
Class 7	 20	 16	 44.4
Class 8	 25	 11	 30.6
Class 9	 16
Class 10	 8
Table 6. The number of the German and non-German students in Kreuzberg.
Source: Der Bezirksburgermeister von Berlin-Kreuzberg, October 1996.
German and middle-class Turkish families prefer not to send their children
to the primary and especially to the secondary schools in Kreuzberg, because they
believe that children raised in Kreuzberg schools with the working-class migrants'
children, become more violent and less academically able. Being raised in these
classrooms, Turkish children often display a lack of confidence in their interaction
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with the majority society due to their inadequate German language and their
deficient empathy with the Germans. The consequence of the lack of interaction
could overtly be seen in the common playground of the Turkish and German
children. The Naunyn Ritze youth centre has a park and playground for the
children in Waldemarstrasse. There is always a youth worker in the park, dealing
with the children. What was striking for me was to see that Turkish and German
children (6 to 12-year-old) hardly interacted in their games. Sometimes, this lack
of interaction might also lead to violent acts between children. For instance, once
the German children built a little wooden-house under the supervision of the
Turkish youth worker in the children's play park of the Naunyn Ritze youth
centre, then the Turkish children silently came to the park at night and destroyed
it.
It seems that the official authorities are reluctant to do something in order
to open the channels of communication and interaction between the children of
the ethnic groups. In an interview, I asked Barbara John, Commissioner of
Foreigners' Office, whether she was trying to change this picture. She said "we
cannot force the people to do this or that; all we are tiying to do is to convince
the Turks to leave Kreuzberg to live in better conditions." The rationale behind
this official discourse seems to be aiming to disseminate the Turkish enclave in
Kreuzberg.6'
61 A regulation, which was issued in 1975, has already forbidden foreigners from taking
up residence in some districts of Berlin. These restrictive zoning laws, enforced by the
Ausländerpolizei (Aliens Police), identify three quarters of the city -Kreuzberg, Wedding
and Tiergarten- as off-limits to the last desirable foreigners (those from the Third World).
These are the districts with the highest percentage of Turkish residents, with 21.2 percent,
17.6 percent, and 6.2 percent respectively. It seems that the zoning laws, regulating the
whereabouts of foreigners, went successful because the Turkish population of some new
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Household
Family is another space where the youngsters live. 62 The general assumption
within and outside the Turkish community concerning the nature of the Turkish
family is that working-class Turkish families are relatively more crowded than
their German equivalents. The number of the members of the families ranges from
six to ten for the twenty youngsters whom I interviewed in Naunyn Ritze and
Chiv. Most mothers are either house-wives or manual workers. On the other
hand, most fathers are manual workers on either construction sites or assembly
lines. Some parents have retired and a significant number are unemployed. The
ones who are retired have the chance to switch between Turkey and Germany.
Discipline within the family is the primary aspect. Those youngsters, who
are very relaxed and self-confident in the public space, suddenly turn out to be
very silent and 'respecthil' under the power of a father. Parents try to keep their
children away from the streets and the youth centres. They believe that interacting
with 'deviant' German and Turkish youth in the streets and youth centres will
make their children disrespectful. Thus, they encourage their children to go to
some community associations such as Ale vi associations, hemsehri (fellow-
villager) associations, and/or mosques.
districts such as Neukölln and Schoneberg has become more than that of Wedding and
Tiergarten, with 19.5 percent and 8.7 percent respectively (Source: Statistisches
Landesamt, Einwohnerrcgister, 30.06.1996). The further stage of this process also seems
to be convincing the Turks to leave Kreuzberg and settle down in some other districts of
Berlin.
Altough I have had limited material on households, due to the nature of my research,
the family as a principal constituent of the diasporic space needs to be taken into
consideration in order to understand the diasporic consciousness.
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Another assumption about the Turkish family structure in Berlin is that
the familial bonds within the Turkish community are more powerful than in
German society. Although these bonds become weaker in comparison to working-
class family culture in Turkey, the children are still expected to live with their
parents until they get married. The parental culture is still quite influential in
choosing a marriage partner. Parents still have a say in the selection of a spouse.
The criteria of selection are usually very simple: the potential spouse should
preferably be from the same ethnic and religious origin. For instance, a German
spouse is not preferred unless s/he converts to Islam; and there is also a strong
boundary between Sunnis and Alevis in terms of marriage. Hitherto, arranged
marriages from Turkey were quite widespread. The youngsters have recently
come to terms with the ever-lasting wish of their parents to go for arranged
marriages. Although I have no statistical data indicating the decreasing pace of
arranged marriages from Turkey, the radically resisting statements of the
youngsters were quite instructive in understanding the new trend. The girls are the
ones who used to extensively suffer from arranged marriages. When their 'age of
marriage' came, their parents used to arrange a marriage for them during the
summer vacation (izin) spent in Turkey.
Another aspect worth mentioning in its relation to the familial life of the
youngsters is represented by the conversations about the relatives, friends and
immovable belongings back in Turkey. They talk either about relatives they miss
or the immovable belongings they left behind or recently bought. Daily, by means
of those in-family conversations and collective memories, youngsters revisit living
relatives; or they watch the video-tape they previously recorded in a wedding
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ceremony in Turkey; or else they watch the video-tape showing the summer
cottage and/or house they bought in the previous visit to Turkey. Each of those
ritualised practices signifies an imaginary journey back home for the youth in the
diaspora.
No one, neither parent, nor teacher, nor youth worker has a complete
knowledge about the youngsters' life worlds. The youths always switch between
these different spaces. They should negotiate and compromise between various
social-cultural landscapes in order to find a way through. What they construct in
these shifting spaces is a kind of cultural bricolage leading to the formation of a
Third Culture. The third culture, to which I will shortly return in the following
chapter, "is a bricolage in which elements from different cultural traditions,
sources and social discourses are continuously intermingled with and juxtaposed
to each other" (caglar, 1994: 33).
The production of the third culture by the Turkish diasporic youth is a
production which goes beyond the conventional Hegelian and Marxist
understandings of production. Stereotypically it is believed that working-class
diasporic youths do not produce anything, they just 'hang around' and do nothing.
This is a common opinion amongst parents, majority society, formal institutions
and scholars Such a stereotype is bound to the ideology of productivism. As
Henri Lefebvre (1989) rightly poses, production does not necessarily require
either product or labour. His notion of production is quite different from that of
economism:
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[W]ords, dreams, texts and concepts produce labour on their
own account;... This leaves us with a curious image of labour
without labourers, products without production processes, or
production without products, and works without creators (no
'subject' and no 'object' either) (Lefebvre, 1989: 72).
Turkish diasporic youth in Kreuzberg produces a web of social spaces composed
of youth centre, Street, school and household. This is a social space which
constitutes a locus of communication by means of signs, symbols, images and
objects, a locus of separations and a milieu of prohibitions (insiders-outsiders).
Furthermore, this is a space giving rise to the production of a postcultural youth
culture in the 'borderlands' of 'various cultures'. All these life-worlds are imbued
with the diasporic space in Kreuzberg. In what follows I shall describe the major
constituents employed by the working-class Turkish youths to construct a new
home in Kreuzberg.
'Sicher' in Kreuzberg: The Homing of Diaspora
Modern diaspora identities inscribe a homing desire while simultaneously create
syncretic cultures in the borderlands. The question of desiring home in diaspora is
precisely linked to the processes of exclusion which operate in the given
circumstances. The discourse of home in the diaspora is an essential need to
challenge the existing regimes of exclusion and subordination. In this sense, the
youngsters refer to Kreuzberg as 'Little Istanbul'. As it was explained above, all
the images, signs, symbols and objects in Kreuzberg contribute to the
mystification of Istanbul and Turkey in the imagery of the Turkish minority. The
use of familiar signs and symbols in the diaspora is, in fact, a quest for homing. All
the youngsters without any exception use the word 'sicher' in explaining how
they feel in Kreuzberg. The word, sicher, literally means 'sure' and 'secure'.
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Being sure of what, and feeling secure against what? Kreuzberg is the new home
for them, where they are always sure of their moves and positions.
Kreuzberg is literally a Turkish ethnic enclave which provides Turkish
migrants and their descendants with a web of solidarity, security and confinement.
Yiiksel (26) expressed how they rarely go outside Kreuzberg, apart from to those
places where their schools are located. When they leave Kreuzberg, they have the
feeling that they have gone outside their home:
If Kreuzberg did not exist, then Germany would be unbearable
to live in for us. Here the water and the climate are awful.
Nothing has taste here, but wherever I go outside Kreuzberg I
am longing for, let's say, a woman going back home from
shopping with a full of bag in her hands. Kreuzberg is a habit.
Kreuzberg no longer marks an international frontier for the Turkish youth. They
navigate between their worlds, not only when they make an annual vacation trip
to Turkey (izin), but also "daily when they leave the Turkish inner sanctums of
their cold-water flats, their Turkophone families and neighbours, their Kleines-
Istanbul ghetto to enter the German speaking work world and marketplace, where
the characteristic economic relations between First and Third worlds are
linguistically, socially, and culturally reproduced" (Mandel, 1996: 151).
Kreuzberg is their very own living territory, they feel secure there and
they do not have any feeling of alienation. It is the Germans from other districts,
according to Neco, who feel alienated in Kreirzberg, not the Turks. No youngster
feels attached either to Germany or Berlin, but they are attached to Kreuzberg.
They identify themselves with Kreuzberg. Kreuzberg provides them with a sense
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of security, behavioural certainty, assurance and confidence as it previously did,
and still does, to their immigrant parents (caglar, 1994: 53).
The feeling of being simultaneously 'home away from home' or 'here and
there' reveals a form of 'double consciousness' and 'awareness of multilocality' in
the imagery of the diasporic youth. The awareness of multiocality or 'double
consciousness' becomes a crucial aspect of their identity formation. When the
youngsters have been asked about where home was for them, they all hesitated to
put clear boundaries between Turkey and Kreuzberg. When I asked Ayhan (20)
from Naunyn Ritze about his feelings on Kreuzberg, he said:
The moment when you asked the question, my hair stood on
end. I love Kreuzberg. I feel myself secure here. Everything is
normal here, the rest of Berlin is like a dead-land. On the one
hand, it is making us suffer, on the other hand there is always
someone here helping you. For instance I learned graffiti and
break-dance here. It has brought some things to us as well as
taking away some other things from us. It is cool. Seriously
speaking, for me home is Kreuzberg. Home is where we live in.
Some people might think that I have become conceited and that
I am in vain, but here is my home. I have not been brought up in
Turkey.
The youngsters are highly attached to their own local boundaries. Owning the
district they live in, they place the boundary between themselves and the majority
society. Their own street is a kind of protective wall for them, they hardly leave
the street. Kreuzberg is a 'fortress' which they and their parents have constructed
in time. The streets of Kreuzberg give the warmth of home to the youngsters. For
instance, while their German 'mates' meet in each other's house to converse or to
entertain, the Turkish youths prefer to meet in the Street. When the centre is not
open in the holidays, they meet in front of the youth centre. Although they have a
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strong local identifications, they may also vary in their identification depending on
the context. Neco said: "When we are asked where we are from in Berlin, we say
we are from Kreuzberg, but if the same question is asked to us outside Berlin we
say we are from Berlin. We say we are from Berlin because we know that Berlin
always seems exotic to the other Germans. Berlin is Kreuzberg." By doing so,
Neco and his 'mates' seem to be aware of their situational local identification
which prompts them to play with the images of the townscape in the imagery of
outsiders.
"Berlin is Kreuzberg." This narration of Neco refers to the fact that the
youngsters realise that Kreuzberg used to be previously conceived by the west
Germans as the major exotic and enigmatic quarter of Berlin. Referring to this
perception, Kreuzberg youngsters tend to have a strong pride with their own
territory. Neco's narration about Kreuzberg seems to be complementary to what
Yiiksel (26) said:
Once upon a time, Kreuzberg was like a battle field. Everything
was falling apart here. Some of the families didn't even have a
toilet of their own, they used to share the common toilet with
the other families in the courtyard of the building. Some of the
houses didn't have neither electricity nor water. We grew up in
such an environment. Everything has changed along with the
reunification. Before the reunification, the west German tourists
often used to visit Kreuzberg just to have a quick look without
getting off the tourist bus. They were afraid of us. It was as if
they were visiting a zoo, and the bus was like their cage
protecting them from the dangerous animals. Then, when they
got back home, they expressed their enthusiasm and happiness
to their friends in visiting Kreuzberg.
Kreuzberg gives the youngsters a sense of security, not only because it is a space
they were born into, but also because it is a place they can socially control. The
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social control of the living space is based on mainly ethnic and hemsehri (fellow
villagers) bonds. Hemsehrilik is a network of solitary interpersonal relations based
on regional ties. It is thought of as a primordial tie like kinship (caglar, 1994:
159). Although the hemsehri bonds have recently become weaker, they are still a
crucial instrument which the youngsters play with. For Eyup, a 22-year-old-boy in
Chio, hemsehrilik is still a very important concept: "I automatically fancy my
hemsehris from Aksaray (a middle Anatolian city). For instance, I don't like the
people from Samsun and Konya, whereas my hemsehris are worthy for anything."
Bagdagul, an 18-year-old-female from Naunyn Ritze, is also very sensitive about
the issue of kinship and hemsehrilik: "Hemsehrilik is very important here. Almost
all Kreuzberg belongs to us." Here, 'us' refers to the Turkish residents from
Erzurum -a city in the eastern Anatolia. Then, she added that she did not bother
about hemsehrilik. There is a contradiction in her narration. On the one hand, she
is internalising the category of 'us', on the other she posits a distinction between
herself and the rest. In fact, she is aware that hemsehrilik is a crucial social capital
for herself as well as for the rest of 'us'.
However, there are some aspects of this ethnic enclave which the
youngsters dislike. These aspects are basically related to their privacy. Gossip is
an important institution in the Turkish enclave of Kreuzberg. Almost all the
residents know what is going on in Kreuzberg. Yiiksel (manager of the rap group
Islamic Force) has brought a yellow aluminium window from Turkey for his
music store in Adalbertstrasse, the very next day almost everybody in Kreuzberg
heard the news, even found out how much it had cost Yiiksel. He stated that the
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kiosk at the opposite side has already ordered the same aluminium from Istanbul
just after he fixed his window.
The community culture of the neighbourhood also has a great impact on
the gender relations as well as on the institution of gossip. Boys say "Kreuzberg
girls are our sisters." They can easily determine which girl is a stranger in their
own district. They chase the 'stranger girls' in the streets and make insolent
remarks to them without looking at their nationality. Elif, youth worker, described
how she had some problems in the very first days when she started to work in the
Naunyn Ritze youth centre. Firstly, she was chased by the youngsters in the street;
and then the boys in the centre started to compete between themselves for her
attention without knowing that she was a youth worker in the centre.
Gossip is also an influential instrument for the parents to keep their
children under control. There is always a social control on both boys and girls, so
that they must be careful in their relations with the other sex. The girls, for
instance, are always afraid of getting caught by some familiar eyes when they
'hang around' with boys. They are concerned of being given the label of 'nasty
girl'. Most of the girls in the centre also refrain from smoking in public because
they fear their elder brothers or parents. Thus, they tend to smoke secretly in the
toilet, or outside the centre. Smoking at such an early age gives them a feeling of
freedom. It is a symbol of freedom which they consider against the authority of
parental power and male dominance. The role of gossip is not also very different
for the boys from the parental perspective. Ayhan (20) says,
If one of my relatives sees me hanging around with a German
girl, then the next day everybody here and in Turkey hears this
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'unacceptable' thing. They start making gossip about me and
my family. They accuse my parents of not having been able to
grow good children.
Ayhan's statement underlines the fact that gossip is a strong means of social
control. As Marie Gillespie (1996: 154) has stated, gossip which focuses on
violations of moral codes, norms and values serves to reinforce them.
Furthermore, gossip reinforces the boundaries between insiders and outsiders in
the process of inter-ethnic relations as well as in that of intra-ethnic relations, i.e.,
German-Turkish and/or Ale vi-Sunni. Thus, gossip strengthens the sense of living
in a secure community space as opposed to the hegemonic culture, and also
provides a source of positive identity for the subordinated masses living in the
margin.
However, the youngsters are well aware of the limitations of Kreuzberg,
feeling secure is not enough for the youngsters. From time to time, the youngsters
express their willingness to move out. Kreuzberg indeed 'has a bad name', as I
have heard expressed in many conversations I had with the youngsters. Most of
the youngsters have no thought about their future prospects. Yet, they are not
content with their expectations. They complain about the stereotypical perception
of Kreuzberg held among the German employers and school administrations.
Devrim (17) made many job applications to do his obligatory praxis (Praktikum)
as a student. He had no positive response: "Of course, they don't accept me
because I am from Kreuzberg. I will keep applying." Mehmet (18) is another
youngster trying to study social pedagogy:
I am trying to be registered in one of these schools. I call them
to get some information. In the beginning of the conversation,
everything goes fine. I speak as good as the Germans without
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any accent. Then they start asking questions about my
background to get informed. When I tell them my name and
that I am living in Kreuzberg, suddenly the conversation
changes. The person who is on the other side of the line
hesitates for a while, it is like a silence for a second. Then he
tries to find some excuses to explain me that I am not eligible
for their school. Kreuzberg has a bad name. I am not eligible for
their school, simply because I am a Turk living in Kreuzberg.
These examples as well as some others, which have been described to me, indicate
that a Kreuzberg address by itself is a handicap when looking for job. I have not
been able to confirm this impression statistically, but I was convinced by those
youngsters, who were hopelessly applying for jobs, that this impression has some
truth in it.
The youngsters are also aware of the fact that moving out is very
difficult. Mehrnet (18) and his parents moved out for two years, and then came
back again: "it was very difficult for us to live outside Kreuzberg. All my friends
and relatives are living here. Here I feel much better although there are many
obstacles to living here." Affirming the importance of close ties is the fact that
many of those who can afford to move to a 'nicer' area do not. They stay and
repair their homes, reasserting the image of the community as a good place to
live. The expression of the wish for moving out, for social advancement, is
predominantly a class issue. It is the class difference which makes some people
express their wish to move out of this ethnic enclave more readily than the others.
Hikmet (30), a final year student of medicine, spoke of his intention to move out
for the future of his children. Ferat's (18) father who has a university degree and a
small-scale private enterprise also expresses his wish to move out for the future of
his only son.
179
Kreuzberg is a diasporic space for the working-class Turkish youth. It
gives the youngsters a complex sense of homing. On the one hand, as long as
these youngsters are surrounded by the signs, music, rhythms and major issues of
Turkey in the townscape of Kreuzberg, they will tend to have an 'imagined sense
of belonging' to the homeland Turkey which has been 'deferred' as a spiritual,
cultural and political metaphor. On the other, they will develop a strong sense of
homing to the 'Turkified' Kreuzberg due to the same reason.
Middle-Class Turkish Youngsters and the Question of Identhy
A good understanding of the social discourses of the working-class Turkish
diasporic youth partly depends on the incorporation of the class aspect into the
analysis. In this section, I will reflect upon the question of identity as it is
expressed by a middle-class Turkish youth group living outside Kreuzberg. As I
pointed out before, this is the group of youngsters who constituted the third
group of the research, B TB TM youth. At the end of their group discussions,
which they undertook within their own group under the supervision of Nurdan,
the head of BTBTM, they organised a youth festival (Jugendfest) where they
presented their views on various issues such as xenophobia, racism, hostility in the
media, generation conflicts, and specially the question of identity. The festival was
held in one of the multicultural venues of Berlin, Werkstatt der Kulturen, on the
18th of May, 1996. Barbara John, commissioner of Foreigners' Office, Ingrid
Staumer, senator of cultural affairs, Hayrettin Erkmenoglu, Turkish counsellor in
Berlin, German and Turkish media were in the audience.
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The festival was primarily set up in order to present to the audience how
'multicultural' and cosmopolitan the Berlin-Turkish youth was. The sense of
being 'multikulti' in all the spheres of daily life is a crucial symbolic capital for
these youngsters. Multiculturalism becomes a principal source of identity politics
for them. The multicultural capital provides them with a sense of recognition by
German society. This is the way they gain access into the mainstream culture.
They extensively use the term 'multikulti' in expressing their music taste, disco
taste, friendships, life styles, and their neighbourhood. In this sense, the selection
of the folklore, dance and music performances for the festival was made to
underline their multicultural image: a Jewish music group, an amateur German
dance company called 'Multikulti', a Turkish folklore group, and a Kurdish
folklore group. B TB TM youths were also very curious about not calling the
festival as 'Tiirkische Jugendfest' because they were keen on showing their
cosmopolitan and multicultural identity.
Besides the discourse of multiculturalism, which became apparent in the
festival, another crucial point was displayed by the youngsters: the correlation
between representation and the question of identity. These are the youngsters who
are mostly represented in both German and Turkish media in Berlin. Berlin-Turks
are proud of them, because these youngsters are the 'good' representatives of the
Turks living in Berlin, and they are the ones who have been able to integrate into
the German society 'without losing their Turkishness'. Germans are also proud of
them because these youngsters represent 'how well' the German integration
policies have been working.
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It is evident that contemporary discussions on identity are partly related to
the dominant regimes of representation in the media. It was striking for me to
realise in the course of the research that it was the middle-class youth who
attempted to draw attention to the 'question of identity' rather than the working-
class Turkish youth. The working-class youths, who are relatively away from the
manipulation of media, seem to be quite content with their identity without
problematising it. On the other hand, since the middle-class youths have been in a
dialogical relation with the media, they tend to conceive the 'identity question' as
granted. The way these youngsters raised the issue of identity was, in fact, a
reflection of their representation in the media.
The question of identity is mostly problematised by the media in a way that
influences the identity formation process of ethnic minority youth. The middle-
class youths give response to their own representation in the media. What they
discussed in the Jugendfest was not their own identity problems. What they did
was, in fact, having a 'chatter about the chatter' about their identity. The chatter
about their identity which they chattered was the chatter made up by the media.
This is like the chatter about the sport that we chattered about, not the sport itself
as a practice (Eco, 1986: 162163).63 Thus, we rather tend to discuss about what
is represented to us by the media, but not about the event itself. In addition to
their difference from the working-class youth in terms of their problematisation of
the identity issue, the middle-class youngsters also have a different sense of place
in the diaspora. Unlike the working-class Turkish youth, they do not feel any
Umberto Eco atributes to the 'chatter about chatter about sport' in order to express the
impact of the press on the interpretations which we consider as our own.
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attachment to the places they are living in. They rather attach themselves to the
'multikulti' city of Berlin. In what follows, I will shortly examine their sense of
place and home in the diaspora.
Middle-Class Turkish Youth: Cosmopolitan self and Heimat (vatan)
The middle-class Turkish youth has rather a cosmopolitan understanding of home.
They mainly express that they miss Turkey when they are in Germany, and miss
Germany when they are in Turkey. They rather feel an affinity with Berlin rather
than with their neighbourhood and Germany. What strikes them in Berlin is its
multicultural character. Multilocality is very determinant in their identification of
themselves as well. Gulten (17) expresses her feelings about home in such a way:
Home is where you are living, and where your friends are. For
the time being, home is both Germany and Turkey for me, I do
not want to define home actually. Home itself should attract
you. I am still in search of home. Home should be something
wk depends on your way of life. I miss Germany when I am in
Turkey. Mine is something cosmopolitan, something which I
will never be able to define. Both Turkish and German. We take
the good parts of both. This is a richness.
They all either have dual citizenship, or are in the process of gaining it.
They see dual citizenship as being equal to the Germans, and having a
cosmopolitan identity. For instance, if they have a problem with the police, they
state that the police have a tolerant behaviour towards the Turks having German
passport, and that "they can't ask you stupid questions like 'Where are your
residence documents?". This group of youngsters is much more mobile compared
to the working-class youth. They sometimes prefer to go to other countries for
vacation such as USA, Morocco, Spain and France. Another advantage of
German citizenship appears in this case, i.e. there is no need for a visa to go to
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other European Union countries. However, some youngsters insist on not having
German citizenship. Dilek (18) is one of them. She does not want to have German
citizenship because:
[T]he Germans want to assimilate us. If I have German
citizenship, then I will be doing what they want me to do. I
don't want to. As a Turkish citizen who was born here, I must
have the same rights as the German citizens. This is
discrimination and racism, and I am fighting this. I am against a
given identity. As long as they don't accept dual citizenship, I
won't get the German citizenship.
Having a cosmopolitan identity, the middle class youth, in fact, seeks social
change in their country of settlement. On the other hand, the disadvantaged
working-class youth, as Brake states, "is not anti the prevailing social order, but
seeks a place within it" (Brake, 1980: 26). By raising the question of identity, they
aim to negate the way they are presented by the German media which
homogenises the German-Turkish youth. In the context of Turkish diasporic
youth, another crucial difference between the two youth cultures is that the form
and style of the working-class youth culture is mediated by the local
neighbourhood whilst that of the middle-class youth culture is mediated by the
translocal class orientation. Apart from the fact that Berlin-Turkish youths have a
multicultural competence, there is also another general aspect worth mentioning,
i.e., their linguistic competence which enables them to switch codes as they find
appropriate.
Language and 'code-switching'
Berlin-Turkish youth, be it working-class or middle-class, undoubtedly manifests
relationships of 'boundary transgression' by means of linguistic competence.
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Turkish youths have a peculiar language of their own. They speak a creole
language. It is a mix of Turkish, German and American-English. This new form of
city speech in the migrants' suburbs is a verbal celebration of ghetto
multiculturalism, twisting German, Turkish and American slang in resistance to
the official language. Leaving aside the American slang which they pick up from
the movies and songs, they habitually switch between Turkish and German, and
sometimes between three languages Turkish, Kurdish and German. Although
imperfectly, the youngsters tend to use all these languages at once in order to
express themselves. In linguistics, this is called code-switching. S. Poplack (1980:
588) defines code-switching as "the alternation of two [or more] languages within
a single discourse, sentence, or constituent". Poplack states that there are three
major types of switching: i. intra-sentential switching; ii. inter-sentential switching;
and iii. tag-switching, or emblematic switching.
i. Intra-sentential switching: This type of switching includes the switches
made within a sentence.
example:	 Nezaman Fahrpriifung yapacaksin?
(When are you going to get the driving test?)
This type of switching may well be made by all the youngsters from each segment
of the community. It does not really require a full competence in both languages.
This is the common switching type which the working-class Turkish youngsters
mostly repeat.
ii. Inter-sentential switching: These type of switches occur between
sentences. Each clause or sentence is uttered in one language or another.
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Proficiency in both languages is the precondition of this switching mode because
major portions of the utterance must conform to the rules of both languages.
example:	 Ben bir zamanlar çok kitap okurdum. Ab und zu
hab' ich mal so 'n Drang was zu lesen.
(Once upon a time I used to read a lot. Time to
time Ifeel a desire to read something.)
The B TB TM youngsters, who were in the Gymnasium, were often repeating the
inter-sentential switching in their mutual conversations. On the other hand, the
working-class Turkish youths were not capable of switching inter-sentially as well
as the others, since they had a lack of grammatical knowledge on Turkish and
German.
iii. Tag-switching, or emblematic switching: This type involves the
insertion of an exclamation. Poplack (1980) calls this type of switching
'emblematic switching' because it serves as an emblem of the bilingual character
in a monolingual sentence. Emblematic switching is also quite common for any
youngster.
example:	 Ich meine, ben de kitap okumasini seviyorum.
(I mean, I like reading too.)"
Sociolinguistically code-switching may well have some functions for the bi-lingual
utterer. Rene Appel and Pieter Muysken (1987: 118) have pointed out the
following functions of code-switching. Firstly it has referential function for the
utterer to fill in the lexical gaps of one language. Since the speaker does not know
the exact equivalent of a word, s/he consciously tends to switch to the other
language. Secondly, it has directive function for the speaker to involve and/or to
The examples for code-switching were taken from the unpublished paper of Hasim
Anik and Fugen Sengun (1995).
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exclude a person from a part of the conversation. Thirdly, it may have an
expressive function for the speaker to express her/his transcultural identity.
Fourthly, it may have a phatic function for the utterer to emphasise something in
his/her utterance by changing the speech-tone and the language. In the fifth place,
code-switching may have a metalinguistic function for the speaker who want to
impress the others by showing his/her linguistic skills. Finally, it may also have a
poetic function in switching puns and jokes.
Apart from these types of code-switching, the youth may make other mix-
ups between Turkish and German due to the different grammatical character of
the languages. Turkish language springs from the Ural-Altaic language family like
Finnish, Hungarian, Mongolian and Korean languages. Turkish is from the Altaic
group as Mongol and Korean. All these languages share three common features.
These features are namely agglutination, vowel harmony and lack of grammatical
gender. Turkish is a language without any article and with many suffixes. This is
the reason why the Turkish youngsters tend to adopt German nouns without any
article, and they sometimes add suffixes for case- and plural-marking.
example a:	 Burda Grundschulen once Kindergarten ' gitmek sart.
(It is obligatory here to attend the Kindergarden before the
primary school.)
-den : Ablative case in Turkish
-e	 : Dative case in Turkish
example b:
	 Yasak yerlere grafiti yaptigin zaman Ruhm oluyor.
(When you make graffiti on the illegal places, you get fame.)
-un: Genitive case in Turkish
example c:	 En çok Action-movieij seviyorum.
(1 like the action-movies most.)
-ler: Plural marking + -i: Accusative case in Turkish
They also sometimes mix verbs by paraphrasing with the Turkish verbs.
They usually use the German infinitive verbs in combination with the Turkish
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auxiliary verbs of yapmak (to do, to make).... . etmek (e.g. devam etmek: to carry
on), and olmak (to be).
example a:
	
Kimleri einladen etmek istiyorsun?
(Whom do you want to invite?)
example b:
	 Ceketini neden abmachen vapmivorsun?
(Why don't you take off your jacket?)
example C:	 Dun olanlari gordugum zaman überraschen oldum.
(When I saw what happened yesterday, I got surprised.)
The language which is used by the working-class Turkish youth is basically called
Kanak Sprak. 65
 Kanak sprak should, in fact, be written as 'kanake sprache' in
German, but this is the way the Turkish youngsters vernacularise it like many
other examples. They quite often spell the words in the way they are pronounced.
The words which are written on the cover of the tape of rap group Cartel are
quite instructive in this sense. The group have written the Turkish vernaculars of
the English and German words such as 'existira s4'esyal tenks' instead of extra
special thanks, 'ekistira glirlise' instead of exstra Grüsse (greetings), 'Asyatik
Varyors' instead of Asiatic Warriors, 'Getobilaster Turn' instead of
Ghettoblaster Team, and 'Kiroyzberg 36' instead of Kreuzberg 36.
*	 *	 *
To summarise, having to practice various life-worlds, the working-class
Turkish youth in Kreuzberg acquires the competence to behave appropriately in a
number of different arenas. There are linguistic, social and cultural boundaries
between their life-worlds (youth centre, street, school, household). The
'Kanak Sprak' is also the title of the book which has been written a Turkish writer,
Feridun Zaimoglu (1995). In his book, he has edited many brief articles written by some
Turkish youngsters in a wide variety fn)m the rappers to the Islamic fundamentalists. He
attempts to explore the street German used by the Turkish youth with their own
vemaculars. He ironically calls the world of the young Turks 'Kanakistan'.
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youngsters always have to translate and negotiate within and between these rigidly
defined boundaries. The way they behave in these life-worlds is imbued by the
conditions of the diasporic space in which they have been living. As far as it
constitutes a symbolic bridge and cultural continuum between the diaspora and
the homeland, Kreuzberg, 'Kielnes Istanbul', turns out to be the new home for the
youngsters. Kreuzberg provides the working-class youth with a 'fortress'
protecting them against the destabiising effects of racialisation, rising
unemployment, misrepresentation and discrimination. To put differently,
Kreuzberg serves as a security valve for the youngsters to soften the firm strokes
coming from the external world. The youngsters in Kreuzberg also develop a
'demotic' discourse against the dominant discourse of the majority society (ch.
Baumann, 1996). Their multiculturalism which develops in response to the
dominant ideology of multiculturalism (a form of high-culture) springs from their
own form of resistance.
This chapter has been concerned with the question of identity and how it
is predominantly related to representation and dominant discourse. In this sense, it
was noted how the middle-class Turkish youth is highly influenced by their
representation in the media. The German media tend to represent the Turkish
youth as a homogeneous group suffering an identity crisis while wedged between
two cultures. The media problematise the process of identity construction and
articulation by the Turkish youngsters. As depicted above, these youngsters, who
are responsive to the media, take their representation in the media as a starting
point to redefine their identity. Taking the 'identity crisis' as granted, the
youngsters tend to 'chatter about the chatter about their identity'. It was also
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stated that the multicultural discourse of the middle-class youth was essentially
shaped by their concern about integrating into the mainstream multiculturalism.
This is why their discourse of multiculturalism which is defined in relation to the
dominant discourse of multiculturalism is, by and large, different from that of the
working-class Turkish youth. Thus, this chapter has provided a ground for the
investigation of the working-class hip-hop youth culture in particular by
portraying the cultural identity formation processes of the working-class minority
youth has been portrayed in relation to that of the middle-class youth. The
following chapter will elaborate the primary features of the expressive hip-hop
culture among the Turkish youths living in Kreuzberg.
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CHAPTER 5
CULTURAL IDENTITY OF THE TURKISH HIP-HOP
YOUTH IN KREUZBERG
The previous chapter portrayed the prevalent life-worlds of the diasporic Turkish
youth in order to demonstrate the major constituents of their identity formation
processes. This chapter primarily sets Out to delineate the process of cultural
bricolage and the cultural sources that shape the processes of identity formation
of the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth. Being subject to a kind of structural
outsiderism, the working-class ethnic minority youths tend to celebrate their past
and cultural authenticity. This tendency becomes apparent in their rising
orientation to their homeland, religion and ethnicity which thus become their
main cultural sources. Secondly, I shall describe both the particularist and
universalist constituents of the Turkish hip-hop youth culture in Kreuzberg. The
particularist components of their leisure culture are 'âlem' (meeting with
friends), dugllns (wedding ceremony) and arabesk music, while the universalist
ones are rap, graffiti, dance and 'cool' style. Turkish hip-hop youngsters tend to
express themselves by means of these expressive forms of culture as they are
seldom represented positively in the German media. In mapping out the main
framework of the cultural identity formation process and leisure culture of these
youngsters, I shall demonstrate the multicultural competence of ethnic minority
youths.
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Cultural Sources of Identity Fonnation Process Among the Thrkish Youth
As it was outlined in Chapter 1, the modem individual has recently become
subject to the simultaneous interplay of the global and the local (glocal). In the
age of glocallsm, individuals and groups tend to form new identities by going
back to basics. In this process of cultural identity formation, 'authentic' culture,
ethnicity and what is related to the homeland become an important source of
identity politics. Next, I shall examine these sources in order to display the
particularist elements of the cultural identity of the Turkish hip-hop youth.
Orientation to homeland
Orientation to the homeland can be perceived as one of the primary sources of
identity for the diasporic youth. The diasporic youth tends to see Turkey as a
shelter to protect themselves from their exclusion and ghettoisation in the public
sphere, and to feel a sense of belonging. The symbolic bridge between the country
of settlement and the homeland is built by means of regular summer vacations
(izin), by listening to pop and rap music originating both in Germany and Turkey,
and by an interest in famous football players like Tayfun playing in European level
teams like Fenerbahçe. All three are examples of how the advancement of the
means of transnational communications and transportation multiplies the diasporic
communities' orientation to their homelands.
Orientation to the homeland is a never-ending issue for the Turkish
communities in Berlin. Although there is a broad typoiogy of different
communities among the Turkish minority, orientation to the homeland is
practically identical within almost all the communities. An obvious example are
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religious groups, who form various kinds of diasporic communities separated by
strong boundaries from German society. These groups survive with the cultural
and religious baggage they brought from Turkey, and prefer not to interact with
the majority society. However, nationalist groups and left-wing secular groups,
too, although they prefer to interact with the majority society, are also largely
oriented to homeland affairs such as Turkey's internal politics and economic
situation, which are often discussed in the traditional Turkish cafés, meeting
places and leisure time activities.
The mythified summer vacations (izin) remain the main aspect of
orientation to the homeland. The annual journey to Turkey has always been a
great source of amusement for the youngsters. Previously, the rationale behind the
izins was mainly to visit relatives. Nowadays, the vacations have mainly become a
journey to the land of sun and beaches. Before the Yugoslavian war, driving by
car all the way through eastern Europe from Germany to Turkey was the most
convenient way of travel. Most of the youngsters now talk about those days with
nostalgia: the fun they used to have on the way with all the other family members
and relatives; the enthusiastic impatience to arrive at the Turkish border,
Kapikule; leaving the land of 'oppression' and 'discipline' behind; and living the
journey with a feeling of 'full freedom'. Now, the children of those days have
grown up, and they prefer to go to Turkey with their own friends by plane as
quickly as possible. The dreamy journeys of the past have only remained in the
pictures taken during travels, in the nostalgic thoughts and conversations within
the family.
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Music is another primary aspect of the youngsters' orientation to Turkey.
The rapidly growing market of pop music in Turkey has also influenced the young
generation of Turkish pop-music singers in Germany. Recently, the music market
in Turkey has become a significant career opportunity for a large number of pop
and rap music singers in the Turkish diaspora. Accordingly, many Turkish-origin
singers returned to settle in Turkey in order to have a share in the Turkish music
market. 66 For instance, Cartel, a German-Turkish rap group to which I shall
return in the next chapter, sold more than 300,000 copies of the album, called
Cartel, in Turkey in 1995. There are dozens of Turkish music stores in Kreuzberg
selling Turkish pop, arabesk, rap and folk music albums and arranging public
concerts with the singers coming from Turkey.
In the Turkish discos of Berlin, the youngsters listen to these German-
Turkish singers as well as the ones from Turkey. Listening to Turkish music,
drinking Turkish Efes beer, and remembering the summer loves and vacations in
Turkey, the youngsters construct a kind of imaginary journey back to Turkey. The
infusion of Turkish pop music into the Turkish discos in Germany, and dancing to
the rhythm of the Turkish pop singer Yonca as well as to Madonna, also gives the
youngsters self-esteem -one which grows with one's own cultural capital
(Trauffetter, 1995). The dancing spaces in the discos, which are dominated by
Tarkan, Candan Erçetin, Ozcan Deniz, Azer Bülbiil, Sibel Sezal, Can Kat, Cartel,
Erci-E, Karakan, Bay X, Rafet El Roman, Ahmet and Urilu are some of these singers
and/or groups. There are also some other singers coming from other countries such as
BenDeniz (Switzerland), and Cemali and Ozlem Tekin (USA). It is ironic that not only
Turkish origin singers and/or groups are coming to Turkey to seize a share in the
expanding Turkish pop music market, but also some non-Turkish singers are coming into
the market with Turkish lyrics such as 'Endi ye Pol' (Andy and Paul are English pop
singers and they print their names with Turkish vernacular). For further information, see
Greve (1996, 1997) and Köhne and Kepenek (1997).
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what is Turkish, serve as a kind of imaginary remigration to the homeland and to
the past. This imaginary remigration is the precondition of the solidarity network
among the youngsters. This group setting also resembles a part-time diasporic
community formation that excludes what is German. What these youth groups
form in these spaces is a kind of part-time communitarianism that provides them
with a political response to their exclusion from the public space in Germany.
Football is another crucial aspect of the orientation of the diasporic
Turkish youth to their homeland. Most of the youngsters fanatically support one
of the leading Turkish teams. When I was conversing with some of the youngsters
in the Naunyn Ritze youth centre, talking about football warmed up the
conversation quite rapidly. A thirteen year-old boy, a fan of Galatasaray, asked
me which team I supported. When I said I was a fan of Fenerbahce, the
iraditional rival of Galatasaray, we had a very lively conversation revolving
around football. For a considerable number of Turkish youths, playing football
provides a chance for social mobility. Although they may now play for a Berlin
youth team, these youngsters aspire to playing in one of the first league teams of
Turkey (Table 7).
Altinordu	 1995
	
100
	
100
Berlin Türkspor	 1965
	 524	 503
BSC Agrispor	 1984
	
319
	
255
Hatayspor	 1981
	
130
	
130
Hilaispor	 1987
	
211
	
211
Karadeniz	 1987
	
78
	
78
SG Anadoluspor 	 1978
	
343
	
211
1978	 455
	
441
Table 7. Major Turkish Football Teams in Kreuzberg
Source: Der Bezirksbürgermesiter von Berlin -Kreuzberg, 01.01.1996
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Religion and ethnicity
Apart from the orientation to homeland, there are other forms of cultural sources
that shape the cultural identity of the Turkish hip-hop youth: religion, ethnicity
and their reception in Turkey. Religion is a particularly influential cultural source
of identity for the diasporic Turkish youth. The celebration of Islam among the
diasporic Turkish youth springs, in part, from the German society's perception of
them. The majority society tends to employ Islam as a symbolic instrument to
define the Turkish youth and it is used in turn by the youngsters themselves. For
instance, one of the rap groups, to which I shall return shortly, calls itself Islamic
Force, although they have nothing to do with radical Islam. This kind of identity
manifestation seems to indicate a growing kind of what Vertovec (1995: 13) calls
'cultural Muslim identity' among young Turks.67
The stress on religion is usually something they adopt from their parental
culture as part of their negotiation with the majority society. The way the youth
employs religion as a source of identity is quite distant from essentialist. This is a
form of what Herbert J.Gans (1979: 6) calls 'symbolic ethnicity':
[A]s the functions of ethnic cultures and groups diminish and
identity becomes the primary way of being ethnic, ethnicity
takes on an expressive rather than instrumental function in
people's lives, becoming more of a leisure-time activity and
losing its relevance, say, to earning a living or regulating family
life. Expressive behaviour can take many forms, but often
involves the use of symbols -the symbols as signs rather than
myths. Ethnic symbols are frequently individual cultural
practices that are taken from the older ethnic culture; they are
abstracted from that culture and pulled out of its original
mooring, so to speak to become stand-ins for it.
67 In his research on the young Muslims in Keighley, West Yorkshire, Vertovec (1995)
drew our attention to two Asian football teams called 'Keighley Young Muslims' and
'Keighley Muslims' in order to expose the construction and articulation of 'cultural
Muslim identity' among young Muslims.
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Gans' expression of symbolic ethnicity is quite applicable to the situational use of
ethnicity and religion by the Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin. As a response to the
extreme right-wing German militancy, arson attacks and governmental integration
policies towards the privileged Aussiedler and Ubersiedler (ethnic German
expatriates), working-class Turkish youths began to politicise themselves to win
space in the urban landscape. In the process of politicisation, the youngsters have
extensively invested in ethnic symbols such as religious and national days, ethnic
foods, attachment to homeland, return to the histoty of homeland and religious
and/or ethnic figures.
There are some other sources of identity for the diasporic Turkish youth
i.e., ethnic symbols which appear in the form of either ornaments or tattoo. These
symbols usually refer to a covert way of communication amongst the youngsters.
Kreuzberg is a place where a stranger could gain the trust of the youngsters in a
short while by means of ethnic symbols. Ethnic symbols make communication
easier, since they express the distinction between 'us' and 'them'. But one should
be careful in mapping Out the symbolic meanings of these ornaments because they
might be put on for fashion as well as for ethnic and political identifications.
Ethnic symbols are diversified according to ethnic and political
allegiances. In this sense, the most popular ethnic symbols for right-wing Turkish
nationalists are a Turkish flag, a grey wolf with a crescent moon, and a Koran
necklace; and for the Alevis the forked sword (Züfiu1cdr), the picture of the
Chaliph All and/or Pir Sultan Abdal levi patron saint, 16th century) holding a
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baglama68 in his hands. Before the Sivas affairs in 1993, Alevis used to keep these
symbols in the form of picture on the walls of their rooms. Now, those symbols
have become one of the main sources of identity for the Ale vi youngsters.
Previously Ale vi youngsters also carried Turkish flags on their belt buckles, for
instance. After the arson attacks in MöIIn and Solingen, the Ale vi youngsters used
their Turkishness as the main base to articulate their reaction. Subsequently, in
response to the killings of the Ale vi intellectuals and people in Sivas and Gazi
Ma/jallesi, they qualified this articulation by symbolically highlighting their
Alevism.
Reception of Diasporic Youth in Turkey: German-like (Alinanci)
The Identity formation of the diasporic youth results in a permanent dialogue
between the country of settlement and the homeland. For instance, the reception
of the Turkish diasporic youth in Germany and Turkey has an impact on their
daily politics of identity. The overwhelming orientation of the Turkish youngsters
to the homeland is both accelerated and disrupted by the official and popular
discourses in Germany and Turkey. Considering how they are alluded to by the
official German discourse ('Gastarbeiter', 'Ausländer', 'Mitburger'), they are
always represented either through their 'otherness' or through their
'displacement' (caglar, 1994: 97).
Turkish migrants and their children in Germany are officially defined in
Turkey as either 'gurbetci', or 'Almanya'daki vatandaslarimiz' (our citizens in
Baglama is a musical instrument having a guitar-like body, long, and strings, that are
plucked or strummed with the fingers or a plectrum. Baglama has always been one of the
main symbols of the Alevi culture.
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Germany). German-Turks are stereotypicaily defined by the Turkish people in
Turkey as either 'Almanyali' or 'Almanci'. Both terms carry rather negative
connotations in Turkey. The major Turkish stereotypes about the German-Turks
are those of their being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in
Germany, losing their Turkishness, and becoming more and more German. caglar
(1994: 98) defines those stereotypes as:
[t]he heavily overloaded cars packed with household goods that
they bring from Germany for their houses in Turkey; their
pretentiousness and readiness to pay any price when shopping;
their different styles of dress and such details as the way their
girls walk;... [their] readiness to pay more than local inhabitants
for land, apartments, and brides.
Implicitly derogatory in its markedness, in its explicit differentiation from a non-
emigrant Turk, the label bears witness to a combination of difference, lack of
acceptance, and rejection (Mandel, 1990: 158). Their Turkish language and the
way they dress is also determinant in the construction of an 'Almanci' image. The
youngsters are also subject to this labelling. Mehmet (18) explained one of the
memories he had from Ankara:
I was buying some clothes in a shopping centre in Ankara.
When I was talking to the salesperson, a girl whom I did not
know suddenly approached me and asked a question. "Excuse
me, are you from Germany because I bet with my friend over
there that you come from Germany." I did not understand how
they realised. I think because of the way I spoke to the
salesperson, or the way I dressed up. I do not really know. I
mean, here we are called yabanci (foreigner), and there in
Turkey, in my own country, they call us 'Almanci'. I am
depressed about that moment.
"[H]ere we are called yabanci (foreigner), and there [in Turkeyl...they call us
Almanci" Such a line remains a very common discourse amongst the German-
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Turkish youth. Almanci designates someone who has adopted Germany, and
yabanci refers to being a foreigner in the country of adaptation. The youth
considers these two given distinctions in the process of their identity formation.
The orientation to the homeland of the children of Turkish immigrants
has always been a concern for scholars. Some of them argue that decreasing
contact with the homeland will result in the loss of home (Kagitçibasi, 1987;
Abadan-Unat, 1985). Explaining the alienation and exclusion of the first and
second generations by the majority society, Kagitcibasi (1987: 199) differentiates
the two generations:
The first generation hangs on to his traditional culture and
identity, often as a defensive reaction to rejection by the
dominant culture. This tendency is further strengthened by
frequent visits to the country of origin and continuing close ties
with family and kin. He carries his original national cultural
identity with him. The second generation 'foreigner', born in
Europe, however, does not really have such a distinct identity
(at least not to the same degree) to hang on to. He may even
lack the language of the original country, being thus deprived of
meaningful interpersonal ties through visits home. There is, in
fact, no 'home' for the deculturated or culturally impoverished
second generation in a state of alienation (italics mine).
Kagitçibasi, in her statement, seems to disregard the increasing impact of the
global interconnectedness and symbolic links between the subject and homeland.
What emerges out of all these symbolic bonds is an 'imaginary homeland'. What is
more, she also tends to essentialise culture as a practice by defining the youth as
'deculturated' and 'culturally impoverished'. Furthermore, she seems to reduce
the cultural identity of the diasporic youth to an essentialist form of 'Turkish
culture'. Here, cultural identity is not seen as a process but as being something
fixed and essential. In fact, cultural identity is rather acquired and renewed in a
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continuous dialogue between self and external world. It is a dialogical process in
which self is constructed collectively in relation to the 'other'. Contrary to what
Kagitcibasi claimed, the orientation of the Turkish diasporic youth to Turkey has
not declined, rather increased. The growing cultural interaction between Turkey
and the diaspora has undoubtedly facilitated the orientation of the diasporic
communities to the homeland.
Working-Class Turkish Youth Leisure Culture
The leisure culture of the working-class Turkish hip-hop youngsters consists of
various components originating either from their parental culture or from global
hip-hop youth culture. These constituents are namely 'álem' (meeting with
friends), dügüns (wedding ceremony), arabesk music, rap, graffiti, dance and
'cool' style. 'Alem', duguns and arabesk are those leisure time activities which
derive from their working-class and/or rural-origin parental culture. These events
are the other fqrms of orientation to the homeland, whereas rap, graffiti and dance
are the main constituents of the global hip-hop youth culture which a considerable
number of diasporic Turkish youth have internalised. In what follows I shall
describe both the particularist and universalist constituents of leisure culture
among the working-class Turkish hip-hop youth living in Kreuzberg.
The working-class Turkish youngsters mostly 'hang around' together
and entertain themselves in group meetings which take place in one of the
youngsters' house. They call these meetings 'álem' and themselves 'álemci'.
Alem'is a ritual which has been carried from 'sila' (home) to 'gurbet' (diaspora)
by the migrants. In these ritualised meetings, they drink alcohol, listen to arabesk
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music, and experience imaginary journeys back home. 69 These events, organised
among close circles of friends, provide a ground for the consiruction of a 'part-
time communitarianism' within the male youth groups. Listening to arabesk
music, talking about summer vacations, and drinking 'Raki' or 'Efes', the
youngsters recreate the homeland in their imagination.
Another aspect of their leisure culture is the wedding (dügun) ceremonies
which take place in the specially designed Turkish wedding saloOns such as
Dedem (Wedding) and Burcu (Kreuzberg). Turkish wedding ceremonies in Berlin
are not so different from their equivalents in Turkey. Both are very working-class
oriented rituals and similar in terms of the performances of the folk music singers,
arabesk singers, and folk dances with a double-sided drum (davul) and a double-
reed instrument (zurna). 7° This type of wedding ceremony is a ritual brought by
the rural migrants to the urban space. Dancing on davul-zurna for the migrants is,
in fact, an imaginary journey back home and back to the previous rural life. The
ritual is itself authentically performed in the open air in the villages and rural
towns of Anatolia, because Davul-zurna is such a combination of musical
instruments that it should preferably be performed in the open air due to its high-
volume. Thus, davul-zurna performances, which are accompanied by guests' folk
dances in the wedding saloons, mostly bring about a kind of chaos. Urbanisation
has transformed some rituals. Wedding ceremonies, which used to reproduce the
communal pride in the rural space, have now been carried into the urban space.
° The word 'âlem' literally means amusement and/or entertainment.
7° Zurna is a kind of authentic Turkish musical instrument having a flute-like body with
shrill pipe usually accompanied by a drum.
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There are some main reasons why the guests go to wedding ceremonies.
Firstly, they want to entertain themselves; secondly, they conceive it as a duty to
go to the weddings and to give a gift (mostly money and/or gold) 7 ' to the new
couple, with the consideration that their own children will get married someday;
and sometimes to meet friends and/or relatives who live a long distance away. In
one of the weddings to which I was invited by Yiiksel, the owner of a music store
in Adalbertstrasse, what was remarkable was the golden jewellery worn by the
youngsters. It was an Ale vi wedding of a couple originating from the city of
Erzincan (eastern Anatolia), and the gold necklaces of Zllkdr sword and of Pfr
Sultan Abdal in various sizes were obviously the most popular ornaments among
the Ale vi youngsters, reflecting their allegiance to ethnic symbols. Apart from
symbolising the ethnic/religious/peer group values, gold is also a dramatisation of
wealth.
Another crucial aspect of the wedding ceremonies worth mentioning is the
selection of the singers and groups by the hosts. The selection of famous and
popular groups and/or singers by paying big amounts yields a distinction to the
parents of the couple, especially that of the groom. In most weddings, although
the parents of the groom are not able to afford big expenses, they do their best in
order to gain a superior social status within the community.
Folk dance is an indispensable part of the wedding ceremonies both in
Turkey and in the diaspora. In modern urban Turkey, the circle folk dances
71 caglar (1994: 196) states that 'although the hemsehris of the bride and groom do not
feel obliged to pin gold on the bride any more, the amount of gold Turkish brides receive
in Germany is higher in comparison with Turkey.' For the hemsehris of the bride and
groom, it is a symbolic capital to have gold pinned on them in public.
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(halay) are closely identified with the countryside and almost everwhere seen as a
devaluation of country living. However, these dances are perceived as bearers of
ethnic identity by diaspora populations. In Berlin, elegant and urban Turks take
pleasure in dancing circle dances, whereas in Turkey, city people might prefer not
to identify with this type of folk dancing. It seems that in the diaspora
populations, the question of rural origin may be less significant than ethnic
identification, and the positive and valued aspects of it, including dance, music
and food. Besides providing a cultural distinction, circle dances also offer a sense
of collectivism to the diasporic communities. Collectivism is literally embodied in
the shape of the dance and the shared code of communication between the
dancers.72
So far in this chapter I have outlined the particularist aspects of the
working-class Turkish hip-hop youth leisure culture. Next, I shall outline the
common aspects of the global hip-hop culture, which serves to integrate a
significant number of working-class Turkish diasporic youths into the mainstream
youth culture.
Hip-hop Youth Culture and Working-Class Diasporic Turkish Youth
Hip-hop is a youth culture that enables ethnic minority youths to use both their
own 'authentic' cultural capital and the global transcultural capital in constructing
and articulating their identities. It provides the diasporic youth with a ground
72Gillian Bottomley (1987) touches on a similar tendency amongst the Greek diaspora in
Australia. She points out that Greek kalamatianos (a circle folk dance which is very
similar to Turkish folk dance halay) danced by young people in a Sydney club is not that
danced by villagers in Greece. This is because, she states, such a traditional ritual gives a
positive distinction to the diasporic youth from dominant Anglomorph population.
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where they can use their ethnicity as a strategising tool to articulate their identities
in response to the majority nationalism and racism. It also serves as a mechanism
to incorporate the ethnic minority youth into the global youth culture. The
youngsters' use of 'authentic' culture as a strategising tool in the process of
identity formation principally springs from their need to come to terms with the
unpleasant present pervaded by racism, unemployment, exclusion and poverty. As
Clifford (1988: 5) has rightly stated, the diasporic groups who are alienated by the
system and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West, no longer
invent local futures; what is different about them is that they remain tied to
traditional pasts and ethnicities. Remaking, or recovering, the past serves at least
a dual purpose for the diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way of coping with
the conditions of the present without being very critical about the status quo.
Secondly, it also helps to recuperate a sense of self not dependent on criteria
handed down by others -the past is what the diasporic subjects can claim as their
own (Ganguly, 1992: 40).
However, Turkish youngsters, while having a sense of looking backward,
also tend to transcend the exciusionist policies of the German nation-state by
exhibiting a transnational articulation of culture. In fact, what makes these
youngsters hip-hop youth are not those particularist cultural sources, but
universalist constituents. There are various ways in the global hip-hop culture
through which ethnic minority youths can resist the dominant regimes of
representations and incorporate themselves into the mainstream. Rap, graffiti,
dance, arid the 'cool' look are some examples. All these particular aspects of hip-
hop culture attempt to localise power and to create a distance between the
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already-excluded youth group and the legitimate forms of institutions such as
police, education and media. These are the attempts by the youngsters to get
away from the limited boundaries of the 'ghetto' life. This is a chance to broaden
the living boundaries in a way that leads to the incorporation of the youth into the
mainstream culture. By doing graffiti, rap, or breakdance, they all want to be 'da
King' ('da' is the vernacular of article 'the'). Roaming around the city, trying to
discover the outskirts of the urban landscape, painting and tagging (signing)
graffiti, attending break-dance competitions and parties, and fighting against rival
youths, they do all these things with, and within, the gang.
Hip-hop culture has become very popular among Turkish youngsters
since the late eighties. Especially, Turkish youngsters living in Kreuzberg at
around that time switched from gangsta group formation to hip-hop group
formation. 73 Taner (26) is one of the main figures of the Turkish hip-hop scene in
Berlin, who experienced this transformation:
Before the wall came down there were American discos where
the American soldiers used to go to. They carried the life in
America over to Berlin. They brought here all those DJing,
break-dance, white dancing gloves, and all those sorts of things.
Hip-hop started with the Americans here, with dance and music.
Then we, the Turks, have found ourselves in this culture. We
have grown up with two different musical taste: arabesk at
home and hip-hop in the American discos.
Hip-hop has provided these youths with a ground to incorporate into the
mainstream global youth culture. In what follows I shall describe the common
Gangsta groups in Kreuzberg drew great attention from both Turkish and German
media in Berlin. For further information, see "Ghetto Sisters," Magazine Die Brigitte 19
(1990): 125-132; "Vereint Jagd auf Skinheads," Daily Tagesspiegel Nr.13562 (6 May
1990); "Der Ha13 darauf, als Nichts zu gelten," Daily Saddeutsche Zeitung Nr.184 (11/12
August 1990); "Die Barbaren kommen!," Magazine Zity 4 (1993); and "Turk Kizlari
cetesi," Daily Tan (9 March 1990 - Turkish).
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constituents of the global hip-hop youth culture as much as they relate to the
Turkish hip-hop youth in Kreuzberg. As there will be a separate chapter on the
rap music and the rappers, I shall leave rap out for the time. Graffiti, dance and
'coolness' are the aspects to be examined in the following section.
Graffiti
The word 'graffiti', taken from Italian, served originally as the name of
inscriptions scratched on walls. The word is related to the name of a particular
technique of mural painting, that of 'sgraffito'. Today, other techniques are used
apart from scratching and/or carving: felt tip pens are used inside and on small
areas, aerosol spray cans are used outside and large areas. Regina Blume (1985)
has defined the motives for producing graffiti as: (a) a proof of existence -scribo,
ergo sum (I write therefore I am), (b) a need to express oneself, (c) a sense of
belonging to a group, (d) a pleasure in aesthetic, creative and physical acts, and
(e) an expression of boredom. 74 Having all these motives, graffiti, or tagging,
becomes a way of resistance against the formal life, sanctions of the adults, and
the legitimate world of the institutions. The world of graffiti is the youngsters'
other world because grown-ups do not read them, and also this is the world in
which the minority youth can express itself with its own vernacular language
without any restrictions or questionings.
Graffiti is a way of expression of the poverty of the urban 'ghetto', of
youngsters' territorial claims, and of their power. It is the freedom of writing
'Kanak' instead of 'Kanake', or 'masaka' instead of 'Masakker'. Writing graffiti
In her work on graffiti, Blume (1985) has explored the historical aspects, sources,
forms, functions and addresses of graffiti.
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on the forbidden walls like the metro stations is a kind of covert war waged
against the official authorities. Sneaking in the dark of the night with the spray
cans and masks without being captured by the police sounds like the
accomplishment of a 'mission impossible'. Graffiti, for the subaltern ethnic
minority youngsters, refers to the 'bombing' of the institutional space.
Constructing a counter-hegemonic space, the graffiti makers wage a war against
the power of state. These youngsters are the 'spray warriors', or the 'street
heroes', who fight against the official authorities for the localisation of power.
The youth localise their power in their graffiti and Street fights which provide
them with a sense of recognition by the public. This Hegelian sense of subjective
recognition could have a 'productive' context: 75 a youngster, for instance, could
come to transform himself as a thinking and active subject; and he could also
achieve his self consciousness in a dialogue of mutual recognition with the public.
Recently, the local authorities have tried to legitimise graffiti by using it as
an educational tool for the kids and youngsters. For instance, the graffiti on the
walls of the Admiralstrasse is an attempt to warn the youngsters against the
dangers of drug and violence and to strengthen the feeling of neighbourhood
(Figure 4).
Graffiti is also a source of distinction for the youth. To become famous, a
graffiti marker must go beyond his local boundaries in the city. The more tags
(personal signs) you have all around Berlin, the more popular you become within
The notion of 'productive' is free from its Hegelian and Marxist connotations which
imprisons the subject into an ideology of productionism. The term has rather a
Lefebvreian meaning which transcends crude and brutal economism.
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the hip-hop community. 'S/al' is a tag which I have seen almost all anmud lhtiin.
in Schoneberg, Wedding. Kreuzberg and Tiergarten. 'JFK is the most p(plIl;11
--
Figure 4. Graffiti in Ad,niral.cira.c.cc . Kotbusser Tor."
graffiti group in Berlin. They always prefer to make graffiti in ihe most dangerous
places: the 'alls of metro stations or high buildings. It is also quite normal to see
a graffiti like '36 floiw ' all around the city, So that the group called '36 Boic' may
well he popular amongst the youngsters. and of course constitute a threat to the
police force, who are the 'enemy' for these youngsters. Eyüp. a 22-year-old hw
' "Dedicated to all st yle seekers and masters. Put your childish fights aside. it is tint
positive for our future atid the future of hip-hop. Our heart has taken us further still, not
the money, not the fame, or the drugs. Ever yone that is true to ihe game 'ill get their
share of the cakc...Bcrlin, one love. iiip-hoi."
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in Chip, quit making graffiti when he was let off by the police officers after his
apprehension:
I was tagging around four o'clock in the morning in Kotbusser
Tor metro station. After I finished my work, the police caught
me on my way home. I mean, I was pissed off with myself,
because they didn't see me tagging. They just saw the spray can
in my hand. I should have better hidden it. Anyway, they took
me to their car. I was extremely afraid that they were gonna
beat me and tell my parents that I was tagging. Then I was
surprised because they did not harm me, they just gave me a
speech about the violation of the rules, and then gave me a lift
up to my apartment. They even didn't tell my parents. I got
shocked really. Then I decided to quit doing these things. But, I
tell you, if I had been beaten by the police, I would carry on
tagging much more than I used to.
The Berlin graffiti scene is composed of Germans as well as the minority
youngsters. They have a bilingual graffiti magazine (German-English) called
Backiumps. The magazine consists of written and figurative form of graffiti
samples from Berlin and other urban centres such as New York, Paris, London
and Melbourne. The graffiti artists also have a transnational connection with the
hip-hop scene in the other European cities like Paris, Amsterdam and London.
The language of graffiti is usually English. By using English as the graffiti
language, the Turkish hip-hop youngsters have both the feeling of sharing a code
of communication with the outside world, and of sustaining a resistance
movement against the supremacy of the German language. On the other hand, in
figurative graffiti, the common rule is to imitate others' figures, TV-cartoons, and
comics. All the figures in the graffiti made in many different countries look like
each other, with big eyes (as in the globalised Japanese TV-cartoons) and a style
of dressing similar to that of the American-black hip-hop scene (Figure 5) .
For further information, see Henkel et al. (1994).
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Adapting various aspects and colours from their ethnic arsenal, the youngstei-s
make their own additions to the globalised style of figurative graffiti. and build up
their local style of graffiti. Then, graffiti turns out to be a field where culture is
constructed on the basis of bricolage and hvbridity with the global and kxaI
motives.
it.
Figure 5. Graffiti in Ad,niralstra.c.ce. Kotbusser 'For.
Sometimes the graffiti artists might go further and have their own peculiar
style. This peculiar style pn.wicles them with the pssibility to switch to painting.
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Er/ian, or Gino, is one of them. Er/ian used to be a graffiti artist. Now, he is a
painter. Although he is just 18 years old, he has held many exhibitions in
Germany. He works in a workshop in the attic of the Naunyn Ritze youth centre.
The titles of his works are all English, e.g., 'Jump to the Future', 'Disappearing
Footsteps', 'Eagle Eyes', 'Birth of Virgin' and 'Dedicated to Hasan'. The use of
English gives him a sense of being incorporated into the global culture. It is
amazing to see the shift in his work from the figurative graffiti to painting. This
artistic switch has given his work a postmodern look. What he is providing the
audience with is a hybrid art composed of two distinct artistic forms: graffiti and
painting.
Dance
Break-dance is another constituent of the hip-hop youth culture. The dance-floor
has a three-fold function for the diasporic youth. Firstly, the dance-floor provides
the Turkish youth with a substantial ground for the homing of the diaspora
because they appear to be the 'hosts' in the dance-floor. Secondly, the dance turns
interethnic confrontations from fighting to dancing. As Ozcan (19), a Turkish
youngster in Naunyn Ritze, said 'there were previously fights in the streets, now
there is dance, we compete on the stage. I show my superiority by way of
dancing.' In doing so, hip-hop youth affirms the "sublimation of fight into dance,
of conflict into contest, of des, jation into stle and a sense of self-respect"
(Hebdige, 1988: 216). Finally, the dance is also another source of distinction that
the boys tend to use against 'others'. Previously, breakdance as a distinction was
convertible to economic capital: some of the Naunyn Ritze youngsters have made
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some money from participating in the break--dance competitions organised in
Berlin (Fiture 6).
Figure 6. A break-dance competition in the Naunrn Rite youth centre (1996)
CooI' Style
Cool is an American word which has become a ver y
 crucial motto of the
contemporary hip-hop youth culture. it literall y means	 (2) nOT affected by
passion or emotion... (3) lacking enthusiasm warmth of interest: lacking in
cordiality ... (5) (of jazz music, a jazz musician) restrained .ir relaxed in style...;
characteristic of those who favour relaxed music: good. excellent, admirably up to
date. stylish... ' Recentl y. especiall y since the early I 980s. the word 'cool' has
S Thc Oxi,rd En'lic/z Dictionan'. Oxford: Clarendon Press. I Q.
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been extensively used in hip-hop youth culture by blacks and Latinos living in the
United States. Ruth Horowitz (1983: 87-88) has defined 'coolness', in the context
of Chicano youth in Chicago, as the ability to stand back from certain situations
and rationally evaluate others' actions. The contextual use of 'cool' posits a
distance between the object and the subject who is using the word. Being cool,
looking cool, or staying cool has a critical connotation in itself. It is a way of
expressing a transcending reality for the youngsters.
In hip-hop culture, critical look is very crucial. It requires positioning
oneself at a reasonable distance to the external world, so that one can keep the
critical look. Unlike the recent techno, punk, or grunge cultures, one is never
supposed to get lost in the artificial world of entertainment, and s/he should
always keep her/his 'coolness'. An example is the way the rappers and their
groupies move in the concerts, or in their daily lives, which looks very serious and
masculine. This masculine posture symbolises resistance against subordination. It
gives the impression that these ethnic minority youngsters have been consciously
positioning themselves against cruelty, hostility and inequality which spring from
capitalism. Their cool style is a challenge against the hegemony of the dominant
regimes of representations. By looking so, the youngsters are also challenging, at
a symbolic level, the stereotypes of the outsiders about their indifference to life,
which may come from both the majority society and from middle-class Turkish
communities. The German society may have stereotypes about their violence and
vandalism, on the other hand the middle-class Turkish groups may treat them as
troublesome, lazy and non-integrationist. Thus, their cool style is, at the same
time, a response to the stereotypes of both Germans and Turks.
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The cool style which is performed in accordance with a critical posture has
also something to do with the way the youngsters dress. The clothes are chosen to
represent both a sense of freedom and an 'authentic' working-class bacidash.
Wide and comfortable outfits are a major part of the cool style. It symbolises
freedom and comfort as opposed to the traditional tight and stiff outfit. The way
the rappers and the break-dancers dress also represents the celebration of
working-class origin. Wearing wide overall trousers they resemble the mine
workers, or the construction workers. Hebdige (1987: 123-124) previously
defined the difference between the early youth cultures and their relation to each
other in terms of class:
[Plunk style was perhaps interpreted by the teddy boys as an
affront to the traditional working-class values of forthrightness,
plain speech and sexual puritanism which they had endorsed and
revived. Like the reaction of the rockers to the mods and the
skinheads to the hippies, the teddy boy revival seems to have
represented an 'authentic' working-class backlash to the
proletarian posturings of the new wave.
Departing from the statements of Dick Hebdige concerning the youth
'subcultures' of the earlier periods, hip-hop may well be considered the new form
of youth culture representing an 'authentic' working-class backlash to the
proletarian posturings of the 'new wave'. Yet, it goes beyond the notion of
'subculture' because the formation of ethnic minority hip-hop youth culture seems
to retain a more complex process which is characterised by globalisation and
modern diasporic consciousness.
The word 'cool' has become a transcultural notion and the motto of a
distinct youth style. It is evident that this word has quickly been adopted in many
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languages. Since culture is becoming more and more global and transnational, the
national languages become incapable of creating new words to comply with such
a rapid cultural change. German, French and Turkish are some of the languages to
which the word, 'cool', has infused without any resistance. German language has
even produced the antonym with the prefix of 'Un': 'uncool'.
Although 'cool' is a very global word, it might have many local
connotations in itself. The Turkish rappers' use of the word is, of course, a
cultural translation. Thus, the word might lose some of its content as well as
gaining some other connotations. MC Unal, pronouncing the word with a very
American accent, states that "what is cool in Berlin might not be considered cool
in Miinchen, for instance." Here, 'cool' refers to the acceptability of something
within hip-hop youth culture in a local sense. It intimates a local cultural code
depicting what might suit hip-hop culture. Incidentally, the word 'hip' is another
American word which likewise has an extensive use in the world. In slang, it
literally means (1) following the latest fashion in especially popular and jazz
music, clothes, etc., stylish...' 79 'Hip' is also a new word that has entered the
German language. It depicts trendy and stylish, such as a 'hip concert', 'hip
colour', or 'hip movie'.
Hip-hop youth szyle: A Cultural Bricolage
German-Turkish youngsters, at first glance, might seem as if they are practising a
conventional and essentialist form of cultural identity which they have taken out
of the ready-made package of cultural attributes carried across from homeland by
See The Oxford English Dictionaty. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
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their parents. Such a conclusion would be misleading because the formation and
articulation of cultural identity is a process, which is not free from the constant
intercourse between various social groups, classes and cultures. As Czarina
Wilpert (1989: 21) accurately states:
The significance of the concept of cultural identity within this
framework derives from the assumption that, in the
construction of a collective ethnic identity, culture becomes a
resource. It is not that culture, which may be in continual
transformation, is viewed as something static and fixed, nor that
an immigrant 'community' is considered to live as a
homogenous closed cultural entity within a foreign society.
Rather, elements of culture, its signs and symbols, may be
transformed or fified with new meaning and take on a new
significance in this process. This is accomplished in a particular
context at a specific moment in history in interaction with the
conditions and principles which structure the lives of the
immigrant descendants, and with reference to the resources they
have at hand for understanding the world around them...
Hereby, Wilpert reminds us of two significant points. The first point to be
considered is that reification of culture in the diaspora is a vital instrument to be
employed in the process of identity formation. The second point to bear in mind is
that the community culture formed in the diasporic space is not immune to the
allure of the culture of the wider society, unchanging, or always clear and
unambiguous; Kreuzberg is not a traditional little village cut off culturally,
socially, and ecologically from the majority society; its community culture cannot
be equated with that of Gemeinschaft (Töennies, 1957).
In this sense, there are at least three main landmarks that shape the
cultural identification of the German-Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin: a)
'authenticity' which is the expression of imagined Anatolian culture; b) global
culture which is mainly the imitation of urban Black American symbols; and c)
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German culture which refers to the life styles of German peer groups to which the
German-Turkish youngsters desire to adapt themselves. For instance, as outlined
in the previous chapter, the language used by the German-Turkish youth in Berlin
reflects a mixture of their Turkishness, Germ anness and cosmopolitan identity.
This refers us to the 'multiple cultural competence' of the descendants of
migrants 8° Modern diasporic communities like the Turkish diaspora in Europe
should learn to inhabit at least two identities, "to speak two cultural languages, to
translate and negotiate between them" (Hall, 1993: 310). People belonging to
such cultures of hybridity tend to gravitate either to 'Tradition' or 'Translation'.
Gravitating to tradition is an attempt to restore the former purity and authenticity
which are felt as being lost, whereas choosing translation acknowledges that
identity is subject to the play of history, politics, representation and difference
rather than being subject to purity (ibid.: 309).
What German-Turkish youngsters construct is a form of cultural bricolage,
or creolization, which literally means the interruption of the monolithic structure
of the nation-state in a way that leads to the emergence of a 'third space'
(Bhabha, 1994), or a 'third culture' (Featherstone, 1990). Cultural bricolage is
also what Homi Bhabha calls a 'differential communality', and what Felix Guattari
(1989: 14) refers to as the 'process of heterogenesis' By the 'processes of
heterogenesis' Guattari negates the Hegelian and Marxist dialectics whose aim is
the 'resolution' of opposites. He argues that "our objective should rather be to
nurture individual cultures, while at the same time inventing new contracts of
80 Alund (1992: 75) mentions 'double cultural competence' in the Swedish context to refer
to cultural bricolage of the immigrant youth simultaneously fitting both into their own
parental cultural identity and Swedishness.
218
citizenship: to create an order of the state in which singularity, exceptions, and
rarity coexist under the least oppressive conditions" (ibid.: 14). He describes this
formation "as a logic of the 'included middle', in which black and white are
indistinct, in which the beautiful coexists with the ugly, the inside with the outside,
the 'good' object with the bad" (ibid.: 14).
Cultural bricolage is, in a sense, constitutes a 'third space' that enables
other positions to emerge (Bhabha, 1994: 211). This creolization process brings
about the emergence of a transnational identity, or what Gilroy (1987: 13) calls a
'syncretic culture'. As Gilroy (ibid.) states, "culture does not develop along
ethnically absolute lines but in complex, dynamic patterns of syncretism". Cultural
identity is not something fixed and permanent, "it refers to becoming as well as
being, and is never complete, always in process" (Hall, 1991: 47). Thus, cultural
identity of the German-Turkish youth is formed on the basis of Continuous
dialogue between past and future, between homeland and country of residence,
between different worlds of meaning, between various life-worlds, between global
winds and local resistance, between 'roots' and 'routes', and between 'here' and
'there'. Gilroy's (1987, 1993) definition of a kind of duality of consciousness -
with direct reference to W.E.B. Du Bois' notion of 'double consciousness'
underlines diasporic individuals' awareness of multilocality which derives from
their attachments to those given continuous dialogues. The 'double
consciousness' of diasporic subject serves to bridge the gap between the local and
the global.
*	 *	 *
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To summarise, this chapter has indicated particularist and universalist
aspects of the Turkish hip-hop youth living in Kreuzberg. It was concluded that
the Turkish hip-hop youth has simultaneously developed a form of cultural
nationalism and a syncretic 'third culture'. The sources of their cultural
nationalism are two-fold: the first one is the majority nationalism which has
recently been quite hegemonic and even coercive in Germany. This point is
enormously important in view of what I will argue in the following pages because
it shows that ethnic identities are not simply the product of 'traditional mores',
but the result of an unequal conversation between majority and minority
groupings. Sandra Wallman (1978) suggests that boundaries and social
definitions are always the result of an encounter between at least two social
agents. She puts the focus on the ethnic majority -not on the minority
populations- because it is [majority] ethnicity, according to her, which
determines the boundary of 'them' and 'us'. The second source of this cultural
nationalism is the media, both German language media and Turkish language
media. In Berlin, one will immediately realise that Turks, or other ethnic groups,
are excluded in the German print media or radio-TV. In that way, the feeling of
exclusion and segregation for Turks may increase. They are, in a sense, forced to
get back to their own cultural and local settings by the structural adjustments. On
the other hand, as explained in the third chapter, international Turkish media and
Berlin-Turkish media insist on the notion of Turkishness to sustain the
particularist ethnic sentiments of the German-Turks.
The syncretic 'third culture' of the Turkish hip-hop youths derives from
their multicultural competence which enables them to switch between various
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cultures such as minority culture, majority culture and global culture. To put it
differently, they form their cultural identity through the hybridity of 'tradition' and
'translation', authenticity and syncreticism, heritage and politics. The practice of
cultural bricolage fosters a relationship among heterogeneous elements in a
meaningful ensemble which displays both harmony and tension. (Clifford, 1997:
12). This multicultural competence is acquired by means of lransnational
communications and transportation, sustaining the pace and density of
relationships of the diasporic youth with the homeland and the entire world. The
'third culture' that is formed by the diasporic youth, at the same time, has a
progressive nature. This syncretic culture, as Melucci (1989: 14) has correctly
stated, is "the journey into unfamiliar territory... [which] teaches us to recognise
ambivalence, encourages us to acknowledge different points of view, and thereby
stimulates awareness of potential freedoms..."
Hip-hop culture has emerged as a source of alternative identity formation
and social status for the Turkish diasporic youth living in an ethnic enclave whose
older local support institutions have been demolished. Alternative social identities
were formed in fashions and language, and in establishing neighbourhood crews
or posses. These crews, who are composed of hip-hop fans, artists, musicians, and
dancers, are new kinds of families providing insulation and support in a complex
and unyielding environment and may, in fact, contribute to the community-
building networks that serve as the basis for new social movements (Rose, 1994:
78). As this chapter was an attempt to interpret the discourses of Turkish hip-hop
fans, artists and dancers in Kreuzberg, I will explore those of the rappers in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
AESTHETICS OF DIASPORA: CONTEMPORARY
MINSTRELS
Hip-hop as a form of aesthetics of diaspora enables the descendants of migrants to
construct a syncretic culture entwined with diasporic consciousness and
transculturalism through the method of collage and by means of globalism. The
Turkish rappers in Berlin present an adequate example to expose the production
of cultural bricolage among a group of Turkish diasporic youth. Accordingly, this
chapter will map out the social identities and counter-hegemonic discourses of the
Turkish rappers in Berlin, and the rise of the Turkish hip-hop community in
Germany. There are many German-Turkish rap groups in Berlin, such as Cartel,
Islamic Force, Unal, Erci-E, Azize-A. The interviews held with the rappers will
be often quoted in order to expose the way they narrate their stories as
contemporary storytellers of the diasporic youth in the urban landscape. By doing
so, the rappers will have the ground to express themselves as in a virtuoso verbal
performance through an imaginative excursion. Besides describing the discourses
of those storytellers and/or organic intellectuals, the interviews with the rappers
are also essential to demonstrate the transcultural and transnational nature of
some diasporic youth cultures.8'
81 The rap group Cartel is represented in a slightly different way from the others, as most
members of the group originate outside Berlin. The only member of the group from Berlin
is Erci-E whom I interviewed separately.
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Rappers as contemporary minstrels, 'organic intellectuals' and storytellers
For someone who grew up listening to a very mixed variety of music ranging from
western classical music to Turkish classical music, someone who idealised the
sound of Eric Clapton, someone who felt attached to the Turkish protest music of
the eighties such as Zifü Livaneli, Yeni Türkz and Ezginin Giinlügll, and
someone who always switched between the western and eastern forms of music,
rap was not a natural transition for me. Although Turkey is a land of hybrid forms
of music of any type, rap was a taste that was difficult to acquire at first. Recently,
I have grown to greatly appreciate rap as an oppositional political practice. As it
became an academic interest of mine, I began to be amazed by the narratives,
stories and discourses of the rappers in particular.
The rappers I worked with during the course of my research in Berlin
made me conscious about their own social identities. The more I analysed their
lyrics and narratives, the more I realised that they are what Antonio Grarnsci
(1971)82 called 'organic intellectuals' and/or what Walter Benjamin (1973) called
'storytellers' of their own local communities. These two terms are quite
complementary in essence. Organic intellectual refers to the intellectual who
originates in subaltern groups, as in the urban ghetto communities. Gramsci's
(1971: 12) definition of 'organic intellectual' presupposes the existence of a
Antonio Grarnsci (1971) makes a differentiation between the 'professional intellectuals'
and 'organic intellectuals'. Professional intellectuals are attached to the state, whereas
organic intellectuals aim to improve socio-economic, political and cultural interests of
their communities. Professional intellectuals are the deputies of the State, and they have a
'mandarin consciousness'. Organic intellectual, on the other hand, must be an organiser of
the centrifugal forces. It should also be pointed out that the term 'organic intellectual' was
first used by Gilroy (1987: 196) to define the black London rapper Smiley Culture. For
further information, see also Decker (1992).
223
dominant class or group, exercising hegemony and domination on the subaltern
classes or groups, through the State and juridical government. The 'organic
intellectual' serves to raise the interests of his/her newly organised class or group,
who aim to be incorporated into the system and to take their place in the process
of distribution of resources. They attempt to disrupt the social, political and
cultural hegemony of the dominant groups. The Turkish rappers in Berlin try to
contribute to the formation of a sense of unified community as opposed to the
exclusion, segregation, misrepresentation and racism prevailing in the country of
adaptation.
A storyteller, on the other hand, "is a man [sic] who has counsel for his
readers.. .The storyteller takes what he tells from experience -his own or that
reported by others. And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are
listening to his tale" (Benjamin, 1973: 86-87). Benjamin also states that "the
storyteller joins the ranks of the teachers and sages" (ibid.: 107). Hence, the
rapper is an intellectual storyteller who has counsel for his/her audience, and who
wishes to mobilise his/her local community against the power of the hegemonic
and/or coercive group. The rapper also reminds us of what we are already inclined
to forget, i.e., the 'communicability of experience' which is destined to decrease.
In this sense, rap turns out to be a critique of the modern urban way of life which
disrupts the 'communicability of experience'. In other words, rap helps to
communicate symbols and meanings, articulating intersubjectively the lived
experience of social actors.
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Besides mapping out the rappers with these two terms -'organic
intellectuals' and 'storytellers', I will also define some of the rappers as
'contemporary minstrels'. It is a preferable formulation in the context of the
Turkish rappers because the notion of minstrel also has its equivalent in the
Anatolian cultural context. The medieval Turkish minstrels (halk ozani) were the
travellers who enlightened the masses with their lyrics accompanied by the sound
of a stringed musical instrument baglama. In the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, some of these minstrels used to write and sing poems against the
supremacy of the Ottoman rule over the peasantry. They were the spokespersons
of the degraded and undervalued Turkish popular culture against the Ottoman
high culture, which was a mix of Byzantine, Persian, Arabic and Turkish. 83 Having
been raised in a working-class and/or rural-based parental culture which was
pervaded by the Anatolian minstrels' music and myths, most of the Turkish
youngsters in Berlin might well feel themselves attracted by the educative nature
of rap. Besides taking inspiration from the intellectual teaching of the Anatolian
minstrels, the rappers also tend to borrow their lyrical structure: it is quite
common for the Turkish rappers in Germany to state their names in the last part
of the lyrics as the mythical Turkish minstrels used to. Thus, having such a
cultural tradition makes the Turkish rappers more capable of contextualising
themselves locally within the global hip-hop youth culture on which they receive
an up-to-date flow of information via MTV, VIVA TV (German local form of
MTV), music magazines, tapes, records and CDs.
83 Some of the mythical Turkish minstrels in the seventeen century were Karacaoglan,
Köroglu and Pir Sultan Abdal. Arif Sag, Musa Eroglu, Mahsuni Serif, Yavuz Top and
Mazium cimen are some of the contemporary minstrels in Turkey. These minstrels are
often invited to European cities by Turkish communities to perform their art and to teach.
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German-Turkish hip-hop youngsters, like other minority hip-hop youth
groups, tend to express themselves by means of protest music, break-dance and
graffiti, which fit into the consumerist popular culture. This kind of expression
facilitates the emergence of resisting identities. The youngsters develop these
resisting identities within the 'areas of conversation' (Bottomley, 1992: 131) with
those who have anti-Turkish prejudices; and aim discriminatory acts towards
them. The racist attacks on the Turkish community members in Mölln and
Solingen in 1992 and 1993 received an extensive reaction from within the Turkish
diaspora throughout Europe. Turkish rap groups immediately reacted to the arson
attacks in a very radical way. They have played a vital role in developing the anti-
racist struggle by communicating information, organising consciousness and
testing out, deploying, or amplifying the forms of subjectivity within the Turkish
diaspora. In what follows, I shall portray the major rap groups/singers and
delineate their counter-hegemonic discourses.
Cartel: Cultural nationalist rap
In summer 1995, a gangsta rap group called Cartel was introduced to the Turkish
audience. Most of the public/private TV and radio channels and the print media
focused their attention on this group, and their video and CD suddenly became
number one in the Turkish pop charts. These 'strange-looking' guys had come
from Germany. In the video, they were walking in German streets with a number
of groupies behind them. Their hit rap song, also called 'Cartel', was sending
messages to the Turkish youth in Germany to unite against the rising racist attacks
and killings. The way they walked in the video was not so different from its
equivalent in American rap (jabbing towards the camera with their fingers); the
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anger and hatred in their faces against the murders of the Turks in Germany were
easily readable; and they were calling everybody to join the 'movement' of Cartel:
"Gel gel Cartele gel I Carteldekiler kankardesler" (Come to Cartel / The ones
with Cartel are bloodbrothers).
Cartel is a music project initiated by a Berliner producer called Ozan
Sinan. The group is composed of three different rap groups originating in various
regions of Germany: Karakan (based in Niirnberg), Da Crime Posse (based in
Kiel), and a West-Berliner MC, Erci-E. The group consists of seven members:
five Turkish, one German and one Afro-Cuban. They all dress austerely in black,
with Turkish motives on the uniform T-shirts. The design of the CD/tape
resembles the Turkish flag, with a red background and the initial letter 'C' of
'Cartel' which imitates the crescent on the flag. The name 'Cartel' on the cover is
also decorated with Turkish ornamental shapes (Figure 7). The release of the
group and the goods (Cartel T-shirts, caps, hats and coats) was extremely well-
timed. It was a time in Turkey when popular nationalism was prevailing. Thus,
such a group immediately encountered a warm welcome from the Turkish
audience. The group was also extensively promoted by the Turkish media to
strengthen the hegemony of the state as a measure against centrifugal forces such
as Kurdish nationalism.
Before the group went to Turkey to give concerts, the media promotion
had already been done. Thus, Cartel had already had an impact on the national
pride of a remarkable part of the Turkish audience. They were greeted by an
ardent crowd of youths from the right-wing nationalist movement (Mil4yetci
Hareket Part isi, MHP, which is active in both Turkey and Germany, and
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Figure 7. Album cover ut rap group carkl, 1995
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advocates Turkish and Pan-Turkish Nationalism). This kind of support was
present in all the concerts of Cartel, held in many major cities of Turkey, even in
the south-eastern Anatolian cities. The fact that Cartel's rap salute was very
similar to the 'grey-wolf' salute of the MHP, turned the group into a new totem
for the nationalist crowds. As Robins and Morley (1996: 252) pointed out,
what the ultra-nationalist youths were seeing and identifying
with was the tough and angry mood of rap culture. These were
young people who were insecure, often in a paranoid way and
consequently aggressive, in the expression of their Turkish
identity. These were the ones who were prepared to come to
Cartel, drawn by its talk of bonding and belonging.
Being translated from the German to the Turkish context, Cartel suddenly
became one of the main pillars of popular Turkish nationalism. Such a translation
encouraged these crowds to do something about the 'enemies of the Turkish
nation and race' at a time when the dream of Turkish Turan (Volk, greater Turkic
world) was revisited. MC Erci-E, to whom I shall return shortly, expressed his
surprise and shock at this enthusiastic reception by the extreme-right wing youths,
and complained about the misunderstanding of the Turkish audience. Yet,
whatever way they were interpreted in Turkey, the manager and the production
company Polygram were satisfied with the result: in 1995 they sold more than
300,000 copies of the album in Turkey, displacing Michael Jackson from number
one in the album-charts, and more than 20,000 copies in Germany.
The rap group Cartel is a form of 'playful cultural-nationalist rap'.84
Cartel infuse rap with Turkish percussion, a blend of Turkish-German, English
Swedenburg (1992) classifies the rap groups into four sub categories in the Anglo-
American context: a) hard or serious nationalist rap of, say, Public Enemy; b) playful
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and Spanish lyrics, Turkish folk music sound, and cries against racists. Cartel
rappers assert and construct a distant pan-Turkish diasporic cultural ident4y
while acknowledging the African connections of rap art. Like many other Turkish
rap groups, Cartel also acknowledges its 'authentic' Turkish folk music
connection in the form of a lyrical structure which was used by the mythical
Turkish minstrels (halk ozani). By doing so, the rappers also contextualise
themselves both in their 'own authentic' culture and in the global youth culture.
By means of hip-hop culture, the youngsters ironically both convince themselves
of their involvement in the mainstream global culture, and feel attached to their
own 'authentic' cultural and ethnic identities. It is a syncretic mode of
demonstrating incorporation into the mainstream and attachment to the roots. As
the elements of a surviving strategy, they are in need of incorporating into the
mainstream culture, because the 'myth of return' is over; they are also in need of
going back to their roots, because the past is one of the rare things they can claim
as 'their own'. Rap is a resistance movement in itself, offering a shared code of
communication as well as a sense of collectivism. Above all, rap culture, which is
dominated by Cartel, tends to bridge the gap between the displaced Turkish
diaspora community and the 'imaginary homeland'. In other words, it is an
imaginative journey back home.
As the intellectual storytellers of their group, the members of the hip-hop
nation form an 'imagined community' that is based less on its realisation through
state formation than on a collective challenge to the consensual logic of Germany
cultural-nationalist rap of, say, Jungle Brothers; c) gangsta rap of, say, Ice-T; and d)
women's rap of, say, Queen Latifah.
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and to the majority German nationalism (Decker, 1992: 54). Hip-hop nationalism
as a variant of minority nationalism should be explored in relation to the majority
nationalism. The use of ethnic symbols resembling the Turkish flag should not
immediately be labelled as regressive, racist or exclusioriist. Such a
straightforward judgement would lead us to misinterpret the nationalist discourse
of Cartel, and to underestimate the presence of German nationalism. Hennayake's
notion of 'interactive nationalism' is unquestionably of good use to understand the
major impetus behind minority nationalisms (Hennayake, 1992). Interactive
nationalism simply refers to a kind of minority ethnic nationalism which is formed
in opposition to the simultaneous practice of hegemonic politics and exclusionary
nationalist politics of the majority nation and/or of the dominant ideology.
Paraphrasing John Berger (1972: 11), it is the fear of the present which make the
Turkish youth celebrate their 'past' and 'authenticity'. In this sense, the cultural
nationalist discourse of Cartel provides a ground for Turkish youth to acquire a
positive and optimistic politics of identity.
Music is said not only to express differences but also to articulate them
creatively, affecting social and cultural realities while at the same time being
shaped by them (Grenier, 1989: 137). Music-making and other forms of popular
culture serve as a specific site for the creation of collective identity as well as
shaping and reflecting dominant and subordinate social and cultural relations. In
some cases, music might become a social force attempting to transform the
existing social system. Rap is very instructive in this sense. Cartel, while being
sustained by the Turkish cultural capital, attempts to construct a 'pan-Turkish'
diasporic cultural identity. The rappers strongly adhere to a notion of community,
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and principally do not assume that this community is pre-given and exists
naturally; rather, they consider that it must be constructed and created against all
odds, in the face of the threat of decimation (Swedenburg, 1992: 58). In this way
cultural-nationalist rappers can be considered the 'organic intellectuals' of their
communities.
Accordingly, Cartel has a political message to announce both to the
Turkish minority and the German majority, besides being the symbol of cultural
pride. The rappers in Berlin aim to mobilise the masses against arson attacks,
racism, xenophobia, exclusion, drug trade, drug abuse, materialism, capitalism,
and antagonism between Kurds and Turks. They are also intent on praising the
family institution, on celebrating the brotherhood of Turkish and Kurdish, on
presenting Germany as the new homeland, and on criticising the perception of the
diasporic youth as 'Almanci' (German-like) in Turkey and 'Ausländer' (foreigner)
in Germany. They try to inform the audience about their own experiences and
those of the others. The expression of the black French rapper, MC Solaar, gives
the rationale behind rapping: 'If you rebel, you isolate yourself. If you explain,
people learn' (Newsweek, February 26, 1996). Thus, the rationale behind the hip-
hop nation is the quest for communication and dialogue with the hegemonic social
classes/groups.
Kankardesler
Allahim yine mi?
Kankardes cankardes demek
Gerekirse kardes 1cm ölmek
Canini kanini vermek
GözUnü kirpmadan herzamari iste
Bloodbrothers
Oh my God, not again?
Bloodbrother is everything
It is to die for your brother
It is to sacrifice
Always tell me what you want
'Allahim yine mi?' (Oh my God, again?) is the cry of a woman in the background,
which echoes the image of the 'caring mother'. Her cry is for the Turkish families who
wern killed in the arson attacks in MölIn and Solingen.
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Defol dazlak dedik
Biz Turküz deyince fasist bilindik
Yanindayim koçum sonuna kadar senin
Sana edilen laf ayni anda bize
Oynamaya bakma damarima basma
Soyluyorum sana kaybedersin sonunda
Meseleyi fazia uzatmaya gelmez
Hepberaber olursak bizi kimse yenemez
Hadi gulüm yandan yandan
Karakan geliyor çekilin yoldan
Hadi gülum yandan yandan
Biz korkmayiz ondan bundan
Kan kan kankardesler
Hepberaber bizi yenemezier
Kan kan kankardesler
Hepberaber iste sana Cartel
We said "piss off skinhead"
When we said we were Turks,
We were labelled as fascist.
I am always with you boy.
Screaming at you means screaming at me
Don't dare to fool me,
You will be the loser.
If we get together, no one can beat us
C'mon guys!
Karakan is coming.
C'mon guys,
Nothing can scare us.
Blood blood bloodbrothres
They can't beat us
Blood blood bloodbrothers
This is Cartel
Üç tane hail kan, alti tane hail daha kardes
Bu ne demek acaba, kUçllk bir sozcük
Ama anlami bUyiik
Ne ateslere biz korükle yuruduk
Bazen kaybettik bazen kazandik
Kankardesimizi yalniz birakmadik
Anca beraber kanca beraber
Arkadasin çok olur gelirler giderler
Kankardesim seni hay atinca severler
En kötu gününde bile yaninda gezerler
Karsinda Cartel, bilmiyorsan eger sana oylerler
çocuk ogrende gel, ugrasimiz rap
çunku pop bize yaramaz
Sarmaz bize yakismaz bizi açmaz
Kursun gibi sözler deler gecer
Refrain
Soracaksin kim diye, ben Kerim
Kâbus ilk adim bunu boyle bum
Kara kemilderle bizim Alper
Seksi kanakeden nefret eder
Sadece o degil bizim hepimiz
Birimiz hepimiz, hepimiz birimiz
Turk, Kurt, Laz ye cerkez
Ayrimcilik yaparsak kaybedecegiz
Uyanmak çok kapisinda kahpeler
Toz pembe bakmasin gelecege
Zannettigin arkadaslik bu degil
Daha da öte daha da ileri
Hep beraber olup kiracagiz zincirleri
Kankardeslere yakisir bir sekilde
Eger hazirsani.z simdi sira sizde
Refrain
Karakan (Cartel)
Five letters 'bloocE, seven more letters 'brother'
What is this, a little word
But with a strong meaning
We walked through many troubles
Sometimes lost, sometimes won
We never left alone our bloodbrother
Forever together
Your friends come by and leave
They love you
They hang around with you to death
This is Cartel, if you don't know someone can tell you
Go and find out, our business is rap
Cos pop is no use for us
It isn't for us
Words can kill like a bullet
Refrain
My name is Kerim
I am known as nightmare
Next to me Alper with black bones
He hates sexy 'kanake'
Not only him, all of us
One for all, all for one
Turk, Kurd, Laz and Cfrcassian
We will lose if we disunite
Lots of traitors behind
Don't dream
What you think of is not friendship
It is something further, stronger
All together we will break up the chains
In a way that suits the bloodbrothers
If you're ready, it's your turn now.
Refrain
Karakan (Cartel)
86 Laz and Circasian are just two of the major ethnic groups in Turkey. For a detailed
map of ethnic composition of Turkey, see Andrews (1989).
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This particular rap song by Cartel demonstrates the need to unite across
the diaspora of the German-Turks that consist of various ethnic groups such as
Kurd, Laz and Circasian. By this song, MC Kerim (Cartel) invites his Turkish
'bloodbrothers' to fight racist arson attacks. This song also displays that the flow
of the lyrical structure resembles that of the Turkish minstrel tradition. In the last
part of the song, MC Kerim first introduces himself, and sharply gives his
message: "One for all, all for one".
The rise of the local rap sound amongst the German-Turks is an indication
of the cultural nationalism that is sustained by the processes of racialisation,
assimilation and acculturation. The sources of Turkishness which have appeared
as components of rising cultural nationalism have offered the German-Turkish
youngsters a positive sense of identity in the face of negative pressures towards
assimilation and racism. Here, "ethnicity is used as a source in the struggle for
social status, in particular, to counteract the negative representations of immigrant
workers, and those with minimal power in their 'host' societies" (Bottomley,
1992: 57). The minority hip-hop youth culture is an attempt to constitute a form
of counterculture. What the ethnic minority youth constructs is no more a kind of
passive 'sub-culture'. Ethnic minority youngsters have become aware of the
contradiction between the prevailing ideologies of equal opportunity and the
reality of discrimination and racism in their daily lives. This, as Castles and Miller
state, can lead to the emergence of countercultures and political radicalisation
(Castles and Miller, 1993: 33). What are the main constitutive parts of the
minority youth counterculture and political radicalisation? There is not a
straightforward answer to this question. It seems that ethnicity is the primary
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instrument for the German-Turkish youth to construct a counterculture and a
fruitful sense of identity. Cartel as a form of gangsta rap presents a form of
diasporic cultural politics; and it also positions itself against cultural displacement,
racism and capitalist exploitation.
Islamic Force: Universalist political rap
Islamic Force was founded in 1986 by the self-initiatives of Boe-B (male Turkish)
and the manager Yiiksel. Besides Boe-B, there are three more members: Killa
Hakan (male Turkish), DJ Derezon (male, German mother and Spanish father),
and Nelie (female, German mother and Albanian father). What they make is
conceived as oriental rap and anti-racist rap in Berlin. Boe-B writes the lyrics, DJ
Derezon is the technical expert in mixing melody, beat and rhythm. The name,
Islamic Force was chosen to provoke the Germans who have a stereotypical
image of Islam; otherwise the group has nothing to do with radical Islam.
Recently, in order to release their works in Turkey, they have changed their name
to Kan-Ak. The reason for this change is the concern surrounding the probability
that the name Islamic Force might well be misinterpreted by the Turkish audience
in Turkey. The previous misinterpretation of Cartel's discourse by the Turkish
audience in Turkey has also made them conscious about probable unjust critiques
in Turkey.
By changing their name to Kan-Ak, the rappers believe to have a more
gangsta-type of name for the Turkish market: Kan-Ak literally means 'running
blood' in Turkish. On the other hand, the reason for choosing the new name Kan-
Ak is also the acceptance of an offensive word used by the right wing Germans to
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identify the Africans (Kanake). There is a parallelism between the use of nigga
instead of the racist word 'nigger' by the blacks in the USA and the use of Kan-
Ak, or Kanak, instead of the offensive word Kanake by the Turks. The choice of
such a name, in a way, springs from their feeling of being 'white -niggers'. Tommy
L. Lott's analysis of the term nigga is instructive in this context (Lott, 1994: 246).
He rightly claims that gangsta rap has creatively reworked and recoded the social
meaning of the term in a socially transgressive and politically retaliatory manner.
Similarly, Peter Mclaren offers an illuminating explanation for the revision of the
term nigger by the blacks in New York, or Los Angeles:
When gangsta rappers revise the spelling of the racist version of
the word niger to the vernacular nigga they are using it as a
defiant idiom of a resistive mode of African American cultural
expression which distinguishes it from the way that, for
instance, white racists in Alabama might employ the term
(Mclaren, 1995: 37).
The term Kan-Ak is the Turkish vernacular of the original racist version of
Kanake. "If you take negative racist identifications like Kanake, and make them
positive for your own use," says MC Soft-G, "then the racist groups have to
produce new concepts to insult you. And it is always difficult to produce new
concepts." It is a term that has very specific bounds of acceptable usage -it could
only be used by the working-class Turkish youth.87
The term Kanak also permits a form of class consciousness among the
working-class Turkish youth in the sense that it distinguishes Turkish urban
working-class youth from those middle-class Turkish youths who feel denigrated
87 Mapping out the creation of black-British youth identities, Claire E. Alexander (1996:
56-58) raises similar issues concerning the use of the term 'nigga' by the working-class
black youth.
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whenever the term is used. Besides the fact that Turkish rap has evolved in the
binary-coded struggle against the hegemony of the German nation-state and rising
racial attacks, it has also developed as a relatively independent expression of
Turkish male artistic rebellion against the newly emerging Turkish bourgeoisie
and the Turkish media, by romanticising the ethnic enclave as the fruitful root of
cultural identity and authenticity. MC Boe-B pointed out that the Turkish media
have always represented the 'successful' and 'well-integrated' middle-class
Turkish youngsters rather than the working-class youth in Kreuzberg who had no
'achievement'. Thus, the working-class Turkish youngsters are to imagine
themselves in opposition to the 'white' German society, and also to the other
'blacks' who aspire to integrate themselves into the dominant German culture
(Robins and Morley, 1996: 249).
Islamic Force is the first Turkish rap group to combine a drum-computer
rhythm of Afro-American tradition with melodic samples of Turkish arabesk88 and
pop music. 89
 By mixing some traditional Turkish musical instruments such as
The history of arabesk music in Turkey starts with the internal migration from rural
spaces to urban spaces since early 1960s. It is an epiphenomenon of urbanisation.
Arabesk is primarily associated with music, but also with film, novels and foto-roman
(photo dramas in newspapers with speech bubbles). Arabesk music is a style which is
composed of western and oriental instruments with an Arabic rhythm. This syncretic form
of music has always borrowed some instruments and beat of the traditional Turkish folk
music. The presence of the arabesk music on TV was banned by the state until the early
eighties. The conservative-populist government of Turgut Ozal set it free in the mid-
eighties. The main characteristic of arabesk music is the fatalism, sadness and pessimism
of the lyrics and rhythm. Hitherto, the lyrics were composed of an irrational and pessimist
reaction of people with a rural background to the capitalist urban life. Recently, the
composition of the lyrics has extensively changed. Instead of expressing pessimism in the
urban space, lyrics tend to celebrate the beauty of the pastoral life which has been left
behind. In other words, it has become a call to the people to go back to basics. It should
be pointed out that there is an extensive literature on the sociological dimensions of the
arabesk music in Turkey (Ozbek, 1994; Stokes, 1994; Giingor, 1993).
The group is using the old popular Turkish melodies from Bans Manço, Zülfu Livaneli
and Sezen Aksu as their samples.
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zurna, baglama and ud with the Afro-American drum-computer rhythm, they
transculturate rap music. Transculturation is a two-way process whereby elements
of international pop, rock, and rhythm-and-blues are incorporated into local and
national musical cultures, and indigenous influences contribute to the new
transnational styles (Wallis and MaIm, 1984: 300-301). What happens in practice
is that individual music cultures pick up elements from iranscultural music, but an
increasing number of national and local music cultures also contribute to
transcultural music. Through the transculturation process, music from the
international music industry can interact with virtually all other music cultures and
subcultures in the world due to the world-wide penetration of music mass-media
(Wallis and Maim, 1990/1984). Tn oriental rap, the global rhythm and beat of rap
infuse into local Turkish folk music, pop music and arabesk music. Oriental rap
becomes the music of the state of bricolage, or hybridity, as in Islamic Force.
MC Boe-B defines their rap style with an illustrative example: "The boy
comes home and listens to hip-hop, then his father comes along and says 'Come
on boy, we're going shopping'. They get into the car and the boy listens to
Turkish music on the cassette-player. Later, he gets our record and listens to both
styles in one" (Quoted in Elfleim, 1996). Transculturation, in the form of mixing
arabesk and hip-hop in one, is, at the same time, the expression of a 'double
diasporic consciousness'. 9° This consciousness stems from the double migration
experience which the migrants experienced both in Turkey and in Germany.
Before migrating to Germany, most of the migrant parents had already lived a
90The term 'double diasporic consciousness' derives from Gilroy's notion of 'double
consciousness' -a term which he reinterpreted from W.E.B.Du Bois (Gilroy, 1987).
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diasporic experience (gurbet) by leaving their villages to work in the big industrial
cities of Turkey. Arabesk has been the expression of their parental culture. They
have been raised in such a cultural climate at home. The pessimism of arabesk
music has dominated their musical taste. What Ferdi -a 16-year-old boy in the
Chiv youth centre- has said is very illustrative to understand the impact of
arabesk on the diasporic youth: "When I listen to Ferdi Tayfur I feel that I am
back home, especially that song, you know which one I mean: 'Hadi gel
koyumuze geri dönelim' ('Come on, let's go back to our village')." 9 ' On the other
hand, they have experienced the problems of being an ethnic minority in Germany
away from their homeland. In diaspora they have taken hip-hop as an expression
of their alienation and resistance to the capitalist system. Arabesk also provides
these working-class youngsters with a symbol of solidarity, but not in more than a
weak and implicit sense of solidarity against anybody else. Arabesk is not
threatening, and so the Turkish diasporic youth can keep its mystique meaning to
themselves.92
Thus, arabesk and hip-hop are the two musical styles which some of the
youngsters prefer to listen to as an expressive form of their 'double diasporic
identity'. They employ arabesk as a musical and cultural form to express their
imaginary nostalgia towards 'home', 'being there', or the 'already discovered
country of past'; and, on the other hand, they consider hip-hop a musical and
cultural form to express their attachment to the 'undiscovered country of the
91 This song is a critique of urbanisation and industrialisation, and narrates the longing
and nostalgia of the 'gurbetci' for the pastoral way of life.
Similarly, Ulf Hannerz (1968) has defined the concept of 'soul' as a solidarity symbol
among the Black 'ghetto' youth which is not threatening to anybody.
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future'. To put it differently, both arabesk and hip-hop represent the symbolic
expression of the dialogue which the diasporic youth have between 'past' and
'future', between 'tradition' and 'translation', between 'there' and 'here', between
the local and the global.
Selaminaleykum
Köyden Istanbul'a vardilar
Alman gümrügunde kontrol altinda kaldilar
Sanki satin alindilar
Bunlari kullanip kovariz sandilar
Ama aldandilar
Bizinikiler onlarin hesaplarini bozdular
Koylu dedikieri kafalari kullandilar
calisip edip kosturdular
Her koseye bir finn ya da inibiss kurdular
Ama bu kadar iyi haberin acisi da var
Kaybediyoruz can kaybediyoruz kan
Evier yaniyor bazen deliriyor insan
Ben bunlari anlatmak için seçildim
Hepsi bagiriyor "Boe-B soyle"
Ben de hip-hop seklinde sunuyorum Kadiköy'de
Selaminaleyküm aleykümselam
Selaminaleyküm aleykumselam
Milzigiinize devam
Burda olanlari size anlatiyoruz
Haberlerimizi size evet sunuyorum
Bizim semtten Kadikoy'e bir baglanti kuruyoruz
Harbi hip-hop duyuruyoruz
Burdan size yolluyoruz
Turlarsin artik sesle mahallelerde
Altinda bir Benz ya da bir BMV, ya da Golf, ya da Audi,
ya da herhangi
Nebileyim, ne bileceksin, polis arkanda
Takip ediyorlar seth
Ama sen farkina vannadin daha
Bakinadin daha
Sinyal vermeden donuyorsun
Aniden her yerde polis göruyorsun
In diyor, indiriyor
Araban çalinti diyor
Bir kagidin eksik diye karakola göturuyor
Hic acimiyor
Adam isini biiyor
Sayiyor, aliyor ye kontrol ediyor
Senin de insan oldugunu gormüyor
Hafiften haksizlik oluyor
Ye bunu Boe-B size Kadikoy'e kadar duyuruyor.
Refrain
Boe-B (Islamic Force)
Selaminaleykum
They arrived in Istanbul from their villages
And got searched in the (3ennan customs
It is as if they got purchased
Germans thought they'd use and kick them off
But they failed to
Our people ruined their plans
Those peasants turned out to be clever
They worked hard
Opened a bakery or an imbiss on each corner
But they paid a lot for this success
We are losing life, losing blood
Homes are on fire, we get mad
I was chosen to explain these things
Everybody screams "Tell us Boe-B"
And I am telling our story as hip-hop in Kadiköy93
Selaniinaleykum aleykumselam
Selaniinaleykum aleykümselam
Let's go on rapping
We tell you our experiences
We present you the news
We connect our neighbourhood and Kadikoy
We are doing real hip-hop
And we tell it to you
You drive with high-decibels in the streets in either
Benz, or BMW, or Golf, or Audi, or whatsoever.
The police is behind you
They are following you
You haven't yet realised
You haven't yet looked behind
You are turning without signalling
Suddenly everywhere gets full of police
He says "get out!"
He says "you stole this car"
He is taking you to the police station just because of the
lack of a document
He doesn't have any mercy at all
He knows his business
He is counting, taking and conirolling
He doesn't know, you are also human
This is unjust
And I am telling this story in a far land, Kadikoy.
Refrain
Boe-B (Islamic Force)
Kadikoy is a district of Istanbul in the Anatolian side. MC Boe-B states the name of
Kadikoy because he was born there.
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Islamic Force attempts to bridge the gap between the diaspora and the
homeland. Their rap song 'Selaminaleykiim', following the traditional Turkish
minstrel genre with the name of the poet in the last part of the song, for instance,
undertakes to inform the Turkish youth in Turkey about their own experiences in
the diaspora away from 'home'. MC Boe-B narrates in this rap that they have
been raised in families who have been twice migrants. This song is the expression
of double diasporic identity as well as that of the quest for homeland. By referring
to Kadikoy in the song, he holds on to his roots. He defines himself as a
'messenger' chosen by his community in Berlin to express their state of being to
their Turkish compatriots in the homeland. He tells a 'true' story to his
'imaginary' Turkish compatriots about the life-worlds of the German-Turks who
are subject to institutional racism, harassment, arson attacks and discrimination.
This song is quite illustrative of two crucial points: firstly, it exposes how "a
diaspora can be created through the mind, through cultural artefacts and through
a shared imagination in the age of cyberspace" to use Cohen's words (1996: 516);
and secondly, how the diasporic youth use an emerging global cultural form (hip-
hop) and a granted local cultural form (arabesk) for their own expressive
purposes. This syncretic 'double diasporic consciousness' simultaneously points at
Turkey and Berlin, past and present as well as local and global.
MC Boe-B's narrative in the given song resembles that of the Turkish
minstrels. In fact, the rapper as a 'storyteller' and/or an 'organic intellectual' has
its equivalent in Anatolian culture. Though having completely different musical
tastes, rhyming and storytelling are the common denominators of both artistic
forms. Thus, the working-class Berlin-Turkish youth, who have been raised with
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the sound of Turkish folk music, could easily relate to the rap form of art. The key
concept in what follows will be the transcultural form of Islamic Force. I have
reproduced the personal narratives of the group members to be able to
demonstrate their individual discourses and politics of identity.
(a) DJ Derezon (26) was born in Kreuzberg. He is the son of a German
mother and a Spanish father. He feels alienated in Germany, and akin to the
Turkish minority. He is partly assimilated to the minority Turkish youth culture;
he actually defines himself as Turkish. For him Turkishness is a state of mind and
an equivalent of feeling in minority: "We are all foreigners. We are Turkish."
While saying this, he immediately adds that "Brooklyn is similar to Kreuzberg."
After receiving his Abitur from high school, he became involved in hip-hop
culture, tagging on the walls all over Berlin. Then he started DJ-ing. He went to
Brooklyn and did some DJ-ing with Black Americans in 1992. He picked up a
Black American accent there. After returning to Berlin he became one of the most
important figures in the Berlin hip-hop scene. He got in touch with the Turkish
rapper Boe-B (Bülent) and the manager Yiiksel in 1993, and later with Killa
Hakan and Nelie. After listening to some Turkish samples, he decided to mix the
Turkish melodies with beat and rhythm. He also convinced Boe-E that he should
rap on Turkish samples: "I said: it is your roots, Boe-B, you should do that.
Everybody is doing that." He always refers to the Black American origin of hip-
hop. His presence in Islamic Force and his transnational links with the East Coast
hip-hop community confirm the transcultural character of hip-hop culture.
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DJ Derezon also defines the role of the rapper as a medium establishing
communication between various segments of the community:
Rappers are the speakers of the streets.. .They are the politicians
of the community. ..We live here in Kreuzberg and have many
friends. We always talk to our friends and have a continuous
exchange of ideas. At the end of the day, we construct our own
vision, and then express it to society.. .We are doing culture rap
and political rap.. .Rap is a chance for the subordinated
minorities to appear on the stage of art.
(b) Boe-B (24) came to Germany when he was 8 and finished
Hauptschule in Kreuzberg. His friends called him Bobby (Boe-B) in the primary
school due to his resemblance to Bobby in the American TV series Dallas. Then
he recovered this name for the stage, changing it to Boe-B (B is the initial of his
forename, Bulent). Having been involved in gangsta groups in the past, he is
afraid that some day Kreuzberg might turn into another New York in terms of the
crime rate: "We are the voice of the streets. The media do not present life in the
streets. What we do is to bring the street life onto the stage... We express
ourselves through rap."
As the song-writer of the group, Boe-B composes lyrics against racism,
drug abuse, materialism, police terror, exclusion, youth bands and rap theft. He
favours East-Coast rap, which gives priority to lyrics and political messages. His
favourite rap group is Wu Tang Clan (WTC) because he sees a resemblance
between WTC and themselves. WTC is an East-Coast rap group who display a
bohemian way of life and a gangsta profile like Islamic Force. Since Boe-B's
group has begun to be involved in the commercial rap business, he is shifting
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towards West-Coast rap which lays the emphasis on beat and rhythm rather than
lyrics.
Boe-B's rap is a clear exponent of the fact that the beauty of the rap
experience does not only spring from the mix and the beat, but also from the
quality of the rhyme and of the voice. The point is not to show that one can rhyme
but that one can rhyme differently. While stating the peculiarities of good rapping,
he underlines the competition between Islamic Force and Cartel. One of his main
concerns is rap theft. It is said that Cartel and TCA Microphone Mafia have
stolen some of their Turkish samples.
(c) Killa Hakan (23) was born in Kreuzberg. He dropped out of the
Oberschule. He is a fan of hardcore rap and arabesk (especially Milsinrn
Gürses).94 He used to be a gangsta before joining Islamic Force. He defines the
rapper as a 'storyteller', or a narrator, who utters various stories. He attributes a
broad meaning to hip-hop:
Real hip-hop does not exist in Turkey. We are trying to take it
there. The rappers are gonna change the Turkish youth in
Turkey. After the introduction of hip-hop, Turkey will improve
itself much further.
He often complains about racism in Germany, and he seems quite keen on
returning to Turkey for good:
When the Germans see a black-haired Turkish youth driving a
brand-new car, they stare at him with questioning eyes. They
don't like the Turks with leather jackets at all.
Mäslum Gürses is one of the main figures, or schools, of the arabesk music in Turkey.
A remarkable number of his 'groupies', on ecstasy, tend to harm themselves with razor
blades during the concerts. A similar trend has also been noticed in Berlin amongst a
group of Turkish youth living in the ethnic enclave.
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Hakan's discourse on racism reminds us that biological racism is still quite
significant for the diasporic Turkish youth. By aligning himself with 'hardcore'
rap, Hakan attempts to renegotiate his own ethnicity through proclaiming a
specific musical taste. By positioning himself in the marginal space of hardcore
rap, he also aims to disavow the dominant regimes of representation and to
incorporate himself into the global youth culture. In the meantime, he seems to
complain that having an advantageous economic position is not enough to get rid
of racial harassment.
(d) Nelie (26) was born in Kreuzberg, too. Her mother is German and her
father Kosovo-Albanian. She is a Muslim. Having been raised with the Turks in
her childhood, she attended the Koran courses in a Turkish mosque and learned to
speak fluent Turkish from her Turkish friends. Now, she is making soul music in
Turkish.
Erci-E: Party Rap
Erci-E (23) is one of the rappers of Cartel. He was born in Berlin outside
Kreuzberg. Erci first encountered rap when he was 13-years-old. His first
acquaintance with rap was a crucial moment for him. Rap meant, for him as well
as for many other rappers, transcending the pessimism of pop music at first sight:
Rap is my favourite music. I have loved that coolness since the
age of thirteen. The other music styles have become boring for
me. For instance, pop music was very stable without any change.
What fascinates me in rap is its dynamism and power.
After giving up university just for music, he began making oriental or alternative
rap. Like many other Turkish rappers, he relates better to East Coast rappers. He
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is well aware of the changes in rap music all around the world, especially in the
United States. Like all the Turkish rappers, Erci-E gives reference to the
American differentiation of rap sound as East-coast and West-coast. Erci-E
underlines the creative and progressive character of the rap music for the Turkish
diaspora as well as for the other minority youth all around the world. He sees hip-
hop as a ticket out of the 'ghetto':
In rap, rhythm and melody are as important as lyrics. Cartel
gave something to the Turkish youngsters living in Europe.
Now I want to give something else to them. Rap should be
progressive. I don't want to talk about the problems any more,
I want them to enjoy themselves by listening to optimistic rap
and having positive feelings. The message of my new solo long-
play, which I wifi give to the Turkish youngsters in minority all
around Europe, is to struggle against violence and to seek
solidarity.. .Wherever there is a minority, hip-hop is there. It is a
rebellion culture. It is not necessarily a revolt against the
political government. American-Blacks have grown up in the
ghetto. Hip-hop has become a way for them to get out of the
ghetto. By means of hip-hop they have the chance to do more
creative things in their leisure time.
He is planning to have his solo long-play produced all over Europe and
even in the United States of America:
Turks in Europe have been forgotten, they should communicate
with each other. Turkish youngsters in France should know that
they are living the same things as the Turkish youngsters in
Germany.. .1 want to explain something new to them in their
own 'broken' Turkish accent... Turkish pop is not for us. It is
just talking about love, that is it. There is, for instance, sea in
those pop songs, but there is no sea in Germany. I repeat it,
Turkish pop is not for us.
Erci-E tends to see hip-hop in a much broader context which leads him to the
conclusion that rap may well create what we might call a 'diasporic interchange'
and 'diasporic intimacy' among Turkish peoples in the diaspora struggling against
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racism and capitalist exploitation in their countries of settlement. The progressive
and resisting role of music is not only limited by national boundaries. The existing
network of global capitalism and communication technology takes the message of
the dliasporic form of organic intellectuals beyond the national territories (Decker,
1992). He also attempts, on the other hand, to break up the 'rhythmic obedience'
of the pop and arabesk music by providing an alternative to the Turkish
audience.95
 By saying so, he also underlines the fact that rap has reversed the
established pattern of pop music by dictating a strong and progressive lyrical
content beyond the much more common passivist romanticism.
For Erci-E, back to basics is one of the main aspects of hip-hop culture in
terms of ethnic symbols, music taste and images. Accordingly, he attempts to add
Turkishness to rap. He is aware of the fact that, while making rap music, it is vital
to have a sample melody. For instance, in the USA, almost all the songs of James
Brown have been made into samples for the rap songs. Erci does not like to take
James Brown's songs as samples because:
he is not Turkish, he is black. I thought samples should be from
our own music. Bans Manço is the James Brown of Turkish
rap. There is also Erkin Koray and Mogollar. They were
making soul-funk in the seventies. We used to listen to their
songs during the journeys to Turkey by car when I was nine, or
ten years old; and we were proud of their bass sound.
Those were the Turkish popstars of the seventies, who were, in a way, providing
a contact with the West, in a musical sense, for the Turkish audience in Turkey. It
is quite amazing to be witness to the fact that these musicians have had an
Theodor Adomo (1990/1941) used the notion of 'rhythmic obedience' to refer to the
'pseudo individualisation' aspect of popular music.
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essential meaning in the diasporic Turkish youngsters' imagination. Those
popstars have given them a safe bridge, or a reference point, to combine two
different cultures without any contradiction.
Erci, as an intellectual of his own conmiunity, is trying to find some
correlation between the radical, or rebellious, character of the Turkish youth and
their representation in the media:
I have grown up in Berlin. I haven't seen any other place apart
from Germany. I speak German. Germans don't like me, and I
don't like them. There is poverty in Turkey, Germany seems
reasonably better than Turkey. We have always been
misrepresented here in the German media. For instance, Turkey
represents poverty and Islamic fundamentalism for the German
televisions. Turkish children grow up with these images and
with a kind of reactionary feeling which explodes in
adolescence. What we can do is to protect ourselves against
them and not to bother them. We are capable and able to do
this. Since most of the Turkish children are in the Hauptschule,
what else can the Germans think about the Turks? The parents
didn't look after their children. The result is that the children
haven't seen their parents as important as they are, and they
take them for granted. Then, they conclude that we have
poverty, because we are Turks. No, we are here and we are
gonna stay here. We have to change things. We are paying
taxes, so we have the right to get something in return. This is
the reason why the Kreuzberg people are so miserable... We
must change the image of Turkey. Cartel was a good example.
We have joined the European Football championship finals in
England this year, and there are many German tourists going to
Turkey. On top of all these things, we want to make a
contribution to the new image of Turkey.
By doing so, Erci-E wages a war against the formal representation of Turkey and
Turks in the German media, which he considers the main source of tension
between Germans and Turks. Furthermore, Erci's narrative makes one point very
clear: the welfare of the diasporic youth is directly related to the image of the
homeland in the country of settlement. What he aims to achieve is to be able to
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give a positive sense of identity to the diasporic Turkish identity by means of
informal networks of communication such as rap.
Unal: Gangsta rap
Unal (27) was born in Kreuzberg. He was sent to Turkey by his parents to have a
'better' education when he was seven years old. He stayed in Turkey until the age
of fifteen. Then he obtained his university degree from the School of Audio
Engineering at the Berlin Technical University. Now, he is living in Steglitz -a
district of Berlin with a very small Turkish population. He is both a rapper and a
producer. He is called Soft-G on the stage. He first founded Ypsilon Music with
Yiiksel, the manager of Islamic Force. After the Ypsilon Music project ended, he
started to run the Orient Express music company producing basically for the
Turkish market. The pop-music singers Can Kat, Ahmet and Bay-X are his
productions for Turkey. He is recently running another project for the Turkish
market in collaboration with a Turkish female soul singer living in New York and
a song writer from Istanbul. He is the producer in the middle, using the global
network of electronic mail, fax and telephone.
He has made a video for Can Kat as well. In the video, Unal is rapping in
a tenor voice wearing an Italian-American gangster suit of the twenties (Figure 8).
The video was a big success in Turkey. In contrast to the other Turkish rappers,
he is more attracted by the Italian-American rap style. Besides the music
production for the Turkish market, he is making music for the Turkish youngsters
living in Germany as well. Azize-A, for instance, is a Turkish woman rapper
working with Unal to break into the German music market.
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Figure 8. Soft-G and his friends in a video.
Unal often draws attention to the politics of rapping. He points out that
the rapper is an intellectual, and at the same time the microphone is the rappers'
'lethal weapon'. On that account, in the hip-hop scene he is called Sqfl-G. where
the letter G refers to 'gangsta. Unal's picture on Can Kafs CD. which contains
some of his rap pieces, is ver illustrative in this sense. He holds a big microphone
in his hands as if he is gripping a 'lethal weapon.9t1 His politics of rap is identical
to that of Ice-T: Ice-T declares in the song that his 'lethal weapon' is his mind.'
Unal depicts the major differences between the youth cultures since the
sixties. The main difference of hip-hop culture from the others, to him, is its local
character:
' Can Kat U995). cck Git. Berlin: E.MX. Records.
Icc-T (1989.). 'Lethai Weapon," The Iccbc,.Frecdo,,i q/ SJ'cLc/i..Jusi Wwc/i If/ia,
)u Liv. Sire Records.
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The difference of hip-hop from the previous youth cultures is
that hippie and punk were global, whereas hip-hop is very local.
Every epoch has its own particular problem. Hippies were
concerned with some global problems such as sexual freedom,
peace and nature. Punk culture was a bit closer to hip-hop due
to its concern with some local concerns such as revolt against
the dominant social values. Hip-hop springs from the minorities
unlike the hippie and punk cultures. Hip-hop youngsters living
all around the world have various problems and concerns. For
instance, an American rapper doesn't necessarily have to get on
well with the Turkish rapper in Berlin. Hippies were different,
they had a global communication through the common idols
whom they used to listen to such as The Beatles...
Unal also points out the 'Turkification of rap' through the mixing of
instruments and melodies. By saying so, he acknowledges the 'bricolage'
character of rap which transcends the cultural boundaries in music:
In a sense, we Turkify the rap. We are, for instance, trying to
mix Zurna and rock in our own melodies. Gilnay is an example
of this. 98 We must create a Turkish Communizy in rap like the
East-coast or West-coast. In a very near future, I will produce a
tape including two rap songs from each Turkish rap group in
Berlin.
Like many other Turkish rap groups such as Cartel, Islamic Force and
Erci-E he also underlines his objection to pop music which is repetitive and
leading to 'narcotic passiveness' 99 and/or 'rhythmic obedience':
Rap is rebellious music, whereas pop is commercial music. This
is the difference between rap and pop. Rap is usually a social
critique. When a rebellious rap becomes too popular, it
shouldn't be conceived as pop music, because it still keeps its
critical nature.
98Gunay is the Turkish solo in a multi-cultural music group composed of an American, a
Cameron, a German and three Turkish musicians. They try to improvise the Turkish folk
music by mixing the instruments and sounds.
I borrowed the term 'narcotic passiveness' from Umberto Eco. In fact, he uses the term
in the context media: 'Liberated from the contents of communication, the addressee of the
messages of the mass media receives only a global ideological lesson, the call to narcotic
passiveness. When the mass media triumph, the human being dies' (Eco, 1986: 137,
italics mine).
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His claim on popular-critical rap, in fact, undercuts the perspectives of Adorno
and Jameson by arguing that repetition in rap is not always connected to the
commodity system of late capitalism in the same way as other popular musical
forms are. Adorno's interpretation of popular music as an ideological instrument
leading to 'rhythmic obedience' (Adorno, 1990/1941) is challenged by Unal's
interpretation of popular rap which may well lead to a form of collective
resistance.
Azize-A: Woman rap
Azize-A (26) is a woman rapper from Berlin. She is living in Steglitz with her
parents. She completed the Realschule. Although she does not want to be
considered a feminist rapper, she makes a kind of feminist rap. Besides rapping,
she appears in a children's programme, Dr. Mag, made for ZDF TV. Her taste of
music is dominated by American black music, such as jazz, funk and soul. She is
very critical of Turkish arabesk music due to its pessimism. She is trying to break
the traditional image of the Turkish woman in Europe, and wants to show that the
second and third generation Turkish youngsters have become very 'multi-kulti'
and cosmopolitan. She attempts to play with the multicultural capital in order to
be accepted by the majority society.
She calls her rap oriental rap because she mixes some Turkish and Arabic
musical instruments such as Ney, Ud and Saz with the western ones. She also uses
some Turkish samples for her rap:
I used a song of Ibrahim Tatlises as a sample.'°° Turkish people
have forgotten their roots because of imitating the West too
100 Ibrahim Tatiises is a very popular arabesk singer in Turkey and in the Middle East.
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much. We want to reverse this flow. We are trying to use our
own treasures. We turn towards Turkey, and they (the Turks)
turn towards the West. In the end, we meet in the middle.
The letter A in Azize-A refers to the initial of the Turkish word Abla,
which means elder sister. Azize -A is like her equivalents Sister Soulj ah (a member
of Public Enemy between 1990 and 1992) and Schwester-S (a German woman
rapper). A.zize-A adds a crucial meaning to rap:
Rap sends subliminal messages to the people. I want to explain
to the people (German and Turkish) that the Turkish woman
has many other values and talents. I want to demonstrate that
we are not sitting at home and doing house-work all day. I also
attempt to erase the question of "are we Turkish or German?",
and announce that we are multi-kulti and cosmopolitan. I want
to show that we are no more sitting between the two chairs, we
have got a 'third chair' between those two chairs...
The whole process which is embodied by Azize-A and other German-Turkish
rappers illustrates the formation of cultural bricolage by modern diasporic
subjects. Cultural bricolage which is grounded on the lines of local-global,
'tradition' - 'translation', and past-present negates many of the ill-defined concepts
about the state of ethnic minority youths such as 'in-betweenness', 'lost
generation' and 'degenerated'. Negating the so-called state of 'in-betweenness',
Azize-A draws a new picture of the diasporic youth. Her insistence on
multiculturalism seems to be the main pillar of her politics of identity. She does
not invest in the cultural boundaries which imprison culture as a distinct, self-
contained and essentialist form. By stating that she wants to erase the question:
"are we Turkish or German?", she denies the classical understanding of culture
and reconfirms what Rosaldo (1989: 26) said: "cultures are learned, not
genetically encoded".
*	 *	 *
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To reiterate, rap has become the urban popular art of a remarkable
number of Turkish youths in Berlin. The Turkish rappers in Berlin are a
substantial constituent of the cli asporic cultural form developed by a considerable
amount of working-class Turkish youths. Using the traditional Turkish musical
genre as the source of their samples and having been guided by the traditional
Turkish minstrels in terms of lyrical structure, these contemporary minstrels, or
storytellers, tend to be the spokespersons of the Turkish diaspora. What Unal's
'Turkish community' attempts to provide is an informal network of
communications which will shape popular knowledge in a manner that contests
German nationalism and hegemony from within the Turkish diaspora. In this
sense, Turkish rappers do not merely constitute a form of protest like hippies and
punks, but also initiate a 'class politics' along the lines of Gramsci's notion of
'organic intellectuals'.
As organic cultural intellectuals, the rappers transform 'common-sense'
knowledge of oppression into a new critical awareness that is attentive not only to
ethnic but also to class contradictions. These organic intellectuals attempt to build
a 'historical bloc' -a coalition of oppositional groups united around counter-
hegemonic ideas- against the 'traditional elite' who try to 'manage consent' by
making domination appear natural, voluntary, and inevitable. The efforts by
Turkish rappers in Berlin to enter the mainstream by forming a 'Turkish
community' reflect their struggle to assemble a 'historical bloc' capable of
challenging the ideological hegemony of German cultural domination.
Furthermore, rap music, as a popular cultural form, becomes a powerful vehicle
which allows today's Turkish youth to gain a better understanding of their
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heritage and their present identities when official channels of remembering and
identity formation continually fail to meet their needs. What Azize-A calls the
'third chair' illustrates how the diasporic subject crosses over the cultural borders
and constructs a syncretic cultural identity. In his poem 'Doppelmann', Zafer
Senocak writes of his Germany as:
I carry two worlds within me
but neither one whole
they're constantly bleeding
the border runs
right through my tongue.'°'
The diasporic subject who is defined in this poem is someone
experiencing a constant tension between homelessness/rootlessness and diasporic
home. "The split", as Senocak states, "can give rise to a double identity. This
identity lives on the tension. One's feet learn to walk on both banks of the river at
the same time" (Suhr, 1989: 102). The discourses of the Turkish rappers in
Berlin, which I presented, affirm what Hall (1994) has pointed out that
contemporary diasporic identities are developed on two paramount dimensions:
universalism and particularism. The universalist axis refers us to the model of
interculturalism in the form of 'third space' -or 'process of heterogenesis', or
'third culture'- (Guattari, 1989; Bhabha, 1990; Featherstone, 1990). On the other
hand, the particularist axis presents the model of cultural essentialism. Cultural
identity of the diasporic subject is simultaneously grounded both on an
'archaeological' form that entails the rediscovery of an essential and historical
culture, and a 'retelling of the past' that claims the production of a positional,
situational and contextual cultural identity. In other words, the whole question of
101Quoted in Suhr (1989: 102).
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diasporic cultural identity is a tense interaction between essence and politics, and
between 'Tradition' and 'Translation'.
This chapter has also displayed that the music of the diaspora constitutes a
philosophical discourse because they reject "the modern, occidental separation of
ethics and aesthetics, culture and politics" (Gilroy, 1993: 38). The musical genre
of the diaspora is, at the same time, the indication of the emergence of a global
culture which transcends national boundaries. This new notion of global culture
contradicts the conventional notion of culture which is thought to be territorial,
and belonging to nations, regions and localities (Smith, 1990, 1995). The nature
of the existing culture is syncretic. This 'cultural syncreticism' is facilitated by
global capitalism, which disrupts the national boundaries. The emergence of
modern diasporic cultures and identities "underscores the fact that we must learn
to work with the concept of culture in new ways that are capable of somehow
operating against its own inner character, which was defined long ago by the
notions of rootedness, stasis, and fixity that are intrinsic to its original meanings in
the fields of crop management and animal husbandry" (Gilroy, 1995: 18).
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has explored four inter-related theoretical concepts: diasporic
consciousness, diasporic youth, globalisation and cultural bricolage with reference
to the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth. This work primarily suggests that the
contemporary diasporic consciousness is built on two contradictory axes:
particularism and universalism. The presence of this dichotomy derives from the
unresolved historical dialogues that the diasporic communities experience between
continuity and disruption, essence and positionality, tradition and translation,
homogeneity and difference, past and future, 'here' and 'there', 'roots' and
'routes', and local and global (cf., interalia, Clifford, Hall, Gilroy, Cohen and
Vertovec).
By the same token, it should also be stated that the particularist
constituents of diaspora identities such as inheritance, tradition, religion and
ethnicity are all deferred and altered in the diaspora as spiritual, cultural and
political metaphors. Hence, losing their essentialist nature, these particularist
constituents are put into play by the diasporic subject as key ingredients for a
politics of identity. For instance, the idea of 'going back to basics' among the
working-class Turkish diasporic youth is, in fact, a counterculture of self-defence.
As we saw, Neco's attempt to reify the Ottoman past in his paintings as the very
essence of his Turkishness is, by and large, a fiction or a form of mimicry which is
far from essentialism, because what we call Ottoman culture does not have a fixed
essence in the sense that Neco is referring to. Contrarily, the Ottoman culture was
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a hybrid culture which was comprised of Turkish, Roman, Greek, Sejuk, Arabic
and Persian components.
Secondly, this work has claimed that the processes of cultural identity
formation among the working-class Berlin-Turkish male hip-hop youth have
principally revolved around their attempt to form a diasporic consciousness. The
working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youths are active agents in the construction
and articulation of the diasporic consciousness. Being raised in Kreuzberg, which
I presented in this work as a prototype of diasporic space (Kleines Istanbul), these
youths have created a new home there as well as an identity grounded in more
than one location: Berlin and Turkey. Kreuzberg as a diasporic space has
provided these ethnic minority youths with a symbolic wall or fortress protecting
them against racialisation, unemployment, misrepresentation, exclusion and
discrimination. Accordingly, the sense of being a member of a 'different' people
with historical roots and destinies outside the time/space of the 'host' nation
provides them with a distinction and pride.
The third key term that I have considered is globalisation, which appears
here as an individual consciousness of the global situation. The conslruction of
modern diasporic consciousness does not merely depend upon the rigid
incorporation regimes of the country of settlement, it also owes a lot to
globalisation. The wide networks of communication and transportation between
German-Turks and Turkey play a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of
a diasporic identity among the transnational communities. The modern circuitry
connects the diasporic youth both to the homeland and to the rest of the world.
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This is the reason why it becomes much easier for them to live on 'both banks of
the river' at the same time. Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin, as explored in this
work, exemplify a growing stream, of what Brecher et al. (1993) have called
'globalisation from below'. This constitutive entanglement has become a
characteristic of modern diaspora networks. The expansion of economic, cultural
and political networks between German-Turks and Turkey, for instance, points to
this growing stream. In the context of the diasporic condition, 'globalisation from
below' refers to the enhancement of the access of transnational migrants and their
descendants to those social, cultural, political and economic mechanisms which
enable them to transcend the conditions imposed upon them by the transnational
capitalism which is organising them into a system of international and hierarchical
division of labour. To put it differently, diasporic consciousness enables the
diasporic subject to overcome the limitations and oppression of the global
capitalism.
The fourth crucial concept that I explored throughout the thesis is
cultural syncreticism, or cultural bricolage. It is globalisation that gives birth to
the processes of cultural bricolage among the diasporic youth. What emerges out
of this cultural syncreticism is what we might call 'third space' or 'third culture'
(cf. Bhabha, 1990). As I demonstrated in the previous chapters, these 'third
cultures', that are formed in the 'border zones' and that Azize-A called 'third
chair', might contribute to the disruption of the conventional binarism of 'migrant
culture' versus 'host culture'. Thus, knowing that such new cosmopolitan forms,
or 'glocalised' identities, spring from presumed discrete cultural traditions, we
might open ourselves up to a relationship that transcends us, that exists beyond
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and apart from us instead of fully explaining and assimilating the other, thereby
reducing her/him to our world.
Among other things, Berlin-Turkish youth, who simultaneously
experience various life-worlds, also acquire a multicultural competence to behave
appropriately in a number of different social spaces. There are linguistic, social
and cultural borders between their distinct life-worlds, which I presented in
Chapter 4 as youth centre, street, school and household. These youngsters always
have to translate and negotiate within and between these rigidly defined spaces.
Accordingly, diasporic youths construct their cultural identities in the intersection
line of these separate social spaces, or in what Rosaldo (1989) calls 'border
zones'.
The aesthetics of diaspora such as rap music and literature which are
produced within the Turkish diaspora might give us some clue about the
characteristics of these newly emerging cosmopolitan and transnational third
cultures: for instance, 'Oriental' rap as a form of popular art is produced through
a blend of particularist and universalist constituents such as the mix of traditional
Turkish samples and lyric structures with an Afro-American drum-computer
rhythm. This unique form of cultural bricolage in the context of the Turkish
diasporic youth negates those conventional and stereotypical assumptions made
by many scholars on the descendants of transnational migrants, which are, for
instance, 'caught betwixt and between', 'lost generation', 'inbetween',
'acculturated' and 'assimilated'.
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As far as the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth is concerned,
the stereotyped definitions of German-Turkish youth made by various scholars
have been disproved by the youths themselves. The terms such as 'deculturated'
and 'culturally impoverished', which have been attributed to the descendants of
transnational migrants undermine the increasing impact of global
interconnectedness and symbolic links between the subject and the homeland.
Rather, these youngsters are subject to an enriched condition, which springs from
being both inside and outside the West, or from what Du Bois called 'double
consciousness'. The state of 'double consciousness' conjures up the very nature
of diasporic identity, i.e. particularism and universalism.
This fruitful objectivity of the diasporic youth can also be explicable
through Georg Simmel's notion of 'stranger'. The stranger is a constitutive
element of the group itself -an element that is both inside and outside the group.
The stranger develops a unity of closeness and remoteness in her/his human
relationships: as Simmel (1971/1908: 143) pointed out, the distance within this
relation indicates that one who is close by becomes remote, but his/her
strangeness indicates that one who is remote becomes near. Although the stranger
is excluded, and distances himself/herself, from the receiving society, s/he imports
qualities into it, which do not spring from the group. Accordingly, his/her distance
to the group itself enables him/her to develop an objectivity.
Yet, the diasporic cultural identity of the Turkish hip-hop youth is not
only limited to the state of 'double consciousness', it goes beyond this factual
predicament. These youngsters construct and articulate a state of what I call
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double diasporic consciousness in their imagery. This consciousness springs from
the double migration experience of their parents, which they encountered both in
Turkey and in Germany. As I outlined in Chapter 6, this double diasporic
consciousness has become evident in the youths' expressive culture. Arabesk and
hip-hop are the two major cultural forms which the Turkish hip-hop youth
employed to express their own 'double diasporic condition'.
Additionally, this work has brought to attention ways in which a diaspora
can be created through cultural artefacts and a shared imagery which symbolically
connect the diaspora to homeland. As I demonstrated in the case of the rap group
Islamic Force (see Chapter 6), MC Boe-B tries to develop an imaginary intimate
relationship with his people in Kadikoy, Istanbul. This corresponds to an
important fact of the world we live in today: many persons on the globe live in
what, extending Benedict Anderson (1983), Arjun Appadurai has called 'imagined
worlds' (1990: 296-97). Such 'imagined worlds' which are constituted by the
historically situated imaginations of persons and groups can, in some cases,
demonstrate the fact that diaspora might also be an imaginary fiction as well as an
actual condition.
This study has also examined Turkish migratory processes; incorporation
regimes of , the Federal Republic of Germany; ethnic-based political participation
strategies of Turkish migrants; notions of ethnic minorisation and culturalisation;
features and discontents of multiculturalism in the city of Berlin; Turkish ethnic
associations; and cultural identity of the middle-class Berlin-Turkish youths. All of
these complex issues have been raised to comprise a competent theoretical ground
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in order to formulate the major components of the modern diasporic identity. In
addition to this, it was concluded that modern diasporic identities are historically
conditioned according to the patterns of migratory processes in question, to the
immigration policies of 'host' states, 	 to the transnational networks of
communication and transportation, and to the conscious intervention of social
actors. It was also demonstrated that, creating a community consciousness,
diaspora discourse constructs a network of solidarity and confinement among
lransnational migrants and their descendants. In this sense, diasporic discourse
appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, migrant and minority
strategies.
Modern diaspora identities are those that are constantly producing and
reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference. They are
not defined by essence or purity, but by the recognition of heterogeneity,
diversity, divergence, multiplicity and syncreticism. This is why I have refrained
myself from locating the Turkish diasporic youth in a continuous space between
diaspora and homeland without reinscribing an ideology of cultural difference. In
this sense, the notion of diaspora conveys an identity that is not a fixed,
essentialist and authorised totality, but is always in a constant process of change
and transformation. Accordingly, this work has outlined the whole question of
identity as a matter of politics and process, but not of essence and inheritance.
Although it was phrased that modern diasporic identities have been grounded on
both essentialist and situationalist pillars, it was made clear that the essence, in the
final analysis, has become a principal source of identity politics for the
transnational migrants and their descendants.
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Hence, the diasporic cultural identity of the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth
corresponds to a particular time and space. It delimits itself within this certain
time and space. It is highly unlikely that we will see a similar snapshot of these
youngsters in the near future, representing their cultural identity. However, the
future generations will carry on forming new identities and 'third cultures' which
transcend conventional binarism and dominant regimes of representation.
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